September 25, 2008

THE MILITARY PARADIGM – WELL-ENSCONCED

IN THE HEART OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT

THE MILITARY PARADIGM – CHARACTERISTICS

hALLMARK fEATURE: The hallmark of the military paradigm is a narrowing of the range of available choices. It is a logic whose every step admits of only one choice – that choice which leads closer to war. The invariable conclusion is that war is necessary and inevitable – under pretexts such as national defense, national security, the national interest or military necessity.

Throughout the ages, as populations have been inculcated with this pattern of thought, and adopt it unconsciously, millions have died, while ruling groups have enhanced their own privileged position of office or wealth.

The ruling Group: The national “ruling group” consists of an elite, privileged minority which directs the nation’s production, controls the use of the nation’s major means of production, controls the use of the nation’s major means of destruction, and uses wars to consolidate or augment its power to command, its income, or both.

The connection between the ruling group and war is the one which needs to be understood. The ruling group’s systematic denial of alternative national options, provides cover for its hidden agenda. National ruling groups help each other across national boundaries.

In 2007, Peter Phillips traced the constellation of interlocking public-private partnerships through which the United States’ leadership class is able to dominate the nation’s decision-making process. Included in this constellation are the corporate media, public relations firms, military contractors, policy elites, and government officials – all with an agenda of worldwide military control by the United States, an agenda which is indeed now, the nation’s own. The leadership class decides, facilitates action, and gains from this agenda.

Phillips lists the organizations through which the leadership class advocates for its agenda of worldwide military control. These include the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for Security Policy (CSP), the Defense Policy Board (DPB), the Heritage Foundation (HF), the Hoover Institute (HO), the Hudson Institute (HU), the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Manhattan Institute (MI), the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), the National Security Council (NSC), the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and the President’s Foreign Advisory Board (Team B) (Phillips 2007, pp. 169 and 190).

Assumptions: The military paradigm has six major assumptions:

1. War is homicide: The military paradigm assumes that the military form of war, in which humans are the enemy, is the only possible type of war. This assumption negates all the other wars which humans wage (many to their evolutionary advantage) in which the enemy is not human. Such wars include those against pathogens, disease-bearing pests, weeds, toxic pollutants, illiteracy, official lies, civil corruption, tyranny, intolerance, poverty, and even war itself.

Arguments used to control the “monster” of (military) war, such as “just war,” “moral means” arguments, and strategic analysis calculations aimed at maximizing the payoffs for one’s own side, all accept automatically, without scrutiny, the assumption that war is always against humans.

2. Total Destruction of the Enemy: In theory, even the military paradigm admits a gradation in the value assigned to the enemy – from no value (hence an intent to destroy him completely) to some value (hence an intent to inflict on him as few casualties as possible), to subjugation only (hence an intent to kill only the segment of his population which resists domination), to valuing him as a just opposition, for instance, to keep the world in balance (with, even then, the intent to annihilate him completely).

Traditionally, however, the first option, total destruction of the enemy, has been the choice. International wars today are confined to this option. The historical trend has been toward ever more efficient means of destroying completely the enemy and the means of his livelihood.

3. The Army serves the ruling Group: The military paradigm assumes that national security is served through mass-homicide aggression. The fact is that this is a myth imposed and perpetuated throughout the ages by human ruling groups whose personal interests have been advanced by it.

Hiding behind a pretended commonality, elicited by such words as “patriotism,” and “national defense,” or by some high human value, such as “fighting for freedom,” is a conflict of interest between the national ruling group and ordinary citizens. The ruling group benefits from war, whereas ordinary citizens pay for it with their money and their lives.

War helps members of the ruling group continue in positions of authority despite domestic dissatisfaction (which is re-directed toward an external enemy), make extravagant profits from the manufacture of weapons (especially during national arms races), and gain directly from the seizure of foreign lands, markets, resources, strategic sites and/or labor pools.

Ordinary citizens do not realize that their national enemy is the military paradigm itself, not the latest external enemy which the ruling group dangles in front of their eyes.

4. The “tribal a priori”: The military paradigm assumes that only one side in the conflict has material interests and unassailable morality. This side is one’s own – that is, the side on which the author has been placed by the circumstance of either national or allied citizenship. Only the material interests and moral assumptions of this side need be taken into consideration. The enemy is defined as barbaric, predatory, immoral, evil, and in general, understanding force only.

The bias toward one’s own side is revealed by the use of value-loaded terms, the truth of which is not substantiated but simply assumed – for example, describing one’s own side as “free and democratic,” and the enemy’s side as a “totalitarian dictatorship.”

5. The Enemy is motivated most effectively by Fear: The military paradigm assumes that there is only one type of human personality, one which is motivated most effectively by fear of physical harm, and controllable only by punitive authority.

This assumption denies the infinite number of forms and shades of human personalities, each one of which offers an opportunity for choice, and consequently, a judgment which can lead to non-military war (one in which the enemy is not human). The assumption of only one type of human personality, however, is so taken for granted, that its affirmation is declared “realistic,” and its negation, automatically dismissed as “naïve.”

6. Kill-capacity IS A SIGN OF GREATNESS: The military paradigm measures excellence in war by the ability to kill and mutilate efficiently masses of human beings. Kill-capacity is a source of national pride.

The ability to kill with methodical coldness is achieved in army recruits through immersion in indoctrination, obedience conditioning, and the imposition of uniformity in all aspects of life (“boot-camp methods”). The goal is the elimination of all individuality and choice.

The army has its own autonomous technological development program whose scientific telos is ever-more destructive homicidal weapons.

Society provides its moral sanction by enshrining as a supreme ethical good, the sacrifice of one’s life for military goals.

(McMurtry 1989, summarized in Hall 2008, pp. 1-45).

The military paradigm – AS expressed by Michael Klare

Michael Klare’s Book: The book by Michael Klare, Rising powers, shrinking planet – the new geopolitics of energy (2007) exemplifies the assumptions of the military paradigm, even in someone highly committed to peace. Michael Klare is the director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, Amherst, MA.

The following are Klare’s assumptions.

1. War is homicide: Klare assumes that power struggles and wars between nations are military in nature, without putting this type of (military) war in the context of other types of wars which are, or could be, waged by humans. To Klare, war is synonymous with mass homicide.

This narrowing of choice of enemy to a human enemy, automatically rules out of consideration all types of war in which the enemy is not human – such as, for instance, poverty, the slums which are mushrooming in the world, water scarcity, the explosive growth of the world’s population, the causes and consequences of global warming, the mechanization of humans by machines, the myth of the “promised land” which sustains corporate globalization, the infantile delusion of omnipotence which surely must drive a nation to want to dominate all other nations, or even the mind-set which accepts the killing and maiming of others as a way to resolve problems.

Klare does not consider such other choices. It is not that he considers such choices, and then rejects them. It is that Klare’s framework of reference simply does not include choices for war other than mass-homicide.

Klare quotes the then recently-appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, addressing reporters during a Pentagon meeting, in October 2007:

“As a country, we’re just going to have to devote more resources to national security, in the world that we’re living in right now.”

Klare finds the statement “alarming” because such added military expenditure would preclude the size of the investment in new forms of energy which is necessary to transition from the existing energy infrastructure to one based on alternative fuels. This would spell a global catastrophe. To Klare, this is a weighing of two types of expenses. It is not a disagreement with the statement on the basis that mass killing is unethical

(pp. 239-240 and 323).

2. Total Destruction of the Enemy: There is no evidence that Klare considers the options of assigning some value to the enemy, such as by mentioning inflicting as few casualties as possible, subjugating the enemy instead of destroying him completely, or valuing his resistance as providing the opportunity to redress the lop-sided balance of power in the world.

3. THE ARMY SERVES THE RULING GROUP:

a. The Army backs the Ruling Group: Klare admits openly that the military serves the powerful:

The Middle East: “Soon after Chevron and other U.S.-based companies began to seek access to Caspian oil and gas reserves, Moscow began to take a significant interest in the region. At first, Russian authorities seemed most concerned about the conspicuous presence of American firms – and their government backers . . . ” (pp. 128-129. Bold mine).

Africa: “Because of its tortured history, Africa lacks the sorts of defenses against foreign resource exploitation that other previously colonized regions have established over time . . . [In 2007], President George W. Bush announced the formation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) . . . Today, giants like Exxon- Mobil and Chevron view West Africa as one of their most important future sources of crude oil . . .”

“American firms are especially attracted to West Africa’s far offshore production sites [which, because of their location away from local communities, will enable them to avoid the problems encountered onshore, such as the Niger Delta area of Nigeria].”

“As has been the case in the Caspian Basin, . . . American firms seeking new energy assets in Africa have been spurred on and assisted by successive U.S. administrations . . .” (pp. 147, 148-149 and 157-158. Bold mine).

The Persian Gulf: “It has long been America’s intention to exercise ultimate control over this vital region [the Persian Gulf], the repository of 2/3 of the world’s known petroleum reserves. So extensive is the U.S. economic and military presence [there] that some observers have described it as an ‘American lake’” (p. 177. Bold mine).

b. National ruling Groups help each Other: Klare admits openly that the ruling classes help each other across national boundaries:

The Middle East: “Nursultan Nazarbayev, the autocratic president of Kazakhstan, has been a much-lauded guest in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, [and] has been showered with arms and other military equipment by all three” (p. 10).

Africa:

i. “The [Bush] administration has . . . stepped up arms aid and counter-insurgency training . . . to bolster the [oil-producing African] states’ capacity to suppress rebellion and strife . . .” (p. 160. Bold mine).

ii. “The Department of Defense has quickened the pace of arms transfers and military aid, in a struggle . . . to win the loyalty of major energy producers” (p. 174. Bold mine).

iii. “If poverty alleviation is not a likely outcome of major foreign resource projects, the prospects are no better for the alleviation of internal violence. By increasing the flow of illicit wealth to elites that collect the ‘rents’ from oil, gas, and mineral production, such projects inevitably fuel resentment – and, in many cases, rebellion or violent attack – from those who feel unjustly deprived of any benefits. Adding to the prospective flames, the leading energy-consuming nations have tried to protect access to vital materials by providing arms and military training to the armed forces of their primary suppliers, thereby encouraging the rulers of these countries to rely on brute force rather than compromise and inclusion, when dealing with any group that seeks a greater share of oil or mineral revenues” (p. 176. Bold mine).

Saudi Arabia: “[Endeavors such as] the deployment of a U.S. military training mission in Saudi Arabia, and the delivery [to that country] of billions of dollars’ worth of advanced munitions . . . [are] largely intended to bolster ongoing relations between energy-consuming countries and the producing countries’ often dominant military elites” (p. 212. Bold mine).

c. The Poor are the losers: Klare admits openly that the poor are the losers:

The Middle East: “The big losers, of course, are ordinary citizens . . . who will continue to be excluded from most of the benefits of instant energy wealth. This kind of exclusion, in turns, fuels the rise of anti-government movements, and, in some areas, radical Islamic organizations. So far, the ruling elites of the Central Asian and Caspian states have been able to muzzle the most potent expressions of population discontent through systematic repression, and, when necessary, brutal application of lethal force . . .” (p. 143. Bold mine).

Africa: “[One of the attractions of Africa, is that] Africans consume [very little oil and gas themselves], and so most of what they are capable of producing [is] available for export . . . Few of those living in Africa’s resource-producing countries will see any significant benefit from the depletion of their continent’s natural bounty” (p. 150. Bold mine).

The Persian Gulf: “It was to escape the Gulf’s chronic instability that so many nations set out to ‘diversify’ their sources of crude oil, in the 1990’s . . .” (p. 178. Bold mine).

4. The “tribal a priori”: The difference in tone and content between Klare’s description of the actions of the United States – his side – and his description of the “Other,” is dramatic.

a. The Middle East:

i. The United States:

“The regularity with which [American leaders have chosen] to apply, or threaten to apply, force [needs to be underscored]. The first was the ‘reflagging’ of Kuwaiti tankers and their protection by U.S. naval vessels [from 1987 to 1989] during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988; [then] the first Gulf War of 1990-1991; [then, the intermittent use of] air power against Iraq over the next decade-plus; [then] the invasion of Iraq, in March 2003” (p. 186. Wikipedia 2008 “The Tanker War,” pp. 1-3).

ii. The “Other”:

“American forces are still at war in Iraq. They face a kaleidoscope of threats, including a Sunni insurgency against the American occupation, a civil war among various Shiite militias, and violent criminal activity.”

“Under present circumstances, the insurgency and civil strife are incapable of endangering the flow of oil much beyond Iraq itself. Within that country, of course, they have proved exceedingly capable of inflicting enormous damage. Through systemic (sic) attacks on pipelines, refineries, pumping stations, and other components of the country’s vital energy infrastructure, the insurgents (and their criminal accomplices) have largely managed to keep Iraq’s net petroleum output below already low pre-invasion levels” (pp. 186-187. Bold mine).

Considering this history of constant aggression by the United States, for Klare to say that the American forces in Iraq “face a kaleidoscope of threats” from, among others, “violent criminal activity,” and “insurgents and their criminal accomplices,” seems explainable only if the lenses are those of the self-serving military paradigm in which one’s own side monopolizes morality. The phrase “resistors to foreign intervention and exploitation,” is surely missing from the train of thought.

b. The Invasion of Iraq, 2003:

i. The United States:

“Ever since taking control of Baghdad in April 2003, the Bush administration has vigorously sought to influence the reshaping of Iraq’s national oil legislation, hoping to increase the opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the development of that country’s mammoth petroleum reserves” (p. 25).

ii. The “Other”:

“Many [U.S.] legislators are especially troubled by America’s expanding dependency on petroleum imports from that perennial site of conflict and terrorism, the Middle East” (p. 26. Bold mine).

Considering that from 2003 to 2007, approximately one million Iraqis died, and 5 millions were displaced (2 million externally and 3 million internally) as a result of the war, out of a total population of 24 million, Klare’s description of Iraq as a perennial site of conflict and terrorism, seems explainable only within the military paradigm, where only one’s own side is relevant (Several references, summarized in Bugliosi 2008, pp. 227 and 268-269).

c. An Air Assault on Iran:

i. The United States:

“Nuclear concerns aside, Iran is also a significant worry for American strategists because it has deployed numerous anti-ship missiles and other weapons along the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, through which an estimated 17 million barrels of oil are carried by tanker every day. In case of some future crisis – perhaps a U.S. air assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities – . . .” (p. 190. Bold mine).

ii. The “Other”: In the view of most people, and certainly the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (1945-1946), an air assault on another country’s nuclear facilities (which could produce a massive radiation disaster throughout the world), would not be considered a “crisis” but a war of aggression, and as such:

“not only an international crime, [but] the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole” (Quoted in Cryer 2007, p. 267, and in McMurtry undated, p. 2. Wikipedia 2008 “Nuremberg Trials,” p. 1).

d. Plans for a War of Aggression against Iran:

i. The United States:

“[President Bush has approved] a range of [possible] military actions against Iran . . . from limited, ‘surgical’ strikes on nuclear installations and selected military bases in Iran . . . to a sustained air campaign against a broad range of Iranian military and government facilities” (pp. 190-191).

ii. The “Other”:

“Whatever the scale of such an attack, the Iranians are likely to respond with retaliatory measures of their own . . . Even in the face of these myriad dangers, it is unlikely that the United States . . . will abandon the basic, long-term premise of U.S. policy in the Gulf: oil protection” (p. 191. Bold mine).

In view of this aggressive stand on the part of the United States, for Klare to say that the United States faces a “myriad dangers,” is compatible with no other paradigm than the military one, in which the interests of only one’s own side are perceived.

d. The “Other” in Energy-producing Regions:

i. “To enhance their competitive stances vis-à-vis one another, energy-deficient countries may . . . [deploy troops] to unstable energy-producing regions” (p. 7. Bold mine).

ii. “James Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense, 1973-1975, and Secretary of Energy, 1977-1979] bluntly testified, in 2005”:

“‘We shall not end dependence on imported oil, nor, what is the hope of some, end dependence on the volatile Middle East.’”

“Indeed . . . President Bush . . . accelerated U.S. military efforts to dominate the Persian Gulf area . . .” (p. 29. Bold mine).

iii. “Because the Al Qaeda networks responsible for the attacks were based in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and maintained ties to violent Islamic groups operating in Central Asian states, U.S. relations with the Caspian nations were significantly militarized by 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror” (p. 126. Bold mine).

iv. “President Bush . . . [suspected] that American intervention in the region would lead to increased turmoil in the Persian Gulf” (p. 127. Bold mine).

v. “Perhaps the greatest danger in this Muslim-majority region, is that opponents of the prevailing Caspian regimes will be drawn to extremist Islamic movements . . .” (p. 143. Bold mine).

vi. “Another energy-related peril [for the United States] linked to internal instability in the Caspian states, is the possibility that the major external powers will take opposing sides in local or regional disputes to protect their investments, and then collide with one another militarily” (p. 144. Bold mine).

vii. “American officials are deeply concerned about the potential for violent social and political unrest due to the endemic corruption, economic inequity, and misallocation of petroleum wealth in [energy-producing areas of West Africa], that will, in turn, lead to violence that could endanger the steady outflow of oil and natural gas” (p. 159. Bold mine).

viii. “Even if the insurgents in Iraq are unable themselves to threaten U.S. interests elsewhere in the region, the ongoing conflict in that country has emboldened Islamic extremists in neighboring lands . . . [On May 1, 2004, in Saudi Arabia], gunmen killed five . . . Four weeks later, . . . a group of armed militants stormed a residential compound . . . and killed 22. On February 23, 2006, . . . suicide attackers broke through the outer defense perimeter of the Abqaiq oil-processing facility . . . The risk of future terrorist assaults [remains] high” (pp. 188-189. Bold mine).

ix. “The Iranians are . . . said to be . . . aiding . . . militant groups in the region [around Iraq], including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip” (p. 190. Bold mine).

x. “In January 2008, . . . five armed Iranian speedboats . . . maneuvered aggressively . . .” (p. 191. Bold mine).

xi. “[A] range of challengers [China, India, Japan, Russia] has arisen at a time when America’s own position in the Gulf is under assault from insurgents in Iraq . . .” (p. 209. Bold mine).

xii. “No one in recent times has had to contend with a world of many aggressive powers competing for increasingly scarce and valuable resources on a global basis – often in regions that are inherently unstable and already on the edge of conflict” (p. 237. Bold mine).

xiii. “China and the United States possess only limited natural gas reserves, and so would once again face the prospect of competition over imports from unstable, potentially hostile areas of the planet” (p. 250. Bold mine).

5. The Enemy is motivated most effectively by Fear: Klare describes the United States’ policy toward Iran. He gives no evidence of disagreeing with this approach of intimidation.

a. Scaring Iran by destroying Iraq and Afghanistan:

“[In the spring and summer of 2007], the Bush administration deployed two aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, along with dozens of other warships and hundreds of combat aircraft, in an undisguised attempt to intimidate Iran . . . Both [carriers] also participated in combat-support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of them, the USS John C. Stennis, alone launching 7,900 air sorties and dropping nearly 90,000 pounds of bombs on the two countries” (p. 220. Bold mine).

Not giving any evidence of a negative reaction to this intentional carnage of small nations, Klare continues:

“Photographs and videos of the May 2007 combined-carrier operations . . . show the most impressive concentration of naval firepower deployed in these waters since the onset of the Iraq invasion in March 2003 . . . These naval deployments . . . represent a form of constant psychological pressure on the Tehran government, adding teeth to the threats issued on a regular basis by Vice-president Cheney, President Bush, and other senior administration figures” (pp. 220-221 and 318. Bold mine).

b. Scaring Iran with words: “In an [October 2007] speech eerily reminiscent of the scare tactics used by the Bush administration in preparing the way for an invasion of Iraq, Vice-president Dick Cheney [warned] Tehran of the risks of non-compliance with American demands”:

“‘The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose serious consequences. The United States joins other nations in sending a clear message. We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon’” (p. 190. Bold mine).

c. Punishing Iran:

“[As of early 2008], some officials [in Washington] favored intensive diplomacy and the imposition of sanctions, and others advocated the use of force . . .” (p. 190. Bold mine).

6. Kill-capacity is a sign of Greatness (OR AT LEAST, ENTITLEMENT): Klare subscribes to the idea that might is right.

a. “Cheap oil had . . . fueled the global ascendancy of the United States, which seemed to reach its apogee in 1991, with the disappearance of the one other superpower of that epoch, the Soviet Union. Barely a decade later . . . though still confident of its military superiority, the United States was faced with an imminent shrinkage in global oil supplies, at the same time it was growing more reliant on . . . unfriendly (or unreliable) foreign suppliers . . .” (p. 2).

b. “Ever since the early Cold War era, American leaders have believed that, as a matter of strategic necessity, the United States must exercise ultimate control over the flow of Persian Gulf energy, both to preserve unhindered American access to vital petroleum supplies, and ensure that this country – and this country alone – had its hands on the world’s principal oil spigot” (p. 180. Bold mine).

c. “Despite all of the bloodshed, misery and chaos in Iraq . . . American elites believe it to be more important than ever that the United States exercise ultimate dominion over the region” (p. 182. Bold mine).

d. “Over the years, the occasions when American leaders have brought military force to bear in the Gulf, came to dominate the American political landscape . . .” (p. 186. Bold mine).

michael Klare – A CRITIQUE

KLARE’S CONCLUSIONs: Michael Klare’s conclusions follow from his assumptions. I take up four points with which I disagree – Klare’s solution to the conflict over oil and resources, his omission of the poor in this solution, his reassurances to the rich, and his callousness toward future generations.

1. A SIMPLE SOLUTION: Klare’s solution to the present conflict over energy resources, is not commensurate, either in magnitude or in level of complexity, with the problem as he describes it.

Klare goes to great lengths to show the seriousness of the world’s present energy situation, and the dire consequences of not acting to change the present conflictual trend.

Compared to such warnings, however, Klare’s solution is single-faceted and painfully obvious – a partnership between the United States and China, followed by similar partnerships between other countries.

There seems no doubt that if we could change our orientation from competition to cooperation, many international conflicts would be amenable to solutions. The issue is, how to get there – an issue which Klare does not raise.

a. The Problem – Conflict: Klare describes our present predicament as dire:

i. “‘Resource nationalism,’ [is] defined as the management of energy flows, in accordance with vital state interests. [In the case of energy-deficit states, it refers] to efforts by leaders . . . to protect their national interests in a world of intense competition over the available pool of supply” (p. 23. Bold mine).

ii. “Two themes . . . predominate [in the United States Congress]: fear that global energy supplies will fall short of anticipated demand, and that the rising industrial powers of the developing world – with their booming economies, surging middle classes, and new automotive cultures – will trigger a brutal struggle for whatever energy there is” (pp. 26-27. Bold mine)

(“Michael Klare – A Critique,” “Klare’s Conclusions,” No. 1, “A simple Solution,” Item a. “The Problem – Conflict,” continued)

iii. “Over the past few years, Russia’s Gazprom has cut off the gas flow to Ukraine and threatened similar action against other former Soviet republics on its periphery, in a relentless drive for higher prices and greater influence, causing widespread anger and bitterness. As such maneuvers increase, and national humiliations build – while global energy stockpiles dwindle – even minor disagreements, disputes, and disparities anywhere on the planet, could provide the spark for serious conflagrations. Add in elements of national pride, irrationality, and simple miscalculation in tough or contested times, and you have the makings of a potentially fatal brew” (p. 31. Bold mine).

iv. “The struggle for control over key deposits of vital raw materials has gained participants almost by the month, as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Turkey, and other rapidly developing nations joined the fray. The resulting ‘Great Game’ over energy, with all its potential for rivalries, alliances, conflicts, schisms, betrayals, and flash points, will surely be a pivotal, if not the central, feature of world affairs for the remainder of this century” (p. 87. Bold mine).

v. “The Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia . . . are now the cockpit for a 21^st century energy version of the imperial ‘Great Game’ of the 19^th century . . . Virtually all the major energy-consuming nations have sought a foothold [there], while Russia . . . has worked to dominate the transportation and distribution of the region’s energy riches. The result has been a dangerous vortex of competitive pressures” (p. 115. Bold mine).

(“Michael Klare – A Critique,” “Klare’s Conclusions,” No. 1, “A simple Solution,” Item a. “The Problem – Conflict,” continued

vi. “The three-way struggle [by China, Russia and the United States] for geopolitical advantage, is militarizing the Caspian Basin, inundating the region with advanced arms, and an ever-growing corps of military advisers, instructors, technicians, and combat-support personnel . . . These programs . . . heighten traditional suspicions and rivalries that have long plagued the region. The Great Powers are not only adding tinder to possible future fires, but also increasing the risk that they will be caught in any conflagration” (pp. 217-218. Bold mine).

vii. “Preventing a complex struggle of this sort from erupting into unimaginable slaughter, calls for cool heads at the best of times; doing so when conditions begin to deteriorate, may exceed the capabilities of even the most lucid and accomplished leaders” (p. 237. Bold mine).

viii. “The danger that a minor clash over contested energy supplies might trigger an international conflagration, is not the only risk we face” (p. 238. Bold mine).

b. The Solution – Cooperation: Klare’s solution is a Sino-American Partnership, followed by an array of such partnerships among nations:

i. “At its core, [the demilitarization of energy procurement policies, and the rapid development of climate-friendly alternatives] require repudiating the zero-sum, ultra-nationalistic impulses that threaten to dominate energy policy in most major industrial nations, and replacing them with a collaborative approach to solving the world’s energy challenges . . . ”

ii. “Why start with the United States and China? Because they are the world’s top two consumers of energy . . .”

iii. “Thus, a Sino-American partnership aimed at developing climate-friendly alternative fuels, should be the starting point for a sane energy policy. Forging such a partnership will require disavowal of the view that a conflict between the United States and China over foreign energy supplies, is ‘inevitable’ – a view widely held in Washington ever since the 2005 UNOCAL fracas [when the state-controlled Chinese oil company, CNOOC Limited, announced, and then had to withdraw, an $18.5 billion bid for the UNOCAL Corporation, a 115-year-old American energy firm with substantial oil and natural gas reserves in North America and Asia]” (pp. 1, and 243-245. Bold mine).

My Opinion: In my opinion, such a partnership between China and the United States, followed by similar partnerships between other nations, is an incontrovertibly good suggestion, but also one which is monolithic and politically innocuous. Left unanswered are questions such as:

* How about the wide and widening gap between the rich and the poor in the world?

* How about those who will never be able to industrialize?

* How do we communicate to future generations to stay away from some parts of the earth (for fear of their lives), because we have stored there either carbon dioxide or nuclear waste?

* Will water scarcity be a more urgent issue than energy scarcity?

* Will genetic engineering, a nuclear holocaust, a viral mutation, a manufactured “life form,” or a robot out of control, put an end to nature as we know it – making the conflict over energy irrelevant?

* How can the ratio energy-in (EI) to energy-out (EO) of oil, and the convenience of oil, ever be matched by any other form of energy?

2. WHO WILL TAKE CARE OF THE POOR?: Klare describes unhesitatingly the exploitation of the poor by the moneyed elite. Yet nowhere does he suggest a change of course with regards to this trend. On the contrary, his solution – cooperative partnerships between high energy-using countries – omits entirely any focus on those whom oil will elude.

a. The Poor: Klare describes poverty and its reasons, without suggestions for remedies:

i. The Caspian Basin: “What will all these efforts to exploit the Caspian Basin’s energy reserves mean for the region itself? In the short run, oil and natural gas output will rise, exports will increase, and vast fortunes will flow into the bank accounts of the companies involved, and the local officials who control the allocation of energy revenues . . .”

“[For] the people of the region, . . . the answer is likely . . . environmental degradation and, for the most part, unrelieved poverty . . .”

“Several decades from now, when most of the Caspian’s remaining oil and gas reserves have been sucked from the earth, the new facilities now under construction will join [the oil rigs left from the 1890’s], which are today nothing but twisted hulks” (pp. 142, and 144-145. Bold mine).

ii. Africa: “As in previous centuries, resource-consuming nations will extract as much of Africa’s wealth – in this case, oil, gas, and minerals – as they can, often jostling with one another for access to the most prolific sources of supply. In doing so, they will repeatedly proclaim their deep interest in African development, insisting that the exploitation of raw materials will contribute to the improvement of living conditions for the masses of ordinary citizens. If past experience is any guide, however, few of those living in Africa’s resource-producing countries will see any significant benefit from the depletion of their continent’s natural bounty” (p. 150. Bold mine).

“And what do the Africans get out of all this? Except for thousands of holes in the ground, various large-scale environmental catastrophes, and a scattering of heavily guarded villas and Swiss bank accounts for well-connected elites, not very much. Despite the claim that large extractive projects, like oil pipelines and copper mines, will generate jobs and income for Africa’s impoverished masses, and wealth for nations, most ordinary Africans have yet to see – and may never see – any tangible benefit from all the foreign investment in hydrocarbon and mineral production” (p. 174. Underlined, Klare’s. Bold mine).

“The same distorted allocation of the costs and [of the] benefits, occurs throughout the continent, where unrelenting poverty for the majority remains the norm” (p. 175. Bold mine).

“Because oil is critical to modern transportation, a significant contraction in supply – and the attendant increase in price – will ripple through the global economy, boosting the cost of everything from manufactured goods, to foodstuffs, producing unrelieved misery for the poor, the elderly, and those on fixed incomes. For some – those unable to pay the higher prices of heating oil and food – the effects will be lethal” (p. 240. Bold mine).

b. The Rich: For the rich, Klare suggests economic growth and cooperation.

i. “Pre-eminent powers must move together toward a new industrial paradigm that posits economic growth while lowering the consumption of energy and other basic materials. As the world’s two leading resource consumers, the United States and China must take the lead in devising such strategies – and should do so, wherever practical, in a collaborative manner. But the benefits of their collaboration should be shared with other resource-consuming nations” (p. 255. Note the lack of mention of the poor).

ii. Klare suggest a transition from competition to cooperation, to develop new sources of energy and climate-friendly industrial processes (p. 261. See quote on the front cover of the present document. Note the lack of mention of the poor).

My Opinion: Klare’s plea for a “sane” energy policy, the last sentence in his book, is reproduced on the front cover of the present document.

We must, according to Klare, satisfy the basic needs of the major energy-consuming nations (the rich) so that they can face the future with confidence, and not either destroy parts of humanity through war, or unleash an environmental catastrophe. Klare sees the procurement of the energy needs of the United States and China as a Herculean task:

“In 2030, the United States and China will jointly consume an estimated 42 million barrels of oil per day, of which 27 million barrels, or 64 percent, will have to be imported. Of all the tasks facing American and Chinese leaders in the energy field, procuring this quantity of imported petroleum will prove the most Herculean” (pp. 245 and 249).

But after taking care of the rich, Klare stops short of taking care of the poor. In 2002, the total population of middle-income countries (per capita gross national income of $736-9,075) was 2,721 million, and the total population of high-income countries (per capita gross national income of $9,076 or more) was 942 million. The combined populations of middle- and high-income countries, therefore, was 3,662 million – that is, 59 percent of the world’s population, which was then 6,225 million.

Klare’s suggestion of satisfying the basic needs of rich countries, unaccompanied by any policy toward the poorer half of humanity, condemns the population of low-income countries (41 percent of humanity) to a poverty which may, by Klare own assessment, be so unrelieved as to be lethal:

“For some – those unable to pay the higher prices of heating oil and food – the effects will be lethal” (p. 240).

Klare does not so much as mention this poorer half of humanity, on whose back the wealth of high-income countries was built (pp. 240 and 245. United Nations, Human Development Report 2004, pp. 255 and 280).

3. There is no Guarantee, even for the Rich: Klare is optimistic that research can give us alternative energy sources which will replace oil. This optimism is unwarranted. My information leads me to the conclusion that humans will not switch from oil to other energy sources without a dramatic decline in the availability of energy, and in the convenience of this energy. When oil is depleted, even the energy-consuming nations will not have their “basic needs” satisfied. Oil was a one-time bonus which will not be repeated.

a. My Information – Oil and its Alternatives: As background information on alternative sources of energy, I have drawn on three sources:

i. Richard Heinberg, The party’s over – oil, war and the fate of industrial societies (2003). Heinberg is on the Core Faculty of New College of California, Santa Rosa, CA.

ii. Colin J. Campbell, AThe Imminent Peak of World Oil Production@ (1999), and AOil and troubled Waters,@ in Andrew McKillop, The final energy crisis (2005). Campbell is an oil exploration geologist, most recently founder of the (international) Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO).

iii. Peter van Wyck, Signs of danger – waste, trauma and nuclear threat (2005). van Wyck is on the faculty (in the area of communication) at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. His insights are particularly helpful with regard to the sequestration of carbon dioxide and the burial of nuclear waste.

Oil: If we count as 100 the span of time since oil was formed, then the time span since homo sapiens, modern humans, became fully evolved, would be 0.0006 on the scale.

Oil was formed between 145,000,000 and 95,000,000 years ago, during two short epochs of extreme global warming, when a prolific growth of algae overwhelmed the seas and lakes. This organic matter was buried underneath younger sediments, and, as it was heated by the Earth=s heat flow, became converted into the oil and gas we know today. The preservation of this oil and gas was particularly good in the rifts (such as the Red Sea and the North Sea) which developed as the continents (tectonic plates) separated. Homo sapiens became fully evolved 67,000 years ago (Campbell 2005, pp. 133-134. Campbell 1999, p. 2. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

Before 1950, oil imported into the United States had a ratio “Energy Recovered over Energy Invested (EROEI)” of 100:1. In 1995, the ratio was 10:1.

Natural Gas: Natural gas is not a renewable resource. It does not have the flexibility of oil for use in transportation.

Coal: Coal is not a renewable resource. Its impact on the environment is disastrous. To “sequester” the noxious gases produced from its use, without having any means to warn future generations to stay away from sequestering sites, is to doom them to stumble onto the sites, release the gases, and thereby cause disastrous global warming for their generation.

Oil Shale: The processing of the solid organic material (kerogen) contained in organic marlstone, requires large amounts of fresh water – a scarce resource, intrinsically more precious than oil.

Nuclear Power: Nuclear reactors are an environmental nightmare. Naturally-occurring uranium is 99 percent uranium-238 (“Depleted Uranium,” DU) which has a half-life of 4.5 billion years – the age of the earth. Plutonium-239, mostly artificially made, is one of the most poisonous materials known, and has a half-life of 24,000 years. As in the case of carbon dioxide sequestration, the burial of nuclear waste dooms future generations to pay for our follies. Nuclear power is not suited for either transportation or agriculture.

Wind: Wind is not suited for either transportation or agriculture.

Solar Power: Solar photovoltaic technology is not suited for either transportation or agriculture.

Hydro-electricity: Large dams are an environmental nightmare. Small dams rely on fresh water, itself a scarce resource.

Geothermal Power: Geothermal energy is not a renewable source of energy.

Tides and Waves: Tide and wave energy are an environmental nightmare.

Biomass: Energy from biomass – wood, animal waste, seaweed, peat, garbage and agricultural waste (such as sugar cane and corn stalks) – probably does not have much growth potential.

Bio-diesel: At present, the production of vegetable (palm and coconut) oil for use as a fuel, is a net energy loser. Extraction of oil from algae could yield a favorable energy ratio.

Ethanol The energy ratio of ethanol is in the vicinity of 1:1, meaning that the amount of energy recovered from it, is very close to the amount invested in its production.

Hydrogen: Hydrogen is not an energy source. The process of its production uses more energy than the energy the hydrogen yields. Hydrogen is an energy carrier.

(Heinberg 2003, summarized in Hall 2004a, pp. 11-17. Campbell 2005, pp. 133-134. Campbell 1999, p. 2; both of these sources summarized in Hall 2006, p. 1. van Wyck 2005, summarized in Hall 2005, pp. 1-16. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

b. Klare’s Optimism: The above information does not provide a basis for optimism about keeping the world’s energy consumption anywhere near what it is today. This seems in contrast with Klare’s position. Klare gives the impression that a sufficient investment in research will lead to a transition from non-renewable to renewable sources of energy, with life then able to continue pretty much as it is today, except for the type of fuel used.

Klare makes no mention of a decrease in consumption. He only says (as the second of the quotes which follow shows) that the expected increase in consumption is unlikely to be met.

If indeed, Klare’s view is that humans (or at least the rich) will be able to continue life as it is today, only with different sources of energy, then it is a view which partakes of the magical – Surely “they” (the unidentifiable, omnipotent scientists) will find us new sources of energy (Monbiot 2007, summarized in Hall 2007, p. 14).

The following quotes illustrate Klare’s conception of the coming energy transition:

“Government and corporate officials alike continue to view fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural gas) as the world’s principal energy source for some time to come . . . [There are] no practical, plentiful alternatives in sight” (p. 13. Bold mine).

“The worldwide requirement for primary energy is expected to rise by 57 percent between 2004 and 2030 . . . If renewable sources of energy and some of the new fuels now under development, were to become available on a large scale in the years just ahead, we might have some confidence that this mammoth increase in demand could somehow be met. At present, however, there is no reason to believe that this will occur. According to the latest Department of Energy projections, renewables, including old-style hydropower, will account for a mere 8 percent of world energy consumption in 2030, an insignificant increase over their current share . . . Oil, coal and natural gas [will continue to account for] 87 percent” (pp. 33-34. Bold mine).

“Government officials speak of their desire to develop novel sources of energy – biofuels, hydrogen, tidal power, and so on – but their actions suggest a deeply ingrained preference for more familiar fuels” (p. 49. Underlined and bold mine).

“The manufacture of ethanol . . . [from] corn kernels . . . consumes considerable energy . . . It will be decades before cellulosic ethanol is available on a large enough scale to replace petroleum liquids in a meaningful way . . . Wind and solar power . . . have never received the attention they deserve, and so are not near ready to replace coal and oil in the planet’s fuel diet. As a result, government officials will probably turn at first to more familiar sources, notably natural gas and nuclear power” (pp. 60-61. Underlined and bold mine).

“By all accounts, trillions of dollars will have to be invested in new energy forms to make the transition from the existing energy infrastructure to one based on alternative fuels” (p. 239. Bold mine).

“Averting catastrophe requires efforts to demilitarize energy procurement policies, and radically speed the development of climate-friendly alternatives” (p. 243. Bold mine).

“When it comes to the development of new motor fuels – a gigantic endeavor entailing immense expense and effort – cooperation will be a necessity . . . As the global supply of petroleum contracts, many substances will be considered as potential sources of liquid fuels. Those currently receiving the greatest attention, are natural gas, coal, ethanol, biodiesel and hydrogen [the latter as an energy ‘carrier’]” (pp. 249-251. Straight underlined Klare’s. Dotted underlined and bold mine).

“Virtually every serious proposal for reduced greenhouse gas emissions begins . . . with a plea for substantial reductions in coal consumption . . . But however eloquent and urgent [the] entreaties, [they] are unlikely to curb the appetite for coal in the United States and China, so long as affordable alternatives are unavailable. Hence, developing such alternatives should be a top priority for any collaboration” (p. 256. Bold mine).

“Reduced spending on military activities and increased investment in energy alternatives, would . . . unleash a wave of scientific and entrepreneurial innovation, generating the ideas, inventions, and production technologies that could lead us from the now-fading Petroleum Age to the new energy epoch that must follow” (p. 261. Bold mine).

My Opinion: In my opinion, missing from Klare’s discussion, is any analysis of:

* The level (if any) of reduction in energy consumption which will be imposed, either for the world as whole or for the presently high energy-consuming countries (which are the center of Klare’s focus).

In 2005, Andrew McKillop, founding member of the International Association of Energy Economics, Asian Chapter, predicted that by 2035, advanced societies are likely to have 35 percent of the commercial energy consumption they had in 2004 (McKillop 2005, p. 129, summarized in Hall 2006, p. 43).

* The lag time which would be required to make the transition, were a new fuel be available today. For instance, were hydrogen and the infrastructure to distribute it, be ready for use today, it would take several decades before all gasoline-consuming cars were replaced with hydrogen-consuming ones.

* The population which the earth could sustain at any given level of energy consumption.

In 1999, David Pimentel, at Cornell University, Department of Ecology, estimated that it would require at least three times the earth’s entire resources and physical area, to provide the world’s population with the material and energy consumed by an average North American citizen. This calculation was quoted, in 2005, by William Ross McCluney, Principal Research Scientist at the Florida Solar Energy Center, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL (Pimentel 1999, cited in McCluney 2005, pp. 177 and 182; summarized in Hall 2006, p. 17).

4. THE BURIAL OF Carbon dioxide and nuclear Waste:

a. Carbon dioxide: Klare is clear that he favors the sequestration of carbon dioxide emitted from coal burning. This conflicts with what my information leads me to conclude (See the present document under “Michael Klare – A Critique,” “Klare’s Conclusions,” No. 3, “There is no Guarantee, even for the Rich,” Item a. “Oil and its Alternatives – My Information,”).

Klare expresses his approval for carbon dioxide sequestration with certainty:

“Developing . . . alternatives [to coal] should be a top priority for any collaboration [between China and the United States]. To make progress in this area, the two countries must make major investments in developing and installing the technology to strip coal of its impurities, and burn it in such a manner that prevents the carbon content from combining with oxygen and escaping into the atmosphere. Two promising developments might address these challenges in whole or in part: the integrated gasification combined-cycle method of power generation (IGCC), and carbon capture and storage, also known as ‘carbon sequestration’ . . .”

“The widespread introduction of IGCC facilities alone would reduce carbon dioxide emissions when compared to existing coal-fired plants, but its true promise would be wasted if not wedded to . . . the sequestration of all excess carbon in secure underground storage sites, where it cannot escape into the atmosphere and contribute to global warming. As IGCC plants come on line, they must be equipped with devices to strip the excess carbon from the syngas [the combustible mixture of powdered coal, steam and oxygen] and channel it into storage facilities for eventual burial in secure underground sites, such as exhausted oil fields or emptied coal mines. Only when the carbon is buried in this manner, can coal be considered a safe or ‘clean’ source of energy” (pp. 256-257).

b. Nuclear Waste: Klare notes the problem with nuclear waste, but nevertheless seems to approve of it.

Klare’s words:

“Nuclear reactors raise the specter of accidents like those at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), along with the problem of long-lasting radioactive wastes that cannot safely be disposed of” (p. 50).

Klare goes on to quote President George W. Bush, to the effect that research will solve the problem:

“My energy plan directs the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency to use the best science to move expeditiously to find a safe and permanent repository for nuclear waste” (Bush, Remarks at Capital City Partnership, upon releasing the 2001 National Energy Policy, cited pp. 50 and 273).

Klare notes that the assurances contained in the President’s statement, were incorporated in the 2005 energy bill. He then moves on to another subject, leaving the reader with the impression that he agrees with the President (p. 50).

My Opinion: My objections to both carbon dioxide sequestration and the burial of nuclear waste, include moral and ethical issues, the unpredictability of the future, the certainty of accidents, the traumatizing effect of the threat of an accident, how to warn all cultures, how to warn future generations, and how to assign guilt if the repository is entered (van Wyck 2005, pp. xii, xiv, xx, 3, 5-6, 12-14, 20, 29, 46-48, 52, 54, 60, 73, 85-86, 102-103, summarized in Hall 2007, pp. 52-56. These pages from my “Global Warming – an Assessment of possible Solutions” are reproduced as Addendum I of the present document).

Peter van Wyck points out that a purely technical, pragmatic, security-centered approach to ecological threats (such as carbon dioxide and nuclear waste), leads to solutions which are equally technical and pragmatic – a marker for the burial site, probably consisting of a sign and a monument. There is no grief, no mourning. There is simply an installation that must be read correctly (van Wyck 2005, p. 76, summarized in Hall 2005, pp. 1-16).

Michel Foucault (1926- 1984), French historian and philosopher, writes in his book, The order of things – an archaeology of the human sciences (1966):

“The sign does not wait in silence for the coming of a man capable of recognizing it. It can be constituted only by an act of knowing.” (Foucault, cited in van Wyck 2005, p. xiv; summarized in Hall 2005, p. 55. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

My OVERALL Assessment

In 2004, I summarized Michael Klare’s book, Blood and oil – the dangers and consequences of America’s growing petroleum dependency (2004). I was severely critical of it. My critique included an impression that Klare thinks we are better than other societies, what I found to be disparaging statements on Iraq, an illusory comparison between giving up our imperialistic ambitions and giving up tobacco smoking in public places, and an optimism for an economy based on hydrogen – which is not even a source of energy.

I have reproduced as Addendum II of the present document, my summary of Klare’s 2004 book. It is entitled, “Michael Klare, Blood and Oil – The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency” [Klare 2004, summarized in Hall 2004b, pp. 1-9 (Critique pp. 7-8)].

I find that I am equally critical of Klare’s present book. Most of Klare’s quotes are from official sources. Klare seems to be a mouthpiece for officialdom. It is unfortunate that a person in a position to influence so many young people, does not see through the official narrative, useful to the powerful, callous to the poor.

references

All unspecified page numbers refer to:

Klare, Michael. 2008. Rising powers, shrinking planet – the new geopolitics of energy. New York,. N.Y.: Henry Holt/Metropolitan.

Specified page numbers refer to the following:

Bugliosi, Vincent. 2008. The prosecution of George W. Bush for murder. Cambridge, MA: Perseus/Vanguard.

Colin J. Campbell,

1999. AThe Imminent Peak of World Oil Production.@ Presentation to a House of Commons All-Party Committee. July 7.

http://www.hubbertpeak.com/campbell/commons.htm. Accessed October 6, 2006.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2006. “The brief and disastrous Reign of Homo petrolatum.” September 30 (61 pages, unpublished).

2005. AOil and troubled Waters.@ Pp. 133-138, in Andrew McKillop with Sheila Newman, Editors. 2005, The final energy crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2006. “The brief and disastrous Reign of Homo petrolatum.” September 30 (61 pages, unpublished).

Columbia Encyclopedia. 2000. 6^th Edition. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University/Gale Group.

Cryer, Robert, with Elizabeth Wilsmhurst, Hakan Friman and Darryl Robinson. 2007. An introduction to international criminal law and procedure. Section 13.1.3, “Aggression – Relationship to other Crimes.” Cambridge, England: Cambridge University.

Hall, Francoise,

2004a. “Energy today.” July 10 (20 pages, unpublished).

2004b. “Michael Klare, Blood and Oil – the Dangers and Consequences of America’s growing Petroleum Dependency.” October 30 (9 pages, unpublished). Reproduced as Addendum II of the present document.

2005. “A psychoanalytic Approach to contemporary ecological Threats.” May 21 (16 pages, unpublished).

2006. “The brief and disastrous Reign of Homo petrolatum.” September 30 (61 pages, unpublished).

2007. “Global Warming – An Assessment of possible Solutions.” May 26 (64 pages, unpublished). Pages 52-56 reproduced as Addendum I of the present document.

2008. “In War we trust – the military Paradigm.” August 25 (45 pages, unpublished).

Heinberg, Richard. 2003. The party’s over – oil, war and the fate of industrial societies. Gabriola Island, B.C., Canada: New Society.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2004a. “Energy today.” July 10 (20 pages, unpublished).

Klare, Michael. 2004. Blood and oil – the dangers and consequences of America’s growing petroleum dependency. New York, N.Y.: Henry Holt/Metropolitan.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2004b. “Michael Klare, Blood and Oil – the Dangers and Consequences of America’s growing Petroleum Dependency.” October 30 (9 pages, unpublished). Reproduced as Addendum II of the present document.

McCluney, William Ross, 2005. “Population, Energy and economic Growth – the moral Dilemma.” Pp. 176-185, in Andrew McKillop with Sheila Newman, Editors. The final energy crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2006. “The brief and disastrous Reign of Homo petrolatum.” September 30 (61 pages, unpublished).

McKillop, Andrew, 2005. “Introduction to Part III: False Solutions, Hopes and Fears.” Pp. 127-131, in Andrew McKillop with Sheila Newman, Editors. The final energy crisis. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2006. “The brief and disastrous Reign of Homo petrolatum.” September 30 (61 pages, unpublished).

McMurtry, John.

1989. Understanding war – a philosophical inquiry. Canadian Papers in Peace Studies, 1988, Number 2. Toronto, ON: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2008. “In War we trust – the military Paradigm.” August 25 (45 pages, unpublished).

Undated. “The Shadow Subject of History – Understanding 9/11 and the 9/11 Wars.”

http://scienceforpeace.sa.utoronto.ca/Essays_Briefs/McMurtry/McMurtry-9-11. Accessed September 21, 2008.

Monbiot, George. 2007. Heat – how to stop the planet from burning. Cambridge, MA: South End.

Summarized in Francoise Hall 2007. “Global Warming – An Assessment of possible Solutions.” May 26 (64 pages, unpublished). Pages 52-56 reproduced as Addendum I of the present document.

Phillips, Peter, with Bridget Thornton and Celeste Vogler, 2007. “Parameters of Power in the global Dominance Group – 9/11 and Election Irregularities in Context.” In David Ray Griffin and Peter Dale Scott. 2007. 9/11 and American empire – intellectuals speak out. Northampton, MA: Interlink/Olive Branch.

United Nations, Human Development Report, 2004. New York, N.Y. United Nations Development Programme.

van Wyck, Peter. 2005. Signs of danger – waste, trauma and nuclear threat. Theory out of Bounds, Volume 26. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2005. “A Psychoanalytic Approach to contemporary ecological Threats.” May 21 (16 pages, unpublished).

Wikipedia, 2008,

“Nuremberg Trials.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated September 30. Accessed October 1, 2008.

“The Tanker War.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-Tanker War.” Updated April 10. Accessed September 27, 2008.

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