June 18, 2005

 

                                             THE 9/11 REPORT B AN ANALYSIS

 

UNSATISFACTORILY ANSWERS

The July 2004 Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) either makes no reference to the following allegations, or gives an answer which, on analysis, is less than convincing.

 

Issues around the Attacks Themselves

A.        The Flights:

1.                  AA Flight 11: After departing from Boston at 7:59, AA Flight 11 showed clear signs of a possible hijacking at 8:14.  When it crashed into the WTC North Tower at 8:46 (32 minutes later), no Air Force jets had been scrambled, as they should have been under standard procedures (pp. 144 and 152). 

 

The AU.S. military@ means, in particular, the National Military Command Center (NMCC), located in the Pentagon, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), with headquarters in Colorado Springs, CO.  The Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is the only one of the various sectors in which NORAD is divided, which was involved on 9/11 (p. 139).

 

The military claims that the Anine minutes= notice@ which NEADS received about Flight 11 before it struck the North Tower, Awas the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings@ (p. 227).

 

2.                  UA Flight 175: After departing from Boston at 8:14, UA Flight 175 showed signs of a possible hijacking at 8:42.  When it struck the WTC South Tower at 9:03 (21 minutes later), no planes had been scrambled (pp. 145 and 152).

 

The military claims that it received Ano advance notice on the second [plane]@ (p. 227).

 

3.                  AA Flight 77: After departing from Dulles Airport, Washington, D.C., at 8:20, AA Flight 77 showed signs of a possible hijacking at 8:46.  When it struck the Pentagon at 9:38 (52 minutes later), no plane had been scrambled.  The Pentagon was not evacuated (pp. 146, 152 and 189).

 

The military claims that it received Ano advance notice on the third [plane]@ (p. 227).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.                  UA Flight 93: After departing from Newark Airport, New Jersey, at 8:42, UA Flight 93, showed signs of a possible hijacking at 9:27.  It crashed in Pennsylvania at  10:06 B according to a seismic study B (39 minutes later).  The tape of the cockpit recording ends at 10:02.  There is strong evidence that U.S. armed forces shot down UA Flight 93 and that they did so just after it appeared that the passengers were about to gain control (pp. 148, 151-152, 249 and 253).

 

The military claims that:

a.                   It did not know that Flight 93 had been hijacked until after it crashed because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) never specifically called the military about this flight and the teleconferences provided no opportunity for this information to be transmitted.  This claim is highly implausible. 

 

b.                  The shoot-down authorization announced by Vice President Cheney came after the Flight had crashed.  This claim is contradicted by numerous prior reports (pp. 253-254).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B.        The Collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) Buildings:

1.         Fire has never before caused steel-frame, high-rise building to collapse.  Steel begins to melt at 2,770 degrees Fahrenheit.  Jet fuel (kerosene) fires can at most rise to 1,700 degrees Fahrenheit.

 

2.                  In the South Tower, not a single floor beyond the fire=s starting location was hot enough to ignite paper or plastic or to break windows. 

 

3.                  The 47-story WTC-7 collapsed B even though it had not been struck by an airplane and had fires only on the 7th and 12th floor.  Both the WTC-5 and WTC-6 had raging fires but did not collapse.  The Commission Report does not mention the collapse of WTC-7, much less does it mention why it collapsed. 

 

4.                  If the Twin Towers had been brought down by the heat of their fires B perhaps combined with the impact of the airplanes B the North Tower should have collapsed first.  It was struck at 8:46, 17 minutes before the South Tower which was struck at 9:03.  However, the North Tower collapsed at 10:28, 29 minutes after the South Tower which collapsed at 9.59.   

 

5.                  The collapses of the Twin Towers and WTC-7 had ten standard features of collapses caused by Acontrolled demolition@: 

a.                   Free-fall speed.

b.                  Straight down (Apancake=).

c.                   The concrete turning into very fine dust.

d.                  The dust being blown out horizontally.

e.                   A total collapse, leaving no steel columns sticking up into the air.

f.                   ADemolition waves,@ meaning Aconfluent rows of small explosions.@

g.                  The steel beams and columns coming down in sections no more than 30 feet long.

h.                  Explosions occurring within the buildings.

i.                    The collapse being associated with detectable seismic vibrations suggestive of underground explosions.

j.                    The collapse producing molten steel, resulting in Ahot spots@ remaining for months (pp. 25-27, 30 and 32). 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.                  The interior core of the Twin Towers had 47 massive steel columns.  The Commission omits mention of these columns (p. 27).

 

7.                  Larry Silverstein, who had taken out a long lease on the World Trade Center six weeks before 9/11, knew why WTC-7 collapsed, stating that it was Apulled,@ (deliberately destroyed).  Why did Silverstein and the New York Fire Department decide that WTC-7 could not be saved? (pp. 28-29).                  

 

8.                  All steel from all three buildings was quickly removed from the scene, before any forensic examination could be carried out (p. 30).      

 

9.                  Who told New York City mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, Athat the World Trade Center was gonna collapse@? (p. 30).

 

10.              President Bush=s brother, Marvin, had served as a director of Stratesec, the company that handled security for United Airlines, Dulles Airport (from which American Airlines 77 was hijacked), and the World Trade Center.  President Bush=s cousin, Wirt Walker III, was the CEO of Stratesec from 1999 until January 2002 (p. 31).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C.        The Strike on the Pentagon:

1.                  Why did the terrorists not strike the nuclear plant which they passed on their way to New York City?  Is the Pentagon less protected than nuclear facilities? (pp. 36-37).

 

2.                  The plane should never have gotten through because the Pentagon is protected by five very sophisticated anti-missile batteries set to fire automatically if the Pentagon is approached by a non-U.S. military aircraft (p. 36).

 

3.                  Why did the terrorists choose the West Wing rather than the center of the Pentagon? (p. 33).

 

4.                  The facade of the West Wing did not collapse until half an hour after the strike (p. 34).

 

5.                  The hole created in the facade is no more than 18 feet in diameter, whereas a Boeing 757 has a wingspan of 125 feet and a height of 40 feet (p. 34).

 

6.                  No pieces of the Boeing 757 were ever found (pp. 34-35).

 

7.                  No video has ever been provided showing that the Pentagon was indeed hit by a Boeing 757 (p. 37).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D.        The Behavior of President Bush and his Secret Service:

1.                  Why, after being notified about the second strike on the WTC (at 9:03), did President Bush remain in the Sarasota School classroom for another 13 minutes B making himself easily available as a possible terrorist target? (p. 41; Griffin, New Pearl Harbor, pp. 57 and 61).

 

2.                  Why did neither President Bush nor his party show fear at the school, at a time when the Secret Service knew about the hijackings? (p. 47).

 

3.                  Why did the Secret Service not whisk President Bush to safety once it was clear the country was undergoing an attack by terrorists using hijacked airplanes? (p. 43).

 

4.                  Why did the Secret Service not order air cover during the time that the President was at the school, when he was in his motorcade or even when his plane took off at about 9:54 a.m.?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E.         The Hijackers:

8.                  Six of the 19 men officially identified as the suicide hijackers reportedly showed up alive after 9/11  B Waleed al-Shehri, Ahmed al-Nami, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri, Salem al-Hazmi, and Abdulaziz al-Omari (pp. 19-20).

 

9.                  Mohamed Atta, the alleged ringleader, engaged in gambling, drinking alcohol, use of cocaine, eating pork chops, having lap dances performed for him and, shortly before 9/11, taking a trip to Las Vegas.  In addition, it seems very strange that among items in his bags which failed to be loaded onto AA Flight 11, were flight simulation manuals for Boeing airplanes and his own will (p. 20-21).

 

10.              It is strange that Hani Hanjour, described as a Ahorrible@ pilot, could have performed a maneuver with extraordinary skill, in a cumbersome Boeing 757, before allegedly crashing into the Pentagon (pp. 21-22 and 33).

 

11.              The flight manifests which have been released have no Arab names on them (p. 23).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues about Advance Information

A.        Many had Advance Knowledge about the Attacks:

1.                  Sometime before 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) advised Attorney General John Ashcroft to stay off commercial aircraft (pp. 50-51).

 

2.                  Six weeks prior to 9/11, the FBI advised David Schippers (in 1999, chief prosecutor for the impeachment of President Clinton) about attacks planned for Alower Manhattan@ (p. 51).

 

3.                  Advance notice of attacks had been given to Thomas Pickard, FBI Acting Director, and Dale Watson, FBI head of counter terrorism (p. 52).

 

4.                   Investors had advance knowledge of the strikes, as shown by the extremely high volume of Aput options@ purchases on Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (occupying 22 floors of the World Trade Center), and on United and American (the two airlines used in the attacks) (52-53).

 

5.                  On September 10, a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns (p. 57).

 

6.                  Eight hours before the attacks, San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown was warned by airport security to be cautious traveling to New York (p. 57).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues related to Saudi Arabia

A..       The Saudi Flights:

1.                  In 1998, according to al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah in 2002, he himself was present at a meeting between Osama bin Laden and Prince Turki bin Faisal, chief of Saudi intelligence (p. 87).

 

2.                  On September 1, 2001, Prince Turki bin Faisal was dismissed from his post (p. 87).

 

3.                  For the 48 hours after the attacks, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., stayed in constant contact with Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (p. 84).

 

4.                  On September 13, 2001

a.         President Bush kept an appointment, arranged prior to 9/11, with Prince Bandar bin Sultan (p. 83). 

 

b.                  Later that day, private planes carrying Saudi passengers were allowed to fly.  In particular, while the ban on flights by private airplanes was still in effect, a private flight was allowed to take three young Saudis from Tampa to Lexington.  The flight could not have taken place without White House approval (p. 71).

 

c.                   Within hours of Prince Bandar=s meeting with the President, Saudi Arabia dispatched 9,000,000 barrels of oil to the United States, causing the price of oil to drop from $28 to $22 per barrel, thereby helping  stabilize world oil markets (pp. 83-85).

 

5.         Between September 14 and 24, flights carrying Saudis were allowed to leave the country without adequate investigations and interrogations of the passengers.  Among these flights was one from Lexington, on September 16, carrying Prince Ahmed bin Salman, owner of the Thoroughbred Corporation.  The passenger list for a flight from Boston, on September 19, includes the name of Omar bin Laden, who was on the board of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and who, in 1996, had been for nine months under investigation by the FBI.  Omar bin Laden=s FBI file was re-opened on the day he left the U.S. (September 19, 2001).  A total of about 300 Saudis left the U.S. with the apparent approval of the Bush administration  (pp. 76-77 and 79-82).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B.        The bin Ladens and the Saudi Royal Family:

1.                  In 1999, Omar al-Bayoumi, living in San Diego and thought by an FBI informer to be a Saudi intelligence officer, met at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles with a man suspected of terrorist connections.  He then picked up two of the alleged hijackers (Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar) at the Los Angeles airport, set them up in an apartment near his place, and helped them locate flight schools.  In July 2001, al-Bayoumi moved to England where he was arrested after 9/11.  The FBI, however, claiming to believe al-Bayoumi=s story that he had met Alhazmi and Almihdhar by chance, had him released and closed the case on him (pp. 67-68).

 

2.                  Before 2000, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. and his wife, Princess Haifa, sent more than $100,000 to the wife of al-Bayoumi=s friend, Osama Basnan.  Beginning in 2000, al-Basnan=s wife signed the checks over to al-Bayoumi=s wife.  (Omar al-Bayoumi was the Saudi intelligence officer living in San Diego.  See previous paragraph).  At least some of the money was then turned over the Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (p. 69).

 

3.                  In July 2001, when Osama bin Laden was already America=s Amost wanted@ criminal, he spent two weeks in the American Hospital in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where he was treated by American surgeon, Dr. Terry Callaway, and visited by local CIA agent, Larry Mitchell. Osama was also visited by many members of his family, prominent Saudis (including Prince Turki bin Faisal, chief of Saudi intelligence) and  prominent Emirates (pp. 59-60 and 87).

 

4.                  As of the Summer 2001, Osama bin Laden had not been rejected and disowned by his family, as evidenced by the fact that Osama and several members of the bin Laden family were together at the wedding of Osama=s son, in Afghanistan (p. 60).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.                  In March 2002, al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah was captured and tricked into believing that he was talking to Saudi interrogators.  He said that Prince Ahmed bin Salman, living in the U.S. and founder of the Thoroughbred Corporation, knew in advance that America would be attacked on 9/11.  Zubaydah also gave the names of two intermediaries between the Saudi government and al-Qaeda B Prince Sultan bin Faisal and Prince Fahd bin Turki.  At the end of July 2002, all three of the named Saudis died within an eight-day period, the reported cause of death in each case being surprising.  Zubaydah also said that Mushaf Ali Mir, a highly placed Pakistani military officer with close ties to ISI, knew that an al-Qaeda attack on American soil was scheduled for September 11, 2001.  In February 2003, Mir also died in surprising circumstances (pp. 61-62, 79-80 and 114).

 

6.                  In 2002, Zubaydah claimed that the Saudis regularly sent money to al-Qaeda (p. 65).

 

7.                  In April 2002, General Richard Meyers stated, AThe goal has never been to get bin Laden@ (p. 60).  

 

8.                  On four occasions after 9/11, in Afghanistan, the US military let Osama and his al-Qaeda forces escape B the last time from the Tora Bora Mountains, in Afghanistan (p. 60).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues related to Pakistan

A.        Pakistan=s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI):  

1.                  In July 1999, ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas was recorded as saying in a restaurant from which he and others could see the WTC, AThose towers are coming down@ (p. 114).

 

2.                  From September 4, 2001 until several days after 9/11, General Mahmoud Ahmad, head of Pakistan=s ISI, was in Washington.  He met with George Tenet, head of the CIA, from September 4th  through 9th, and then with officials in the Pentagon, National Security Council, and State Department.  On the morning of September 11, Ahmad was having a breakfast meeting with Senator Bob Graham, Representative Porter Goss, and other members of the congressional intelligence committees (pp. 103-104).

 

3.                  On September 9, 2001, Ahmad Shah Masood, leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, was assassinated.  Masood had signed an agreement with Bridas Corporation, the Argentine rival of the oil consortium Unocal.  On September 14, the Northen Alliance released an official statement saying that a APakistani ISI-Osama-Taliban axis@ was responsible for the assassination.  The death of Masood served U.S. interests (pp. 110-112 and 123).

 

4.                  On September 10, 2001:

a.                   At the instruction of Mahmoud Ahmad, ISI agent Saeed Sheikh, wired $100,000 to Mohamed Atta.  In total, the ISI transferred $325,000 to Atta.  This is 65 to 81 percent of the money the 9/11 Commission estimated it cost the plotters to plan and execute their attacks ($400,000 to $500,00) (pp. 104-107 and 112).

 

b.                  Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind behind 9/11, working on behalf of ISI, telephoned Mohamed Atta to give him final authorization for the hijackings (pp. 112-113).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.                  Immediately after 9/11, Pakistan became one of America=s chief allies in the Awar on terror@ (p. 104).

 

6.                  On October 8, 2001, under pressure from the U.S., General Mahmoud Ahmad resigned from his post (p. 107).

 

7.                  In January 2002, Daniel Pearl, Wall Street Journal reporter, was kidnaped and murdered, in Pakistan, by men connected to the ISI, including ISI agent Saeed Sheikh (who had wired $100,000 to Mohamed Atta on September 10, 2001).  U.S. authorities concluded that Pearl=s murder was ordered, and perhaps carried out, by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (the alleged mastermind behind 9/11, working on behalf of ISI) (pp. 112-113).

 

8.                  In February 2003, seven months after the death of the three Saudis named by al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah as having had advance knowledge that an al-Qaeda attack on American soil was scheduled for September 11, 2001, Mushaf Ali Mir, a highly placed Pakistani military officer with close ties to ISI, whom Zubaydah named as also having had advance knowledge of the attacks, died like the three Saudis, in a surprising way (p. 114).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues related to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)

A..       Allegations about the FBI Headquarters:

1.                  In 1998, FBI agent Robert Wright, began tracking a terrorist cell in Chicago, IL, suspecting that money used for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies came from a Saudi multi-millionaire living in Chicago.  In January 2001, he was told that the case was being closed.  In June 2001, he wrote an internal memo charging the FBI of incompetence and intimidation.  In May 2002, Wright announced that he was suing the FBI for refusing to allow him to publish a book about the affair (p. 91).

 

2.                  In July 2001, Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, AZ, sent a memorandum to FBI headquarters, warning that Osama bin Laden=s followers might be taking flying lessons for terrorist purposes and recommending that the FBI begin a national program to track suspicious flight-school students.  Such a program was never instituted (p. 89).

 

3.                  In mid-August 2001, the staff at a flight school in Minneapolis called the local FBI to report their suspicion that a student enrolled in their school, Zacarias Moussaoui, who wanted to be trained on a Boeing 747 simulator, might be planning to use a real Boeing 747 Aas a weapon.@  The Minneapolis FBI arrested Moussaoui and after discovering many suspicious things about him, asked FBI headquarters for a warrant to search his laptop computer and other possessions.  FBI headquarters refused.  Minneapolis FBI legal officer, Coleen Rowley, made public a long memo she wrote about the FBI=s handling of the Moussaoui case (p. 92).

 

4.                  Shortly after 9/11, Sibel Edmonds, a Turkish-American citizen was hired as a translator by the FBI.  She reported to her superiors that a co-worker, Melek Can Dickerson, was mistranslating, or not translating at all, certain documents about a foreign organization for which Dickerson was working as a spy.  Not getting a response from her superiors at the FBI, Edmonds wrote a letter to the Department of Justice, after which, in 2002, she was fired.  She sued under the whistle blowers protection act.  On July 6, 2004, Judge Reggie Walton ruled in favor of the Department of Justice=s request that Edmonds= suit be thrown out.  On July 9, 2004, after seeing that her testimony to the 9/11 Commission was almost completely omitted from the Commission=s Report, Edmonds wrote an open letter to Thomas Kean, Commission Chairman, making this and other points alleging severe misconduct at FBI headquarters (in particular, serious allegations about the behavior of Thomas Frields and Mike Feghali, at the FBI Washington Field Office) (pp. 94-101).

 

 

 

 

Issues related to United States Motivation

 A.      Possible Motives of the Bush Administration:

1.                  In 1992, at the request of then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the Pentagon completes its  document, ADefense Planning Guidance.@  A draft of this document would become the basis for the report ARebuilding America=s Defenses,@ issued in September 2000 by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) (Ruppert, p. 530).

 

2.                  In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geo-strategic Imperatives, portrays Central Asia, with its vast oil reserves, as the key to world power.  Brzezinski notes that America= engagement in World War II was largely because of the shock effect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  Bemoaning the fact that Athe pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion,@ he adds, Aexcept in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public=s sense of domestic well being... [such as] a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat@ (pp. 127-128).

 

3.                  In September 2000, the New American Century (PNAC) publishes its document, ARebuilding America=s Defenses,@ in which the organization expresses that the desired transformation of military forces will probably be a long, slow process, unless America suffers Asome catastrophic and catalyzing event B like a new Pear Harbor@ (pp. 117-118 and 131). 

 

4.                  On January 7, 2001, the ACommission to assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization,@ of which Donald Rumsfeld is chairman, (the Rumsfeld Commission), issues its report in which it states doubts as to whether the U.S. would act soon enough, in view of the fact that the proposals which the Commission offers are costly and involve significant reorganization, and hence will probably encounter strong resistance.  AOr whether,@ the report continues, Aas in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people B Aa Space Pearl Harbor@ B will be the only event able to galvanize the nation and cause the U.S. Government to act@ (pp. 120-121).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.                  On September 11, 2001:

President Bush writes in his diary, AThe Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today@ (p. 118).

 

Henry Kissinger posts an online article in which he says, AThe government should be charged with a systematic response that, one hopes, will end the way that the attack on Pearl Harbor ended B with the destruction of the system that is responsible for it@ (p. 118). 

 

Immediately after the attacks, the President, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice describe the attacks as Aopportunities@ (p. 116).

 

The September 2002, Bush administration=s ANational Security Strategy of the United States of America,@ states, AThe events of September 11, 2001, opened vast, new opportunities@ (p. 116).

 

There is much evidence that the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan was related more to the pipeline project from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, than to the 9/11 attacks (pp. 122-128).

 

The plans to attack Iraq had been in the works for at least a decade before 2003.  The desire to attack and occupy Iraq, expressed by the same people who suggested that a Anew Pearl harbor@ could be helpful, might have provided a motive for facilitating the attacks of 9/11 (pp. 130-134).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSIONS

1.         The purpose of the 9/11 Commission was not to provide Athe fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11.@  It was to argue, implicitly, that the U.S. government was not itself complicit in the attacks of 9/11 (p. 277).

 

There are many reasons to suspect that the FAA was asked to take the fall so that the U.S. military could be protected (p. 255).

 

The Commission contains no criticism of the President, in spite of the obstacles he placed in the way of the Commission.  These obstacles included:

The President=s long resistance even to having such a commission (p. 283).

 

The President=s original appointment of Henry Kissinger to be the chairman of the Commission (p. 118).

 

The President=s refusal to give the Commission adequate funding B only $3,000,000.  His resistance when the Commission asked for an additional $8,000,000.

 

Delays in issuing security clearances.

 

Resistance to providing documents.

 

Insistence that federal employees have Aminders@ present when testifying.

 

Resistance to having White House officials testify, especially under oath.

 

Resistance to extending the deadline when the Commission realized that, because of the many delays, it needed more time (p. 284).

 

Many commissioners and staff had serious conflicts of interest (pp. 285-286).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The criticisms which the Commission offers are innocuous.  No individual is singled out for blame.  The blameworthy deeds are failures of imagination, failures to communicate, and the like B not prosecutable crimes (p. 290).

 

The Commission Report does nothing to dispel the suspicion, held by many people in America and around the world, that the attacks of 9/11 were able to succeed only with the complicity of the U.S. government.  Far from refuting any of the evidence that points in this direction, the Commission simply ignored most of it and distorted the rest.  The Commission=s attempt to defend the U.S. military in particular against the suspicion of complicity, is at best seriously flawed, at worst a set of audacious lies.  Accordingly the Kean-Zelikow Report (after chairman Thomas Kean and executive director Philip Zelikow), instead of lessening suspicions about official complicity, has served to confirm these suspicions.  Why would the minds in charge of this final report engage in such deception if they were not trying to cover up very high crimes? (p. 291)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                     References

 

All page numbers refer to:

Griffin, David Ray. 2005. The 9/11 Commission Report B omissions and distortions.  Northampton, MA: Olive Branch.

 

The Report critiqued is:

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report B final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Authorized Edition. New York: W.W. Norton.

 

Other references, as specified are:

Griffin, David Ray. 2004. The new Pearl Harbor B disturbing questions about the Bush administration and 9/11. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch/Interlink.

 

Ruppert, Michael. 2004. Crossing the Rubicon B the decline of the American empire at the end of the age of oil. Gabriola Island, B.C., Canada: New Society.     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                           ***