November 24, 2006

OUR PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT,

OUR CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND,

OUR MORALITY,

AND

OUR SPIRITUALITY

Francoise Hall

Number of Words: 19,461.

Copyright 2006, Francoise Hall, all rights reserved

OUR PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT, OUR CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND

OUR MORALITY, AND OUR SPIRITUALITY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................................. 3

OUR PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT............................................................................................ 7

GRAINS.......................................................................................................................................... 8

CROPS.......................................................................................................................................... 10

FISH.............................................................................................................................................. 15

THE EARTH=S FOREST COVER............................................................................................. 18

WATER......................................................................................................................................... 22

THE EXTINCTION OF SPECIES.............................................................................................. 30

GLOBAL WARMING................................................................................................................. 33

THE OZONE LAYER.................................................................................................................. 41

NUCLEAR RADIATION............................................................................................................ 45

TECHNOLOGICAL THREATS TO LIFE ON EARTH............................................................ 50

ENERGY...................................................................................................................................... 54

A SUSTAINABLE SIZE FOR HUMANITY............................................................................. 64

FOR HUMANITY B A COGNITIVE, CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL CRISIS................... 74

REFERENCES............................................................................................................................. 82

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Overshoot and Collapse B The Idea takes hold: There is no precedent in history for the steep decline in per capita world energy production which many researchers predict is likely to take place during the next 20-30 years (See AEnergy,@ p. 54 in the present document).

The idea that growth cannot be sustained forever, however, does have a history:

* In 1925, Alfred Lotka (1880-1949), mathematical biologist, concludes:

AThe human species, considered in broad perspective, as a unit, including its economic and industrial accessories, has swiftly and radically changed its character during the epoch in which our life has been laid. In this sense, we are far removed from equilibrium B a fact that is of the highest practical significance, since it implies that a period of adjustment to equilibrium conditions lies before us, and he would be an extreme optimist who should expect that such adjustment can be reached without labor and travail.@

AWhile such sudden decline might, from a detached standpoint, appear as in accord with the eternal equities, since previous gains would in cold terms balance the losses, yet it would be felt as a superlative catastrophe. Our descendants, if such as this should be their fate, will see poor compensation for their ills in the fact that we did live in abundance and luxury@ (Lotka 1925, quoted in Duncan 2000, pp. 8-9).

* In 1950, Norbert Wiener (1894-1964), mathematician, founder of the field of cybernetics, writes:

A[Our] increased mastery of nature . . . , on a limited planet like the earth, may prove in the long run to be an increased slavery to nature@ (Wiener 1950, quoted in Duncan 2000, p. 9).

* In 1956, King Hubbert, researcher at Shell Oil Corporation, presents his findings to the American Petroleum Institute. He predicts a probable peak in United States oil production between 1966 and 1971. (The actual peak occurred in 1970) (Korpela 2005, pp. 11-12. Campbell 2005, p. 32, 46, 135 and 234. McKillop 2005, pp. 88 and 90. Heinberg 2004, p. 26. See Hall 2006a, pp. 1-61).

* In 1964, Fred Hoyle (1915-2001), astronomer, makes the point:

AWith coal gone, oil gone, high-grade metallic ores gone, no species, however competent, can make the long climb from primitive conditions to high-level technology@ (Hoyle 1964, quoted in Duncan 2000, p. 9).

* In 1971, Jay Forrester (1918-), pioneer computer engineer and systems theorist, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), builds a world model:

Ato understand the options available to mankind, as societies enter the transition from growth to equilibrium.@

Forrester=s model shows overshoot and collapse, projecting a peak in material standard of living in 1990, and then a decline through the year 2100. Measured by the leading and lagging 30 percent point of the curve representing the material standard of living, the life expectancy of industrial civilization is about 210 years. (For the Aleading@ and Alagging@ 30 percent points of a pulse curve, see AEnergy,@ Note (e) to Table 13, p. 57 in the present document).

AOur greatest challenge now is how to handle the transition from growth to equilibrium@ (Forrester 1971, quoted in Duncan 2000, p. 10).

* In 1972, Donnella Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens, also at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), publish The limits to growth, in which they report the use of the comprehensive AWorld3 Model@ to design social policies geared toward sustainability in the world system. As with Forrester=s model, their AWorld3 Reference Run,@ projects overshoot and collapse:

ABoth population and per capita industrial output grow beyond sustainable levels and subsequently decline. The cause of their decline is traceable to the depletion of non-renewable resources.@

The model predicts that the per capita industrial output would peak in 2013, and then decline steeply through the year 2100. The duration of AIndustrial Civilization,@ as measured by the leading and lagging 30 percent points of the curve representing the per capita industrial output, is about 105 years. (For the Aleading@ and Alagging@ 30 percent points of a pulse curve, see AEnergy,@ Note (e) to Table 13, p. 57 in the present document) (Meadows et al 1972, cited and quoted in Duncan 2000, p. 11).

* In 1989, Richard Duncan, petroleum engineer and Director of the Institute on Energy and Man, Seattle, WA, presents his Olduvai theory of human history:

AThe broad sweep of human history can be divided into three phases@:

1. AThe pre-industrial phase B a very long period of equilibrium, when simple tools and weak machines limited economic growth.@

2. AThe industrial phase B a very short period of non-equilibrium which ignited with explosive force when powerful new machines temporarily lifted all limits to growth.@

3. AThe de-industrial phase B [which] lies immediately ahead, during which the industrial economies will decline toward a new period of equilibrium, limited by the exhaustion of non-renewable resources, and continuing deterioration of the natural environment@ (Duncan 2000, p. 11).

* In 1992, Donnella Meadows, Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers re-calibrate their 1972 model with updated data, and use it to:

Aenvision a sustainable future.@

The results of the AUpdated World3 Reference Run,@ which they report in Beyond the limits, gives almost exactly the same results as those of the 1972 model. Per capita industrial output peaks in 2014 (in 2013 according to the earlier model), and the duration of industrial civilization is 102 years (105 years according to the earlier model).

The team concludes:

AOvershoot [can] no longer be avoided through wise policy. It [is] already a reality@ (Meadows et al 1992, cited and quoted in Heinberg 2004, p. 95).

* In 1999, David Pimentel, at Cornell University, Department of Ecology, estimates that it would require at least three times the earth=s entire resources and physical area to provide the world population with the material and energy consumed by an average North American (Pimentel 1999, cited in McCluney 2005, pp. 177, 182 and 304).

* In 2002, Mathis Wackernagel, who, in 1996, with William Rees, developed the concept of Aecological footprint,@ warns:

AHumanity=s ecological footprint exceeds the Earth=s biological capacity by about 20 percent.@

The biological footprint is the biologically productive land or sea area required to produce a yield sufficient to support a human population and absorb the corresponding carbon dioxide emissions (Wackernagel 2002, cited and quoted in McCluney 2005, pp. 176 and 304).

* In 2004, Donnella Meadows, Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers update their 1972 and 1992 data, publishing their results in The limits to growth B the 30-year update. They conclude:

AWe are much more pessimistic about the global future than we were in 1972. It is a sad fact that humanity has largely squandered the last 30 years in futile debates and well-intentioned, but half-hearted responses to the global ecological challenge@ (Meadows et al 2004, cited and quoted in Heinberg 2004, p. 95).

OUR PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Matter that surrounds us: Our physical environment is made up of all the Ait@ that surrounds us, both in the singular AIt@ and in the plural, AIts.@ It is the domain of the objective, of science and technology, of materialistic proofs. It is the matter in which our life is imbedded, the social system in which we live. Our physical environment determines whether, when we are hungry, we take our sword and go on a hunt, or open the door of the refrigerator. It determines whether we travel on foot, by train or by plane.

This physical domain of our lives is correlated with, but can never be reduced to, the AYou@/AWe@ domain (the inter-subjective, mutual understanding, our world view, our culture, ethics, morality), and the AI@ domain (the subjective singular, aesthetics, introspection, our inner religious, spiritual life). These latter two domains are discussed in the section, AFor Humanity B a Cognitive, Cultural and Spiritual Crisis,@ p. 74 of the present document. [The cognitive aspect, that is, the ability to comprehend the magnitude of world trends, calls on the cognitive line of development within the AI@ (the subjective singular) domain of any person].

These four domains, the AIt@ and AIts,@ the AYou@/@We@ and the AI@ are the four inseparable dimensions of the being-in-the-world of any individual. We begin with the physical environment in which humanity is now imbedded. The following pages describe a world in which the physical environment is rapidly deteriorating (Wilber 2006; summarized in Hall 2006b, pp. 1-26).

GRAINS

Nutrition: Grains include principally wheat, rice and corn. They account for 47 percent of the caloric intake, and 42 percent of the protein intake of humanity (Worldwatch 2006a, p. 22).

Harvest: From 1995 to 2005, the total world grain harvest increased by 17.5 percent. On a per capita basis, however, the amount of grain harvested increased by only by 3.7 percent (Table 1).

Reserves: From 1998 to 2005, the world reserves of grain decreased by 33 percent B 40 days worth of reserves (Table 2)

TABLE 1: WORLD GRAIN HARVEST ^(a)

Year	Total Grain Harvest (1,000,000,000 Kilograms)	Grains Per Capita (Kilograms)
1965	914	273
1975	1,241	303
1985	1,665	343
1995	1,715	301
2005 (preliminary)	2,015	312
2005 compared to 1995	+ 17.5 %	+ 3.7 %

^(a) Worldwatch 2006a, p. 23.

TABLE 2: WORLD GRAIN RESERVES ^(a)

Year	Percent of Annual Consumption	Days of Consumption which Reserve represents
1998	33	120
2005	22	80
2005 compared to 1998	- 33 %	- 40 days
Average yearly decrease	-1.6 %	-5.7 days

^(a) Worldwatch 2006a, p. 22.

World Cereals B Production and Utilization: Graph No. 1 shows the world cereal production and utilization, 1995-2005 (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006a, p. 4)

World Cereals B Percentage of Stocks remaining after the following Season=s Consumption: Graph No. 2 represents, for world cereals, the ratio of the closing stocks in any given year to the utilization in the following season. The ratio is expressed as a percentage. In 1999, the closing stocks were 33.4 percent higher than utilization in 2000. In 2006, the closing stocks were predicted to be 20.1 percent higher than the projected utilization in 2007 (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006a, p. 4)

CROPS

World:

Cropland Area: From 1996 to 2005, the world cropland area decreased by 7.7 percent B that is, an average of 127 billion square meters (0.85 percent) annually.

Genetically-engineered Crops: From 1996 to 2005, the world percentage of genetically-engineered crops planted increased by more than 5,000 percent B that is, an average of 98 billion square meters (575.8 percent) annually (Table 3).

United States:

Cropland Area: From 1996 to 2005, in the United States, the cropland area decreased by 5.9 percent B that is, an average of 12 billion square meters (0.65 percent) annually.

Genetically-engineered Crops: From 1996 to 2005, in the United States, the percentage of genetically-engineered crops planted increased by more than 3,000 percent B that is, an average of 53 billion square meters (354.8 percent) annually (Table 3).

Health Effects of G-M Crops:

* In September 2004, Arpad Pusztai, biologist at the Rowett Research Institution, Aberdeen, Scotland, issued a report on his analysis of an experiment by Monsanto Corporation, which consisted of feeding genetically-engineered corn MON-863 to rats for three months. Pusztai concluded that, compared to the control groups, the G-E corn-fed rats had statistically significant differences in the weight of their kidneys and several blood parameters (Pusztai 2004, cited in Phillips 2006, pp. 73-74).

* In the summer of 2005, researchers at the University of Urbino, Italy, published a confirmation that mice fed genetically-engineered soy develop abnormal liver cells and other cellular abnormalities (Phillips 2006, p. 73).

* In December 2005, researchers at the Russian Academy of Sciences reported that the offsprings of rats fed genetically-engineered soy, died within the first three weeks of life at six times the rate of those born to rats fed non-engineered soy (Phillips 2006, p. 73).

Erosion: During the 40 year period 1955-1995, nearly 33 percent of the world=s cropland was abandoned because erosion had made it unproductive B this is almost 125 billion square meters (0.83 percent) annually. Under agricultural conditions, it takes 500 years to form 2.5 centimeters of soil (Pimentel et al 1996, p. 2).

TABLE 3: GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED (G-E) CROPS B

THE WORLD AND THE UNITED STATES ^(a)

Year		World	U.S.
	Total Cropland ^(b) billion m^2	Planted with G-E Crops billion m^2 (Percent of Total)	Total Cropland ^(b) billion m^2	Planted with G-E Crops billion m^2 (Percent of Total)
1996	15,000	17 (0.1%)	1,853	15 (0.8%)
2003 ^(c)	14,103	677 (4.8%)	1,768	428 (24%)
2004 ^(d)	13,978	809 (5.8%)	1,756	478 (27%)
2005 ^(e)	13,853	898 (6.5%)	1,744	494 (28%)
2005 compared to 1996	- 7.7%	+ 5,182%	- 5.9%	+ 3,193%
Cropland, 2005 m^2 per capita ^(f)	2.1	-	5.9	-

Notes to Table 3:

^(a) World: Pimentel et al 1996, p. 2. University of Michigan 2006a, p. 2. Brown 2001, p. 1. Council for Biotechnology Information 2006, p. 1. Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, pp. 1-3.

U.S.: United States Department of Agriculture 2003, p. 1-4. Pimentel and Giampietro 1994, p. 2. Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, pp. 2-3. Des Moines Register 2005, p. 2. International Society for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) 2006, p. 3. Wikipedia 2006a, p. 3).

^(b) World: In 1996, Pimentel et al estimated that the total world cropland was approximately 15,000 billion square meters (1.5 billion hectares). The University of Michigan 2006a, and Brown 2001, p. 1, use this estimate.

In 1996, Pimentel et al further estimated that a third of the total world cropland B that is, 5,000 billion square meters B had been lost due to erosion during the prior 40 years B a loss rate of 125 billion square meters per year. The cropland for subsequent years was calculated on this basis: For 2003: 15,000 billion - (125 billion x 7) = 14,103 billion square meters; For 2004: 14,103 - 125 = 13,978 billion square meters; For 2005: 13,978 - 125 = 13,853 billion square meters.

U.S.: The United States Department of Agriculture has estimated that the country=s cropland, in 1997, was 1,841 billion square meters (455 million acres ) and, in 2002, was 1,789 billion cubic meters (442 million acres) B a decrease of 52.6 billion cubic meters (13 million acres) in 5 years, or 10.5 billion cubic meters (2.6 million acres) per year. However, in 1994, Pimentel and Giampietro estimated that the cropland loss rate in the United States was 12.1 billion cubic meters per year (3 million acres per year) B two-thirds (8.1 billion cubic meters) to erosion, salinization and water-logging, and one-third (4.0 billion cubic meters) to the demands of urbanization, transportation networks and industry. All cropland areas were calculated using this latter estimate.

^(c) In 2003, U.S. G-E Crops represented (428 / 677) x 100 = 63 percent of the world=s total acreage of these crops

^(d) In 2004, U.S. G-E crops represented (478 / 809) x 100 = 59 percent of the world=s total acreage of these crops.

^(e) In 2005, U.S. G-E crops represented (494 / 898) x 100 = 55 percent of the world=s total acreage of these crops.

^(f) World: In 2005, the world population was 6,451,000,000. The cropland area was, therefore, 13,853 billion m² / 6.451 billion = 2,147 m² per person.

United States: In 2005, the U.S. population was 295,700,000. The cropland area was, therefore, 1,744,000 million m² / 295.7 million = 5,898 m² per person.

United States B Principal Biotech Crops: In the United States, the principal genetically-engineered crops are soybeans and corn.

From 2001 to 2006, the percentage of soybeans planted which were genetically-engineered was essentially unchanged (increased by 1 percent). The percentage of corn planted which was genetically-engineered corn increased by 4.7 percent (Table 4).

TABLE 4: THE UNITED STATES B

PRINCIPAL GENETICALLY-MODIFIED (G-M) CROPS ^(a)

Year	Soybeans^(b) Total planted billion m^2 (Percent G-M Varieties) ^(e)	Corn ^(c) Total planted billion m^2 (Percent G-M Varieties) ^(e)
2001^(d)	299.9 (68%)	306.8 (26%)
2002	295.4 (75%)	319.3 (34%)
2003	298.3 (81%)	319.7 (40%)
2004 ^(e)	302.3 (85%)	328.2 (45%)
2005 ^(f)	296.6 (87%)	330.2 (52%)
2006	303.1 (89%)	321.3 (61%)
2006 compared to 2001	+ 1 %	+ 5%

Notes to Table 4:

^(a) United States Department of Agriculture 2002, pp. 1-2. United States Department of Agriculture 2005, pp. 1-2. United States Department of Agriculture 2006a, pp. 1-2. United States Department of Agriculture 2006b p. 2. United States Department of Agriculture 2006c, p. 1. Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004, pp. 3-4. Worldwatch 2006a, p. 22.

^(b) Soybeans are genetically-engineered for one trait only B that for the herbicide-tolerance (HT).

^(c) Corn may be engineered for insect-resistance (Bt), herbicide-tolerance (HT), or both the Bt and the HT traits (AStacked@ Gene Varieties). Table A shows the increase in the stacked varieties.

Table A: Varieties of G-E Corn B Percentage of Total Acreage planted

Year	Bt only (percent)	HT only (percent)	Stacked Traits (percent)	Total (percent)
2001	18	7	1	26
2002	22	9	2	34
2003	25	11	4	40
2004	27	13	5	45
2005	26	17	9	52
2006	25	21	15	61

^(d) By 2001, G-E corn had been planted in every state of the continental U.S. Other G-M crops included canola (54 percent of which was G-M), papaya (more than 50 percent of which was G-M), and squash.

^(e) By 2004, G-E sugar beets, potatoes and sweet corn were commercially available but not planted widely. Of the 56.3 billion square meters planted with cotton, 76 percent were planted with G-M varieties.

^(f) By 2005, G-E rice had been introduced on a small scale. Scientists were working on genetically-engineered wheat.

FISH

The Extinction of Fish: In 2003, researchers at Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, Canada, taking as a baseline the fish population in the 1950's, concluded that only 10 percent of all large fish (tuna, swordfish) and ground fish (cod, hake, flounder) were left anywhere in the ocean (Whitty 2006, cited in Phillips 2006, p. 43).

World Fish Harvest: From 1995 to 2003, worldwide, the catch of wild fish decreased by 9.2 percent. This decrease was compensated by a 75.7 percent increase in fish from aquaculture, so that on a per capita basis, the total world fish harvest increased by 5 percent (Table 5).

TABLE 5: WORLD FISH HARVEST ^(a)

Year	Wild Catch 1,000,000,000 Kilograms	Aquaculture 1,000,000,000 Kilograms	Total Fish Harvest 1,000,000,000 Kilograms	World Population	Fish Per Capita ^(b) Kilograms
1965	47.0	2.6	49.6	3,300,000,000	15.0
1975	60.2	5.2	65.4	4,100,000,000	16.0
1985	74.8	11.4	86.2	4,800,000,000	17.5
1995	85.6	31.2	116.8	5,700,000,000	20.0
2003 ^(b)	77.7	54.8	132.5	6,300,000,000	21.0
2003 comp- ared to 1995	- 9.2%	+ 75.7%	+ 13.5%	+10.5%	+ 5%

^(a) Worldwatch 2006a, pp. 26-27. United States Bureau of the Census 2006, pp. 1-3.

^(b) Latest year for which data are available.

Wild Catch and Aquaculture: From 1995 to 2003, on a per capita basis, the world=s catch of wild fish decreased by 18.6 percent. The fish provided by aquaculture increased by 63.6 percent. The percent of fish provided by aquaculture increased by 55.1 percent. By 2003, aquaculture accounted for 41.4 percent of the total world fish harvest (Table 6).

Three pounds of wild fish must be caught in order to feed one pound of farmed salmon (Whitty 2006, cited in Phillips 2006, p. 43).

TABLE 6: FISH B WORLD WILD CATCH AND AQUACULTURE ^(a)

Year	Wild Catch Per Capita Kilograms	Aquaculture Per Capita Kilograms	Total Fish Harvest Kilograms	Aquaculture as a Percent of Total Harvest Percent
1965	14.0	0.8	14.8	5.3
1975	14.7	1.3	16.0	8.0
1985	15.4	2.4	17.8	13.2
1995	15.1	5.5	20.6	26.7
2003 ^(b)	12.3	9.0	21.3	41.4
2003 compared to 1995	- 18.6%	+ 63.6%	+ 3.4%	+ 55.1%

^(a) Worldwatch 2006a, pp. 26-27. United States Bureau of the Census 2006, pp. 2-4.

^(b) Latest year for which data are available.

Fish Catch B Mean Depth of Catch, 1950-2001: Graph No. 3 (World Bank and United Nations University 2000, p. 8).

Fish Catch B Mean Trophic Level, 1950-2000: The trophic level of an organism is its position in a food chain:

Organism Level in the Food Chain

Top Carnivore 5

Carnivore 4

Predator 3

Herbivore 2

Primary producer 1

The decline in the trophic level of the fish harvested is largely due to the over-harvesting of fish at higher trophic levels, which are typically of a higher economic value (Graph No. 4) (World Bank and United Nations University 2000, p. 8).

THE EARTH=S FOREST COVER

The Definition of AForest@: The United Nations defines a forest as an area which has 10 percent or more actual tree cover. This includes, therefore, degraded and severely damaged forests, modified natural and semi-natural forests, plantations (which usually consist of a single species), and areas which are actually savannah-like ecosystems (Butler 2005, pp. 4-5. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b).

Change in Forest Cover 1990-2005:

From 1990 to 2000, the world forest cover decreased by 2.2 percent B that is 88 billion square meters (0.22 percent) annually (Table 7).

From 2000 to 2005, the world forest cover decreased by 0.93 percent B that is 74 billion square meters (0.19 percent) annually.

This net loss obscures a gross deforestation rate of 130 billion square meters annually, partially compensated by the planting and the natural regeneration of 56 billion square meters of forest annually (Table 7) (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Earth Policy Institute 2006a, p. 2. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Butler 2005, p. 1).

In terms of net loss of forest, during the period 2000-2005, South America lost the largest area of any continent B 42 billion square meters annually. Brazil, where large tracts of the Amazon rainforest are being cleared for cattle ranches and soybean plantations, accounts for 34 billion square meters (81%) of this total annual loss (Table 7) (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Butler 2005, pp. 2 and 8).

In terms of percentage loss of forest cover, during the period 2000-2005, Africa among the continents, lost the highest percentage B 0.64% annually (Table 7).

Primary Forests: Primary forests, defined as natural forests showing no visible sign of past or present human activities, are the most biologically diverse ecosystems on the planet. In 2005, the world still had 14,000 billion square meters of primary forest. Of this total, 60 billion square meters (0.43%) were either being lost or degraded annually (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Earth Policy Institute 2006a, p. 3. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Butler 2005, p. 1).

In terms of percentage loss of primary forest during the period 2000-2005, Nigeria stands out as having the highest, with 55.7 percent of its primary forests having disappeared during the five-year period B 11.1% annually. Vietnam is in second place, with 51.0% of its primary forests having disappeared during the five-year period B 10.2% annually (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Butler 2005, pp. 2-3).

Forests and the Land Fresh Water Cycle:

Deforestation accelerates the run-off of water back to the ocean, thereby reducing the airborne movement of water to the interior. In a healthy Amazon rainforest, for example, 75 percent of the rainfall evaporates and is carried further inland by the westward current of air from the Atlantic. In the interior, the moisture cools and is again converted into rain. Only 25 percent of the rainfall runs off into rivers and back to the Atlantic Ocean. This cycling capacity of rainforests brings water inland to the Amazon=s vast western reaches. Without it, the western part of the Amazon forest dries out and is converted into a dryland forest or even a savanna.

When a rainforest is burned and the area planted with grass (such as for cattle raising), the ratios are reversed B only 25 percent of the rainfall is carried inland, and 75 percent runs off to the sea (Salati and Vose 1984, pp. 129-138, cited in Brown 2001, pp. 4-5).

TABLE 7: WORLD FOREST COVER, 1990-2005 ^(a)

Continent	1990 Area billion m^2	2000 Area billion m^2 (Annual Percent Change 1990-2000)	2005 Area billion m^2 (Annual Percent Change 2000-2005)	1990-2005 Area billion m^2 (Annual Percent Change 1990-2005)
Continents with a Net Increase 1990-2005: Europe Asia	9,890 5,740	9,980 (+ 0.10%) 5,670 (- 0.12%)	10,010 (+ 0.06%) 5,720 (+0.18%)	+ 0.08% + 0.02%
Continents with a Net Decrease 1990-2005: Africa South America Oceania North & Central America	6,990 8,910 2,130 7,110	6,560 (- 0.62%) 8,530 (- 0.43%) 2,080 (- 0.24%) 7,080 (- 0.04%)	6,350 (- 0.64%) 8,320 (- 0.49%) 2,060 (- 0.19%) 7,060 (- 0.06%)	- 0.61% - 0.44% - 0.22% - 0.05%
Average World Decrease	40,770	39,890 (- 0.22%)	39,520 ( -0.19%)	- 0.21%

^(a) United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2006b, cited in Earth Policy Institute 2006b, p. 2.

The Earth=s Forest Cover:

Original: Graph No. 5. This computerized picture and the one in Graph No. 6 speak for themselves (Global Forest Watch 2006, p. 1).

Current: Graph No. 6 (Global Forest Watch 2006, p. 1).

WATER

Availability per Person: Of the world=s terrestrial replenishable fresh water, 70,000 billion cubic meters per year come from the evapo-transpiration of vegetation, and 40,000 billion cubic meters per year come in the form of run-off from rivers and lakes.

Of the former (evapo-transpiration), 18,200 billion cubic meters per year (26 percent) is appropriated by humans. The remaining 74 percent must meet the needs of all the non-human terrestrial ecosystems.

Of the latter (run-off), 12,500 billion cubic meters per year (30 percent) is accessible to humans. Of this 30 percent, 6,780 billion cubic meters per year (54 percent) is used by humans and returned to the earth=s fresh water cycle, usually contaminated and polluted. Another 2,250 billion cubic meters per year (18 percent) is consumed by humans and not returned to the earth=s fresh water cycle.

In 1999, humans were, therefore, appropriating for themselves (18,200 + 6,780) = 24,980 billion cubic meters per year of the earth=s land fresh water. This was 30 percent of the total water accessible to them (70,000 + 12,500), and, on a per capita basis, represented 4,200 cubic meters per year per person (Table 8).

TABLE 8 B THE FRESH WATER CYCLE OF THE EARTH=S LAND , 1995-1999 ^(a)

Fresh Water of the Earth=s Land	Evapo-transpira- tion (ET) billions m^3/year	Run-off (R) billions m^3/year	Total billions m^3/year
Terrestrial replenishable Water ^(b): Evapo-transpiration (Total 70,000) ^(c) Appropriated, human-dominated land uses: Cultivated land (cropland) Grazing land Forest land Human-occupied areas Total appropriated Percent appropriated Run-off (Total 40,000) ^(c) Geographically inaccessible Temporally or spatially inaccessible Total accessible ^(g) Percent accessible Used // Consumed // Total withdrawn ^(h) Agriculture, Used // Consumed // Total ^(i) Industry, Used //Consumed// Total ^(j) Municipalities, Used // Cons. // Total Reservoir losses, Used // Cons. // Total ^(k) In-stream flow needs, Used // C. // Total ^(l) Total, Used // Consumed // Total Percent used, consumed, total Available (Total ET appropriated + R used) Percent of Total (70,000 + 40,000) Percent of accessible (70,000+12,500) Per capita (in m^3/yr) (population: 6,000,000,000) ^(m)	70,000 5,500 ^(d) 5,800 6,800 100 ^(e) 18,200 (26%)^(f)	40,000 32,900 19,500 12,500 30% 2,880 // 1,870 // 4,750 975 // 90 // 1,065 300 // 50 // 350 275 // 275 // 500 2,350 // -35 // 2,315 6,780 // 2,250 // 9,030 54% 18% 72%	110,000 18,200 24,980 23% 30% 4,200

Notes to Table 8:

^(a) University of Michigan 2006b, pp. 1 and 4-9. Postel and Richter 2003, pp. 13-16. Petrella 2001, pp. 27-28. Klare 2001, pp. 142-143. Chao 1995, cited in Postel and Richter 2003, pp.14-15. See Hall 2004d, p. 7.

^(b) Every year, some 110,000 billion cubic meters (m³) of fresh water falls on dry land in the form of rain and snow. About 64 percent of this amount (70,000 billion cubic meters) is returned to the atmosphere through evaporation and transpiration B the natural release of moisture by plants. This leaves about 40,000 billion cubic meters of water as run-off B the flow of fresh water back to the oceans through rivers, streams and underground aquifers.

^(c) Evapo-transpiration: Evapo-transpiration (evaporation plus transpiration) represents the water supply for all non-irrigated vegetation, both natural and cultivated (crops). Calculations assume that 2 grams of biomass are produced for every liter of water evapo-transpired.

Run-off: Run-off to the sea is the source of all human withdrawals for irrigation, industry, municipalities, dilution, hydropower, navigation, and maintenance of aquatic life, including fisheries. It is the source of all human diversions.

^(d) This figure includes a downward adjustment for the share of evapo-transpiration requirement met by irrigation. Approximately 16 percent of the world=s cropland is irrigated.

^(e) This figure includes an adjustment downward for the share of evapo-transpiration requirement met by the irrigation of lawns, parks, and other human-occupied areas.

^(f) Non-human ecosystems: Every year, 51,800,000 cubic meters B the remaining 74 percent of the total terrestrial evapo-transpiration B must meet the needs of all the non-human terrestrial ecosystems.

^(g) The accessible run-off is the stable run-off flow, and includes the 3,500 billion cubic meters capacity of large dams which is used to regulate river run-off. This is 64 percent of the total storage capacity of large dams (5,500 billion cubic meters). Large dams are those at least 15 meters in height.

Dams: By the year 2000, worldwide, some 800,000 dams of all sizes blocked the flow of the world=s rivers, trapping in reservoirs 25 percent of the sediment carried by flowing water B sediment which otherwise would be destined to nourish flood plains, deltas and estuaries.

In 1950, the number of large dams was 5,000. By 2000 it had risen to 45,000. In 1995, B. F. Chao showed that the weight of impounded waters at high latitudes in the northen hemisphere had slightly altered the tilt of the earth=s axis and increased the speed of the earth=s rotation.

^(h) Used Water: Used water is that water which is returned to surface run-off. It is usually contaminated, whether by agriculture, industry or domestic activities.

Consumed Water: Consumed water is that water which is not returned to streams after use. For the most part, it enters the atmospheric pool of water via plant transpiration (especially from Athirsty@ crops, such as cotton and alfalfa). Irrigated agriculture accounts for most consumptive water use, and decreases surface run-off. An extreme example is the Colorado River, which has most of its water diverted to irrigated agriculture, so that, in a normal year, no water at all reaches the mouth of the river. Consumed water also includes evaporation, as from reservoirs in arid areas.

⁽ⁱ⁾ Water used: The figure of 2,880 billion cubic meters per year, was arrived at assuming an average water application rate of 73,240 cubic meters per hectare (10,000 square meters) (29,640 cubic meters per acre), and a 1990 world irrigated area of 2,400 billion square meters (593,000,000 acres). The latter figure represents 16 percent of the total world cropland.

Water consumed: The figure of 1,870 billion cubic meters per year was arrived at by assuming a consumption of 65 percent of the water used.

^(j) Water used: The 975 billion cubic meters per year estimated to be used by industry (91 percent of the total withdrawals by industry), are discharged back into the environment, often polluted.

Water consumed: The figure of 90 billion cubic meters per year was arrived at by estimating that the consumption of water by industry is about 9 percent of the 975 billion cubic meters per year industry uses.

^(k) The gross storage capacity of reservoirs is approximately 5,500 billion cubic meters. Yearly evaporation was estimated to average 5 percent of this total capacity B 275 billion cubic meters per year.

^(l) The needs of the in-stream to become fresh water may be more than only dilution. However, it was assumed here that its needs would be met by pollution dilution alone. A dilution requirement of 28.3 liters per second per 1,000 population was used. Assuming that none of the water discharged into the in-stream is treated, the dilution requirement, for the 1990 world population (5,300,000,000), is 4,700 billion cubic meters per year. A more reasonable assumption, and the one used here, is that half of the water discharged into the in-flow stream was treated adequately. The dilution requirement then becomes 2,350 billion cubic meters per year.

^(m) This figure is in cubic meters per person per year.

Water Stress and Water Scarcity: The minimum human requirement for water is approximately 1,000 cubic meters per person per year. Less availability of water is labeled Awater scarcity.@ The range between 1,000 and 2,000 cubic meters per year is labeled Awater stress.@

Human Appropriation of Fresh Water, Projection to 2025: If, by 2025, humans have been able to increase the amount of run-off which is accessible to them from 12,500 to 13,700 billion cubic meters per year (an increase of 9.6 percent), and if they have been able to appropriate 70 percent of this accessible run-off, instead of the present 54 percent, then in that year (2025), the fresh water they would have available from run-off would be 1,129 cubic meters per person per year, instead of the present 1,190 cubic meters per person per year B a decrease of 5.1 percent (Table 9).

TABLE 9: AVAILABLE RUN-OFF B

HUMAN APPROPRIATION, 1995 AND 2025 (PROJECTED) ^(a)

Fresh Water	1995 billion m^3per year	2025 (Projected)^(b) billion m^3per year
Run-off Accessible Appropriated Percent appropriated	12,500 6,780 54%	13,700 9,830 70%
Population	5,700,000,000	8,000,000,000
Run off available, m^3 per capita, per year 2025 compared to 1995	1,190 -	1,129 - 5.1%

^(a) University of Michigan 2006b, p. 9.

^(b) Assuming that the average per capita water demand remains the same, and adjusting only for the pollution dilution required for the additional population (projected population in 2025: 8,000,000,000).

Water Scarcity: The minimum human requirement for water is approximately 1,000 cubic meters per person per year. This includes 36 to 72 cubic meters per year (100-200 liters per day) for personal use, and in addition, the water needed for agriculture, industry and energy production. Less availability of water is described as Awater scarcity.@ Availability of less than 500 cubic meters per year produces a critical situation (Petrella 2001, pp. 27-28. Klare 2001, p. 142).

Table 10 lists the water availability in selected states of North Africa, and the Middle East/Southeast Asia. Assuming an increase in water demand due only to a population increase, the range of decrease in water availability for 2025 is predicted to be from 30 to 60 percent of the amount available in 1990.

By 2025, availability of water (stated in cubic meters per person per year), is predicted to be in the critical range for Saudi Arabia (50), Lybia (60), Yemen (80), Jordan (80), United Arab Emirates (110), Kenya (190), Burundi (280), Israel (310), Tunisia (330), Rwanda (350), and Algeria (380).

Water Stress: The range of water availability between 1,000 and 2,000 cubic meters per year is described as Awater stress.@

TABLE 10: WATER AVAILABILITY, SELECTED STATES OF

NORTH AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST/ SOUTHWEST ASIA,

1990 and 2025 (projected) ^(a)

Country	Water Availability 1990 m^3 per person per year	Water Availability 2025 (projected) m^3 per person per year	Percent Decrease
Africa Less than 500 m^31992: Lybia 500-1,000 m^3 in 1992 Tunisia Kenya Burundi Algeria Rwanda 1,000-2000 m^3 in 1992 Egypt Morocco More than 2,000 m^3 in 1992: Ethiopia The Middle East and Southwest Asia Less than 500 m^3 in 1992: Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Yemen Jordan Israel 500-1,000 in 1992: 1,000-2000 in 1992: Oman Lebanon More than 2,000 m^3 in 1992: Iran	160 530 590 660 750 880 1,070 1,200 2,360 160 190 240 260 470 - 1,330 1,600 2,080	60 330 190 280 380 350 620 680 980 50 110 80 80 310 - 470 960 960	63 38 68 58 49 60 42 43 58 69 42 67 69 34 - 65 40 54

Notes to Table 10:

^(a) Gleick 1993, p. 101, cited in Klare 2001, p. 146. The differences between the 1990 and the projected 2025 values are due solely to projected increases in population. See Hall 2004d, pp. 1-9.

THE EXTINCTION OF SPECIES

Rate of Extinction: From the distant past (fossil records) to the recent past (1950-2000), the rate of species extinctions has increased by 20,000 percent.

From the recent past (1950-2000) to the future (2050), the rate of species extinctions is projected to increase by 5,000 percent.

From the distant past (fossil records) to the future (2050), the rate of species extinctions is projected to increase by 1,000,000 percent (Table 11).

Terrestrial Mammals: In 2005, the first worldwide analysis of land mammals revealed that 25 percent of terrestrial mammal species are at risk of extinction (Ceballos et al 2005, p. 1. Stokstad 2005; reprinted in American Association for the Advancement of Science 2006, p. 24).

The total land area of the Earth is 150,000 billion square meters. In order to preserve at least 10 percent of the geographic ranges of terrestrial mammals, approximately 11 percent of this total area (16,500 billion square meters) would need to be managed with a focus on conservation. For purposes of comparison, the total world cropland, in 2005, was 13,853 billion square meters. The world area managed for conservation, therefore, would have to be 19 percent larger than the present world cropland area (Pimentel et al 1996, p. 2. University of Michigan 2006a, p. 2. Ceballos et al 2005, p. 1. Stokstad 2005, reprinted in American Association for the Advancement of Science 2006, p. 24).

TABLE 11: THE EXTINCTION OF SPECIES ^(a)

Time Period	Extinction Rate (all species) Extinctions per 1,000 species per 1,000 years	Ratio Recent Past/ Distant Past (Percent Increase)	Ratio Future/ Recent Past (Percent Increase)	Ratio Future/ Distant Past (Percent Increase)
Distant Past (fossil records)	0.5	200 (20,000%)		10,000 (1,000,000%)
Recent Past (1950-2000)	100		50 (5,000%)
Future (2050, projected)	5,000

^(a) World Bank and United Nations University 2000, p. 5.

The Living Planet Index: The Living Planet Index is a composite measure of the abundance of terrestrial, fresh water and marine vertebrate species on Earth. It is an indicator of biodiversity (Graph No. 7) (Living Planet Fund 2006, pp. 1-3. World Wildlife Fund 2006a, p. 1. World Wildlife Fund 2006b, p. 1. World Wildlife Fund 2006c, p. 1).

The World Wildlife Fund 2006 assessment of 1,313 vertebrate species showed that on the average, from 1970 to 2003, these species sustained a 30 percent decline in their population:

Ecosystem Number of Species Decline in Population

assessed 1970-2003

(All vertebrate) (Percent)

Terrestrial 695 31

Fresh Water 344 28

Marine 274 27

Total (Living Planet Index) 1,313 30

The ecological Footprint of Humanity: Humanity=s ecological footprint is a measure of its use of renewable resources B its demand on the biosphere. The unit of measurement is the number of planets needed at the present rate of resource use, one planet equaling the total biological productive capacity of the Earth during the year in question.

In 2001, humanity=s ecological footprint was 1.25 planets. This is 2.5 times what it was in 1961, when it was 0.5 planets (Graph No. 8) (Living Planet Fund 2006, pp. 2-3).

GLOBAL WARMING

Global Temperature: The temperature of the Earth rose 0.8 degrees Centigrade during the last century, most of this change (0.5 degrees) having occurred from 1975 to 2000 (Godrej 2001/2006, p. 12).

Scientists predict an increase in global temperature of 3.2 degrees centigrade (range 2.4 - 5.4 degrees) during the present century (Kerr 2005; reprinted in American Association for the Advancement of Science 2006, p. 177).

Time to Stabilization: Should the carbon dioxide emissions of humanity peak in 2050, and thereafter diminish, reaching a negligible level by the year 2,200, the atmospheric carbon dioxide would stabilize to a new, higher level around the year 2,250, the global temperature would stabilize to a new, higher level around the year 2,750, and the sea level would stabilize at a new, higher level around the year 6,050 (Table 12, Graph 9).

TABLE 12: GLOBAL WARMING ^(a)

Time taken to reach equilibrium, if present dioxide emission peak in 50 years (from 0 to 100 years), and then diminish, reaching a negligible level 150 years after the peak	Mid-point Years	Range Years
For the carbon dioxide level to cease increasing and stabilize at a new, higher level	200	100-300
For the global temperature to stabilize at a new, higher level	700	300-1,000
For the sea level to stabilize at a new, higher level due to: Thermal expansion The melting of ice	2,000 4,000	1,000 - 5,000 1,000 -10,000

^(a) International Panel on Climate Change 2001, cited in Godrej 2001/2006, p. 27.

Carbon dioxide, Temperature and Sea Level B Time to Equilibrium: Graph No. 9 (International Panel on Climate Change 2001, reproduced in Godrej 2001/2006, p. 27).

Global Air Temperature, 1856-2005: Graph No. 10 (University of East Anglia 2006, reproduced in Godrej 2001/2006, p. 12).

The Atmosphere B Carbon dioxide Concentration, 800-2000: Graph No. 11 (Godrej 2001/2006, p. 20).

The Atmosphere B Methane Concentration, 800-2000: Graph No. 12 (Godrej 2001/2006, p. 20).

Northern Hemisphere B Surface Temperature, Carbon dioxide Concentration, and Carbon Emission, 1000 -2000: (Graph No. 13) (United Sates Global Change Research Program 2000, p. 13).

Sea-level Rise, 1850-2000, and Projection, 2000-2100: Graph No. 14. Neither the Canadian Model nor the British Hadley Model includes consideration of possible sea-level changes due to either polar ice melting or the accumulation of snow on Greenland and Antarctica (United States Global Change Research Program 2000, p. 112).

The Ocean Circulation Conveyor Belt: By means of a Aconveyor belt@ circulation, driven by differences in heat and salinity, the deep ocean water plays a major role in the distribution of heat on the planet. Many climate models, taken together with the historical record, suggest that there is a 25 percent chance that this circulation might be altered in the future. Such an occurrence would impact principally those lands which border on the North Atlantic (Graph No. 15) (United States Global Change Research Program 2000, pp. 5 and 109).

The Threat to Coral Reefs: Graph No. 16 (The Ecologist 1999, reproduced and updated using World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace Sources, 2006, in Godrej 2001/2006, p. 75).

THE OZONE LAYER

The Ozone Layer: The ozone layer protects life on Earth by blocking harmful ultraviolet rays (Aultraviolet B,@ AUV-B@) coming from the sun.

The Ozone Hole: The ozone hole is a severe depletion of the ozone layer high above Antarctica. It is caused primarily by human-produced compounds which release chlorine and bromine gases in the stratosphere. Since 1979, the trend has been toward an increasingly severe depletion. The hole manifests itself primarily during the southern hemisphere spring, when conditions for the destruction of ozone become propitious, as the sunlight reaching the southern polar region increases, and as the Antarctic stratosphere becomes colder.

The Ozone Hole of 2006: The size of the ozone hole is defined as the average area it covers from September 7^th to October 13^th in any given year.

In 1979, there was no ozone hole.

In 2006, the size of the ozone hole was 26,000 billion square meters, the largest observed to date. This was in part due to a colder than average temperature of the lower stratosphere (altitude of 16,000 - 50,000 meters) at the rim of Antarctica B this coldness in turn being due to tropospheric (up to 16,000 meters) weather systems (planetary-scale waves) weaker than average, and hence providing little heat to the stratosphere.

During the year (2006), the ozone hole had a record size from September 21^st to 30^th, when its average area was 27,460 billion square meters (Graph No. 17).

Density of Ozone: The minimum density of ozone is defined as the average minimum density from September 21^st to October 16^th in any given year.

A Dobson Unit is defined as 100,000 times the thickness, measured in millimeters, which a slab of ozone would have, if the column of ozone extending from a certain area on the ground to the upper atmosphere were compressed to 0 degrees Centigrade at one atmosphere pressure.

In 1979, the minimum density of ozone was 225 Dobson Units (the slab would be 0.002,25 millimeters thick).

In 2006, the minimum density of ozone was 100 Dobson Units (0.001 millimeter) B a decrease of 56 percent.

* On October 8, 2006, in a region over the East Antarctic ice sheet, the density of ozone was 85 Dobson Units (0.000,85 millimeters), the least observed to date.

* On October 9, 2006, the ozone density over the South Pole was 93 Dobson Units (0.000,93 millimeters), compared to 300 Dobson units (3 millimeters) in mid-July, during the southern hemisphere winter B a decrease of 69 percent. In the critical layer between 13,000 and 20,000 meters above the Earth=s surface (the tropopause, between the troposphere and the stratosphere), the density of ozone was 1.2 Dobson Units (0.000,012 millimeters), compared to the average non-hole density of 125 Dobson Units (0.001,25 millimeters) in July and August B a decrease of 99 percent.

Trend: The year of peak density of ozone-depleting gases in the troposphere was 1995. The year of peak density of ozone-depleting gases in the Antarctica stratosphere was 2001. Most ozone-depleting substances have lifetimes in the atmosphere of more than 40 years. It is likely, therefore that the ozone hole will disappear, but only slowly, probably by some 0.1 to 0.2 percent annually, from now until 2016. By 2065, the hole may have entirely disappeared, but in the meantime, yearly variations in the hole may make the decrease difficult to discern (United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2006a, pp. 1-3. United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2006b, pp. 2-3. United Kingdom Center for Atmospheric Science 1998, p. 1. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

The Antarctic Ozone Hole Area, September 24, 2006: Graph No. 17 shows the Antarctic ozone hole on September 24, 2006, when it was the largest ever recorded. The average area of the hole from September 21^st to 30^th, 2006, was also the largest ever recorded B 27,460 billion square meters (10.6 million square miles) (United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2006a, p. 1)

Antarctic Ozone Hole Area B Average 1979-2006: Graph No. 18 is a representation of the average area of the Antarctic ozone hole, from September 7^th to October 13^th, for the years 1979 (when it did not exist) to 2006 (when it was 26,000 billion square meters) (United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2006b, p. 3).

Antarctic Ozone Density B Average 1979-2006: Graph No. 19 is a representation of the average minimum Antarctic ozone density, from September 21^st to October 16^th, for the years 1979 (when it was 225 Dobson Units) to 2006 (when it was 100 Dobson Units) (United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2006b, p. 3).

NUCLEAR RADIATION

Fissile Fuels: Uranium and plutonium are the two most useful fissile fuels. The core of today=s nuclear weapons is either highly enriched uranium, or, more commonly, plutonum-239. Civilian nuclear power reactors usually use uranium enriched to a uranium-235 level of up to 10 percent (Dumas 1999, pp. 40 and 84; summarized in Hall 2004a, p. 3).

Uranium: Uranium is the most useful naturally-occurring fissile fuel.

Depleted Uranium: ADepleted uranium@ (uranium-238, DU) is a by-product of the enrichment of uranium. When 100,000 kilograms of uranium ore is processed, it yields 100 kilograms of Anatural@ uranium, of which 99.0 kilograms is depleted uranium, which has a half-life 4,500,000,000 years B the age of our Earth.

The remaining 1.0 kilogram is made up of 0.7 kilograms of uranium-235 (Aenriched@ uranium), which has a half-life of 700,000,000 years; and 0.3 kilograms of uranium-234 which has a half-life of 250,000 years (van der Keur 2001, pp. 1-4; summarized in Hall 2005c, p. 1. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

Plutonium: Plutonium is present in very small quantities in association with uranium ores. Plutonium-239 is one of the sixteen isotopes present in naturally-occurring plutonium, and is the only isotope which can be used as a nuclear fission fuel. It has a half-life of 24,000 years (Dumas 1999, p. 14; summarized in Hall 2004a, p. 4. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

Toxicity: Plutonium is extremely toxic. Based on animal studies, it is estimated that an inhaled dose 0.2 gram would be lethal to half of the exposed humans within 30 days; an inhaled dose of 0.006 gram would be lethal to most of the exposed humans within 18 months; and an ingested dose of 0.000,001 gram would cause fatal cancers within years. It takes 40 years for the liver, and 150 years for the bones to eliminate half of any plutonium imbedded in them (Dumas 1999, pp. 14 and 85-86; summarized in Hall 2004a, p. 4. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000)

Radiation Equivalents B Stockpiled and released: Table 14 summarizes the available and released world nuclear fuel, in terms of the number of Hiroshima bombs radiation equivalents (HBRE).

TABLE 14: WORLD NUCLEAR FUEL

IN HIROSHIMA BOMB RADIATION EQUIVALENTS (HBRE) ^(a)

Nuclear Fuel	Available (HBRE)	Released (HBRE)	Total (HBRE)	Percent of Total
Depleted Uranium (DU) ^(b) Stockpiled, 2001 ^(c) Wartime use (U.S. only), 2005 ^(d) Testing and accidents, 2001 ^(e) Total depleted uranium	185,868,540 - - 185,868,540	- 750,486 71,193 821,679	185,868,540 750,486 71,194 186,690,220	98.8 0.4 - 99.2
Plutonium Extracted in civilian nuclear power plants, 1995 ^(f) In nuclear warheads, 1998 ^(g) Total plutonium	802,667 650,160 1,452,827	- - -	802,667 650,160 1,452,827	0.4 0.4 0.8
Total Nuclear Fuel	187,321,367	821,679	188,143,046	100.0

Notes to Table 14:

^(a) Depleted Uranium:

Hiroshima radioactivity equivalent: Yagasaki 2003, cited in International Criminal Tribunal 2004, p. 36, cited also in Phillips 2004, p. 50. See also Levine undated, p. 1. See also Hanson 1998, p. 1.

Stockpiled: van der Keur 2001, pp. 1-4; summarized in Hall 2005c, p. 2.

Wartime Use: Numerous references summarized in Hall 2005b, p. 9 and Hall 2005c, p. 7.

Testing: van der Keur 2001, pp. 1-3. Moret 2004, p. 3; many other sources summarized in Hall 2005c p. 7.

Accidents: van der Keur 2002, pp. 1-4; summarized in Hall 2005c, p. 4.

Plutonium: Dumas 1999; Caldicott 2002; both of these sources summarized in Hall 2004a, pp. 1 and 5.

^(b) At the October 2003, World Uranium Weapons Conference, in Hamburg, Germany, Professor Katsuma Yagasaki, of Ryukyus University, Okinawa, Japan, reported his estimate that every ton (1,000 kilograms) of DU deposited releases the radioactivity equivalent of 182.6 Hiroshima bombs.

^(c) Table B summarizes the countries where the stockpiles of depleted uranium are located.

Table B: World Stockpile of Depleted Uranium, 2001 *

Country	Amount Stockpiled Tons (1,000 kilograms)	Hiroshima Bomb Equivalents
United States	860,000	157,036,000
France	119,900	21,893,740
United Kingdom Germany, The Netherlands	38,000	6,938,800
Total	1,017,900	185,868,540

* van der Keur 2001, pp. 1-4; summarized in Hall 2005c, p. 2.

^(d) Wartime Use: The data includes wartime use by the U.S. only. Israel may have used depleted uranium weapons in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War; and in 1982, during its invasion of South Lebanon. The United Kingdom may have used depleted uranium in 1982, during the Falklands War.

^(e) Testing: Atmospheric testing includes testing by the United States only.

Inside the Continental U.S.: As of 2001, the number of kilograms of depleted uranium released during testing was as follows: Florida, 100,000; New Mexico, 100,000, Maryland, 70,000, Indiana, 69,000; Nevada, 27,800; California, 11,300; Vermont, 4,500; and Missouri, 3,500. This totaled 386,100 kilograms of depleted uranium, or 70,502 Hiroshima bomb radiation equivalents.

Outside the Continental U.S.: As of 2001, the number of kilograms of depleted uranium released during testing was as follows: Japan (1995-1996), 251; Puerto Rico (1999), 34; and Panama, amount unknown. The known total is, therefore, 285 kilograms of depleted uranium released, or 52 Hiroshima bomb radiation equivalents.

Total: The known total released from testing is, therefore, 386.4 tons of depleted uranium, or 70,554 Hiroshima bomb radiation equivalents. In 2004, Leuren Moret, without giving details of how she arrived at the figure, gave an estimate for the radioactive contamination of the earth from atmospheric testing as the equivalent of 40,000 Hiroshima bombs.

Accidents: Accidents include only a July 1991 munitions fire at the U.S. Army Base in Doha, Kuwait, which released about 3,500 kilograms of depleted uranium, or 639 Hiroshima bomb radiation equivalents. No data are available for another fire which occurred on February 8, 1998, at the Royal Ordnance Special Metal Factory, Featherstone, Staffordshire, United Kingdom.

Table C summarizes the depleted uranium contamination of the Earth.

Table C: Depleted Uranium Contamination of the Earth *

Method of Contamination	Depleted Uranium Tons (1,000 kilograms)	Hiroshima Bomb Equivalents
Wars (Use by the U.S. only): Iraq, 1991-2003 Yugoslavia 1994, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001 Iraq, 2003 Total in wars	800 100 800 2,410 4,110	146,080 18,260 146,080 440,066 750,486
Other Contamination: Atmospheric testing, as of 2001 Accidents, as of 2001 Total Other Contamination	386.4 3.5 389.9	70,554 639 71,193
Total contamination	4,499.9	821,679

* Numerous references summarized in Hall 2005b, p. 9; and Hall 2005c, p. 7.

^(f) Dumas estimates that by December 31, 1995, some 200,000 kilograms of plutonium had been extracted from spent power plant fuel, and were being stored in about 12 countries. A typical plutonium-based nuclear weapon contains approximately 4.5 kilograms of plutonium. Dumas estimates that 4.5 kilograms of plutonium have the explosive yield of 18.06 Hiroshima bombs. Thus, in 1995, the world had (200,000 / 4.5) x 18.06 = 802,667 Hiroshima bomb radiation equivalents in the form of plutonium.

^(g) In 1998, the world had 36,000 nuclear warheads. Assuming that each of these warheads contained a typical 4.5 kilograms of plutonium B and, therefore, the explosive yield of 18.06 Hiroshima bombs B they represented (36,000 x 18.06) = 650,160 Hiroshima bomb radiation equivalents.

TECHNOLOGICAL THREATS TO LIFE ON EARTH

1. The Green Revolution: The introduction, 40 years ago, of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides in agriculture, under the banner of the AGreen Revolution,@ gave us the deliberate destruction of biodiversity; unsustainable industrial methods of agriculture; new diseases and more virulent forms of old ones [such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the Nipah virus, and the avian flu]; in India, the 1984 Bhopal disaster (a leak from a pesticide plant causing the immediate death of thousands, and an additional 30,000 deaths to date); and, also in India, due to intolerable indebtedness, 8 farmers committing suicide daily for the last ten years (a total of 30,000) (Shiva 2005, pp. 91, 153, and 163).

2. Genetic Engineering: The introduction, ten years ago, of genetically-engineered organisms, under the promise of alleviating world hunger, is giving us the deliberate destruction of biodiversity; the transformation of life forms into mere raw materials for industrial production and profit; Aterminator@ seeds (which do not reproduce); Atraitor@ seeds (whose herbicide resistance must be chemically activated); human health hazards; increased power for a few large agricultural corporations; and in four states of India, crops 87 percent below the promised yield [an average yield of 200 kilograms per acre (4,047 square meters) compared to the 1,500 kilograms promised] (Shiva 2005, pp. 35, 38, 41-42 and 91. Meyer 2005, pp. 1-2).

3. Nanotechnology: Nanotechnology, the manipulation of matter on the scale of atoms and molecules, is the newest technical solution offered to improve the conditions of the poor in Adeveloping@ countries. However, in a world where privatization of science and unprecedented corporate concentration prevail, it is neither human development nor social justice which propels this newest revolution. It is rather the technological imperative and the pursuit of profits. Health and environmental considerations are secondary. Socio-economic impacts are left undiscussed. The aim of enthusiasts is to prevent any regulation, or, if that is not possible, accept only voluntary regulations unlikely to interfere with the commercial development of the research (ETC Group 2006a, pp. 78-79, 93-94. Joy 2000, pp 13 and 23).

A General-purpose Technology: Nanotechnology is a Aplatform technology,@ having the potential to revolutionize every major industrial sector (ETC Group 2006a, pp. 78-79 and 86).

The Nano Scale: One nanometer (from the Greek nanos, meaning dwarf) = 0.000,000,001 meter. Ten hydrogen atoms side by side equal one nanometer. A DNA molecule is 2.5 nanometers wide. A red blood cell is 5,000 nanometers in diameter. A human hair is 80,000 nanometers thick. Below about 100 nanometers (that is, at the quantum level), elements of the Periodic Table can exhibit new properties with regards to electrical conductivity, elasticity, strength, color, and chemical reactivity. Carbon in the form of graphite is soft and malleable. At the nano scale, it can be stronger the steel and six times lighter. Zinc oxide is white and opaque. At the nano scale, it is transparent. Aluminum at the nano scale combusts spontaneously. Copper at the nano scale becomes highly elastic (ETC Group 2006a, pp. 80).

Financial Investment: Worldwide, in 2004, governments spent $4,000,000,000 and industry $6,000,000,000 on nanotechnology research and development (ETC Group 2006a, p. 79).

Intellectual Property Rights: In 2003, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted 8,630 nanotechnology-related patents. This was a 50 percent increase over the number issued in 2000, and compares with a 4 percent increase in the number of patents granted in all fields of technology. The five countries which received the highest number of patents were the United States (5,228), Japan (926), Germany (684), Canada (244), and France (183). The five organizations which received the highest number of patents are all based in the United States B four corporations and one university: IBM, N.Y. (198), Micron Technology, Boise, ID (129), Advanced Micro Devices, Sunnyvale, CA (128), Intel, Santa Clara, CA (90), and the University of California, CA (89) (ETC Group 2006a, p. 91).

Rapid Commercialization: More than 720 products containing unregulated and unlabeled nano scale particles are now available commercially, and thousands more are in the pipeline. These new, human-made nano scale particles are being introduced without public debate regarding their possible unintended effects, and without regulatory oversight. The few toxicological studies which are available, indicate that as a class, nano-particles are more toxic than micro- or macro scale particles. Nano-particles, inhaled, ingested or absorbed through the skin, may pass the blood-brain barrier and the placental barrier. They can harm soil bacteria. They can be absorbed by earthworms and, therefore, enter the food chain (ETC Group 2006a, pp. 83-85. Boyd 2006, pp. 2. WiseGeek 2006, pp. 1-2).

Specialties in Nanotechnology: Of the numerous branches of nanotechnology, two include living systems, nano-bio-technology and biological synthesis. Both harness the self-replicating Amanufacturing platform@ of living organisms to synthesize a product which replicates itself, and is able to perform a specific task useful for industry.

a. Nano-bio-technology: The products of nano-bio-technology are new molecular structures which contain both biological and artificial components. They are, therefore, organisms/machines.

* ABiobots@: A biobot is an autonomous robot, the size of a virus or a cell, which has both biological and artificial components, replicates itself, and is able to perform a specific task (ETC Group 2006a, pp. 92-93).

b. Synthetic Biology: The products of synthetic biology are new living organisms which contain only biological components. They are, therefore, biological machines.

* The Synthesis of Viruses: In 2004, George Church of the Harvard Medical School, and Xiaolian Gao, of the University of Houston, announced a breakthrough in the synthesis of long molecules of DNA. They had used an automated system which allows the easy and rapid synthesis of small genomes B such as, for instance, the smallpox virus whose genetic sequence, like that of many other pathogens, is in the public domain.

While the advance is useful for the researchers= goal of re-designing genes and programming cells to make pharmaceuticals, it may indeed also come in handy for bio-terrorists (ETC Group 2006a, p. 92. Wade 2005, pp. 1-2).

* The Synthesis of new Life Forms: In 2005, Floyd Romesberg, at the Scripps Research Institute, La Jolla, CA, announced his preliminary success in synthesizing a new bacterium whose DNA would comprise not only the four naturally occurring bases (adenine, guanine, cystosine and thymine), but also a totally new, artificial base (3-fluorobenzene). As the bacterium containing this Afake fifth base@ divides itself to reproduce, the artificial bases pair up with one another, just as do the natural ones. Soon, a colony of completely new bacteria come into being (ECT Group 2006a, p. 92. Marris 2005, pp. 1-3).

Implications: The implications of human-directed, made-to-order life forms, are breathtaking. Will new, self-replicating life forms, functioning autonomously in the environment, open a Pandora=s box of unforeseen, unintended and uncontrollable consequences?

Self-replication B a new Threat: The technologies of the 21^st century B genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and robotics B pose threats considerably greater than those inherent in the 20^th century technologies of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The ability of the new artificial products to replicate themselves, gives them an amplifying factor which humans might either not be able to control, or on which they might develop such dependence that life would be too risky without their help (Joy 2000, pp. 2, 5 and 19).

Policy: The world=s first synthetic biology conference was convened in June 2004. In October 2004, the editors of the journal Nature called on synthetic biologists to Areflect carefully about risk.@ In June 2005, a group of self-appointed experts from the J. Craig Venter Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) announced a joint project to examine the social implication of synthetic genomics.

As was the case for genetically-engineered crops, the new technology is being introduced on the market with virtually no public discussion about risks and benefits, and within a regulatory framework which is either non-existent, or inadequate and non-transparent. There is no labeling requirement (ETC Group 2006a, pp. 92-94. Joy 2000, pp. 13 and 23. ETC Group 2006b, p. 2).

If present trends continue, nano scale technologies will further concentrate economic power in multinational corporations, and further widen the gap between the rich and the poor.

AWhen the root problems are poverty and social injustice, a new technology is never the silver bullet solution@ (ETC Group 2006a, p. 93).

ENERGY

Oil B our Principal Primary Source of Energy: Oil is easily transported, can be refined into a variety of fuels (gasoline, kerosene and diesel), and is suitable for a variety of purposes (transportation, heating, and the production of agricultural chemicals and pharmaceuticals). Most of all, oil is energy-dense. Energy is power over time. Gasoline contains 10,700 watt-hours per liter (40,600 watt-hours per gallon). Oil is the major primary source of energy for AIndustrial Civilization@ (Heinberg 2003, p. 124; summarized in Hall 2004c, pp 1-20. Oliver 2002, p. 3. Duncan 2000, p. 4).

Peak in Oil and Energy Production: Both the per capita world oil production and the per capita world energy production peaked in 1979, the former at 5.50 barrels of oil, the latter at 11.15 barrels of oil equivalents (Table 13).

Electricity B The Principal End-use Energy: Electricity is not a primary source of energy, but rather an Aenergy carrier.@ It has zero mass, travels at close to the speed of light, and for all practical purposes, cannot be stored. Electric power systems are costly, complex, use a lot of fuel, pollute, and require uninterrupted attention for operations and maintenance. Electricity is the indispensable end-use energy for AIndustrial Civilization,@ the quintessence of the Amodern way of life.@

Primary Sources of Energy and Electricity: In 1999, 39 percent of the world=s oil production was used to generate electricity. This was a much higher percentage than that for the world=s other primary sources of energy B 18 percent of the natural gas production was used for electricity generation, and 1 percent of the coal production was used for electricity generation:

Fuel Source Percent used to generate Electricity

Oil 39

Natural Gas 18

Coal 1

All sources of primary energy 42

Energy Quality: For non-electric end-uses, such as work or heat, joules (units of work) are interchangeable B a joule from coal and a joule from electricity will similarly heat a room.

However, when energy quality is taken into consideration, such as for powering up one=s computer, then one joule of electricity takes 3 joules of either oil or coal to produce (Duncan 2000, p. 3).

The Vulnerability of Electric Power Grids to Fuel Shortages: Because of the vulnerability of high-voltage electric power networks to fuel shortages, Richard Duncan, financial analyst, suggests that permanent blackouts will be strongly correlated with the collapse of industrial civilization B the AOlduvai cliff@ (Table 13) (Duncan 2000, p. 3).

Duncan=s AOlduvai theory,@ which predicts the end of industrial civilization by about the year 2030, recognizes the complex matrix of causes which will contribute to this outcome B overpopulation, the depletion of non-renewable resources, environmental damage, pollution, soil erosion, global warming, newly emerging viruses, and resource wars. He maintains, however, that a single measure B the provision of electricity to end-users B is the most important predictor of our civilization=s impending collapse.

The Olduvai Gorge is a steep, 90-meter deep by 48,000-meter long gorge in northern Tanzania, part of the East African Rift Valley. It contains fossils of at least three hominid species, Australopithecus and homo habilis (both living 1,800,000 years ago), and homo erectus (living 1,500,000 years ago). It also contains artifacts from the two earliest stone tool traditions, one of which is the Oldowan (dating from 600,000 years ago) (Caldwell undated, pp. 1-5. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

TABLE 13: WORLD OIL AND ENERGY PRODUCTION ^(a)

Years	World Oil Production ^(b) Percent Increase/ Decrease per year	Per capita World Oil Production Percent Increase/ Decrease per capita per year	World Energy Production ^(c) Percent Increase/ Decrease per year	Per capita World Energy Production Percent Increase/ Decrease per capita per year ^(d)
1920-1945				+ 0.69%
1920-1973		Exponential growth		Significant growth
1930				30% of the 1979 peak production ^(e)
1945-1973				+ 3.45%
1960-1973	+ 6.65%
1973-1979	+ 1.49%	Negligible growth		+ 0.64%
1979		Peak ^(f)		Peak ^(g)
1979-1999	+ 0.75%	- 1.20% ^(h)	+ 1.34%	- 0.33% (The Olduvai Slope) ^(i)
2000-2011				- 0.67% (predicted) (The Olduvai Slide)
2006	Peak (predicted)
2012-2030				- 5.44% (predicted) (The Olduvai Cliff)
2030				30% of the 1979 peak production (predicted) ^(e)
2006-2040	- 2.45% (predicted) ^(j)

Notes to Table 13:

^(a) Duncan 2000, pp. 1-17. See also Graph No. 24 in the present document.

^(b) AOil@ refers to crude oil and natural gas liquids. One barrel of oil = 159 liters = 42 U.S. gallons.

^(c) AEnergy@ refers to the primary sources of energy B specifically, oil, gas, coal, nuclear and hydropower.

^(d) The term equivalent refers to energy content, not energy quality.

^(e) The duration of a pulse is commonly defined as the time period between its Aleading@ and its Alagging@ 30 percent points B the two points at which production was 30 percent of pulse=s peak value.

Duncan suggests that industrial civilization can now be recognized as a pulse whose duration is 100 years, 1930-2030. At both the 30 percent leading point in 1930, and the predicted 30 percent lagging point in 2030, per capita energy production is 3.32 barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year B 30 percent of the peak production, in 1979, of 11.15 barrels of oil equivalents per capita.

^(f) In 1979, the per capita world oil production peaked at 5.50 barrels.

^(g) In 1979, the per capita world energy production peaked at 11.15 barrels of oil equivalents.

^(h) In 1999, the per capita world oil production was 4.32 barrels (compared to 5.50 barrels in 1979).

⁽ⁱ⁾ It is the first time in history that energy production per capita has taken a long-term decline.

^(j) An average decline of 2.45 percent per year from 2006 to 2040, means a 58.8 percent fall in world oil production during these 34 years.

World Oil B Discovery and Production: Graph No. 20 shows the world crude oil discovery and production, historical 1930-2003, and projected 2004-2050, as estimated by Kjell Aleklett, Professor of Physics at Uppsala University, Sweden (Aleklett 2004, p. 7).

World Oil B Production Peak: Graph 21 represents the world oil production, historical 1960-1999, and projected 2000-2040, showing a peak in 2006, and a subsequent decline, as estimated in 1999, by Richard Duncan, at the Institute on Energy and Man, Seattle, WA (Duncan 2000, p. 4).

World Oil B per capita Production Peak: Graph 22 represents the per capita world oil production, 1920-1999, showing its peak in 1979, and subsequent decline, as estimated in 1999, by Richard Duncan, at the Institute on Energy and Man, Seattle, WA (Duncan 2000, p. 5).

World Energy B per capita Production Peak: Graph 23 represents the per capita world energy production, 1920-1999, showing its peak in 1979, and subsequent decline, as estimated in 1999, by Richard Duncan, at the Institute on Energy and Man, Seattle, WA (Duncan 2000, p. 7).

World Energy B Projected per capita Production Decline: Graph 24 represents the 1999 estimate, by Richard Duncan, at the Institute on Energy and Man, Seattle, WA, of the per capita world energy production, historical 1920-1999, and projected 2000-2060, showing its peak in 1979, and subsequent decline B a decline which is slow at first (1979-1999), then steeper (2000-2012), then precipitous (2012-2030), resulting in a production level by 2030 equal to that of 1930, and a very low production level by 2060 (Duncan 2000, p. 13. See also Table 13 in the present document).

World Oil B Production, 1600-2200: Graph No. 25 shows the world oil production, historical 1600-1999, and projected 2000-2200, as estimated in 2000, by Colin Campbell, co-founder of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) (Campbell 2000, reproduced in Heinberg 2003, p. 30. See also Heinberg 2003, p. 93)

World Population, 1600-2200: Graph No. 26 represents the world population, historical 1600-1999, and projected, 2000-2200, as estimated in 2000 by Colin Campbell, co-founder of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) (Campbell 2000, reproduced in Heinberg 2003, p. 30).

A SUSTAINABLE SIZE FOR HUMANITY

Exponential Growth: In 2006, the world population was growing at the rate of 1.18 percent per year. Based on a total population of 6,5000,000,000, this meant that humans were adding to their numbers 76,700,000 persons yearly. Every four years, humanity is adding to itself a number of people equal to the present population of the United States (300,000,000) (Graph No. 27) (United States Bureau of the Census 2006, p. 3).

The Appropriation of Energy by Humans: The availability of cheap, portable and versatile sources of energy, and the exponential growth of the world population in the past few centuries are closely related.

In 2003, Richard Heinberg, at the New College of California, Santa Rosa, CA, writing about energy resources and cultural change, reminded us that only a limited amount of energy (all of it originally from the Sun) is available to sustain life on Earth. Living organisms depend on a continuous intake of both energy and matter in order to create and maintain their internal order. The energy available in an ecosystem is one of the most important factors determining its ability to sustain life. Many millennia ago, humans began to use their extraordinary powers of adaptation, their grasping hands, and their ability to communicate abstract ideas by means of complex vocalizations (language), to capture more energy for themselves and thereby increase the capacity of the environment to sustain them B at the expense of other life forms.

The strategies which humans have used to increase the capacity of the environment to sustain them, include:

* Take-over: Humans have taken over an ever-larger proportion of the surface of the planet, at the expense of other inhabitants.

* The Use of Tools: Humans have used increasingly complex tools. Nearly all tools assist in harnessing energy from the environment. The complex tools which define Aindustrialization@ require a source of energy external to the human body both for their manufacture and for their use. Examples include the steel plow, guns, the steam engine, the internal combustion engine, the jet engine, nuclear reactors, hydroelectric turbines, photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, and all electrical devices.

* Specialization: Other humans are used as tools, first in the form of slavery, and later as wage labor. For a monetary reward, some humans give their energies to specific, specialized tasks.

* Scope Enlargement: The carrying capacity of a region for an organism is limited by whatever indispensable substance or circumstance is in the shortest supply. Humans circumvent the limitations of a particular region by means of trade. We eat food grown thousands of miles away and fill our cars with gasoline originating in oil wells on the other side of the planet.

* Draw-down: Humans have drawn down nature=s stocks of non-renewable energy resources B coal, oil, natural gas and uranium. Since the planet cannot sustain the present world population at its present rate of resource use, we can expect a period of increased wars, when societies try to capture the limited supply of these non-renewable fuels, and later possibly chaos as societies accustomed to the use of these resources, face a dwindling supply (Heinberg 2003, pp. 9,11-12. 15-16 and 19-29; summarized in Hall 2005g, pp. 18-20).

Alternatives to Fossil Fuels: AAlternative@ forms of energy might better be called sources derivative of fossil fuel, since they all depend on oil for the manufacture of the equipment and transportation which make them possible.

TABLE 15: SOURCES OF ENERGY B ENERGY YIELD ^(a)

Source of Energy	Ratio Energy recovered/ Energy invested
Non-renewable Oil, Continental U.S., 1970 Alaska, 1995 Middle East Natural Gas Coal, U.S. 1977 1995 (Wyoming) Liquefaction Wood, Rainforest, 100 years= growth Plantation Geothermal Oil Shale Nuclear Reactor (light-water)	23 11 8 9 20 11 5 12 2 8 7 5
Renewable Wind Tidal (electricity production, 25-foot tidal range) Hydropower Solar, Photovoltaic electricity Heat Ethanol	26 15 10 6 2 2

^(a) Heinberg 2003, pp. 124, 131, 141 and 152-153; summarized in Hall 2004c, pp. 11 and 13).

The Limitations Renewable Energy Sources: Renewable sources of energy rely on resources which are increasingly in short supply on the planet. For instance:

Wind:

Most of the energy needed for turbine construction and other infrastructure development comes from dwindling fossil fuels (Heinberg 2003, p. 141; summarized in Hall 2004c, p. 15).

Tides:

The loss of estuarine fisheries threatens another endangered resource (Heinberg 2003, p. 154; summarized in Hall 2004c, p. 16).

Hydroelectricity:

Large dams are extremely environmentally destructive. Small dams rely on rivers and streams which are themselves endangered resources (Heinberg 2003, p. 150; summarized in Hall 2004c, p. 15).

Solar: The ratio Aenergy returned@ to Aenergy invested@ is low, and solar energy demands a large surface area to collect it.

* 480 watt-hours per meter per day: The average hourly incident solar energy which falls on the ground during eight hours of a summer day, at 40 degrees latitude, is 600 watts-hours per square meter. For an 8-hour day, this is (8 x 600) = 4,800 watts-hours per square meter. Assuming the conversion of this energy to electricity at a 10 percent efficiency rate, this is 480 watts-hours per square meter per day. A gallon (3.8 liters) of oil contains 40,600 watt-hours B 85 times as much (University of Oregon 1998, pp. 3 and 5. Heinberg 2003, p. 124; summarized in Hall 2004c, pp. 1-20. Oliver 2002, p. 3. Wikipedia 2006b, p. 1).

* To produce 5,000,000 watt-hours of Electricity: At the rate of 480 watt-hours of electricity per square meter per day, the generation of 5,000,000 watt-hours of electricity would require 5,000,000 / 480 = 10,400 square meters of collecting area (just more than one hectare).

Using oil, at the rate of 40,600 watt-hours per gallon, 5,000,000 watt-hours would be obtained with (5,000,000 / 40,600) = 123.2 gallons, or (123.2 / 42) = 2.9 barrels of oil. Assuming the conversion of this energy to electricity at a 40 percent efficiency rate, this is (2.9 / 40) x 100 = 7.3 barrels of oil. A barrel is about the volume of a standard bathtub (University of Oregon 1998, pp. 3 and 5. Enel Corporation 2006, pp. 2-3. Alberta Government 2004, p. 1. Union of Concerned Scientists 2006, pp. 2-3. See also AEnergy,@ p. 54 in the present document).

Ethanol:

From 1996 to 2005, the world cropland decreased at an average rate of 127 billion square meters annually (see Table 3 in the present document). From 1998 to 2005, world grain reserves decreased at an average rate of 5.7 days of consumption annually (see Table 2 in the present document). The demand for energy crops is in competition with the demand for edible crops (Worldwatch 2006a, p. 40).

Geothermal and Nuclear Power are not renewable:

Geothermal Power: Geothermal power is not a renewable source of energy. The commercially useful life of most geothermal fields is 40-100 years (Heinberg 2003, p. 151; summarized in Hall 2004c, p. 16).

Nuclear Power: The world has 3,500,000,000 kilograms of high-grade uranium ore reserves. The current uranium production is 67,000,000 kilograms annually. These uranium ore reserves would last:

* 50 years, at current production levels.

* 9 years, if the present world electricity demand were met by nuclear power.

* 3 years, if the present world energy demand were met by nuclear energy (Caldicott 2006, pp. 6 and 8).

Also, radioactive wastes and serious accidents pose insurmountable problems (Dumas 1999, pp. 21-22, 39, 45, 89-93, 95-97, 100-105, and 338; summarized in Hall 2004a, pp. 8-12).

The Size of Humanity which can be sustained on Solar Power: In 1994, David Pimentel and his team, at Cornell University, New York, constructed two scenarios determining how much energy humanity would be able to consume, were the only source of energy solar. The first scenario assumes a population of 3 billion, the second, a population one billion (Table 15) (Pimentel et al 1994, pp. 2-4).

Scenario No. 1: A population of 3,000,000,000.

Assumptions:

1. Erosion: No more loss of cropland. From 1996 to 2005, an average of (15,000 - 13,853) / 9 = 127 billion square meters of cropland were lost annually to degradation and erosion (See Table 3 in the present document). Soil conservation programs would stop this erosion, and the world cropland would no longer decrease.

2. Cropland: The availability of 5,000 square meters of cropland per capita. This is the area needed to provide one person with a diverse, nutritious diet of plant and animal products. In 2005, the United States had (1,744,000 million m² / 295,700,000) = 5,900 square meters of cropland per person. The world average, however, was (13,853 billion m²/ 6.5 billion) = 2,131 square meters per person (see Table 3 in the present document) (United States Bureau of the Census 2006, p. 3. Earth Policy Institute 2006a, p. 3).

3. Biodiversity: The preservation of 30 percent of the terrestrial ecosystem as natural vegetation. This is the minimum natural biological diversity which would ensure a quality environment, able to provide essential functions (such as the pollination of crops, the recycling of manure, and the purification of water and soil) and serve as a vital reservoir of genetic material.

4. Energy: The use of 5,500 billion square meters of the earth=s surface for energy production. For purposes of comparison, this is (5,500 / 13,853) = 40 percent of the present world area dedicated to cropland in 2005 (see Table 3 in the present document).

This area would produce 200 quads (200 quadrillion British Thermal Units) of solar energy per year. Taking into consideration that the correspondence of heat content to volume of oil is that 2.12 quads per year are equivalent to one million barrels of oil per day, then these 200 quads would produce (200 x 365) / 2.12 = 34,434 million barrels of oil equivalents per year.

Pimentel et al estimated that at the time they were writing (1994), humanity=s consumption of energy in the form of either fossil or solar, was 369 quads annually, or (369 x 365) / 2.12 = 63,531 million barrels of oil equivalents per year. The 200 quads, therefore, would produce only (34,434 / 63,531) x 100 = 54 percent of the energy (fossil and solar) that humanity was using in the early 1990=s.

Result: Under these conditions, a world population of 3,000,000,000 would be sustainable, and be able to consume energy at the rate of (34,434 million / 3,000 million) = 11.5 barrels of oil equivalents per year (Table 15).

Comparison with the United States:

In 1994 (when the U.S. population was 263,400,000), Pimentel et al estimated that the country=s energy consumption was 62 barrels (10,000 liters, 2,600 gallons) of oil equivalent energy per capita per year. (A barrel of oil = 159 liters = 42 gallons).

In 1997 (when the U.S. population was 272,900,000), Richard Heinberg estimated that the country=s energy consumption was 59 barrels (8,076 kilograms) of oil equivalent energy per capita per year. (A barrel of oil weighs 136 kilograms) (Heinberg 2004, pp. 38 and 44. U.S. Department of Energy 1999, quoted in Heinberg 2003, p. 123. Heinberg 2003, pp. 134 and 140; summarized in Hall 2004c, pp. 1-20).

Around 1995, therefore, the U.S. was consuming about 60 barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year (Table 15).

A humanity the size of 3,000,000,000 would have available per capita (11.5 / 60) x 100 = 19 percent of the U.S. energy consumption per capita in 1995.

Comparison with present-day Humanity:

Recalling that in 1994 (when the world population was 5,600,000,000), Pimentel et al estimated that the world energy consumption was 369 quads per year, or (369 / 2.12) x 365 = 63,531 million barrels of oil equivalents per year, we now can calculate that this is (63,531 million / 5,600 million) = 11.4 barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year (Table 15).

In 2000, Richard Duncan estimated that the world energy consumption peaked in 1979 at an average of 11.2 barrels of oil equivalents per capita (Duncan 2000, pp. 1-17).

The 11.5 barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year available to a humanity of 3,000,000,000, therefore, is the same as was humanity=s average consumption both at the time of peak energy production (1979), and in 1995.

Conclusion: If energy consumption were the same as the present world average (11.3 barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year), a population of 3,000,000,000 would be sustainable with solar power.

Scenario No. 2: A population of 1,000,000,000.

Assumptions: The assumptions are the same as those in Scenario No. 1, except for energy:

Energy: The world per capita energy consumption would be half that of the United States at the present time B (60 / 2) = 30 barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year (Table 15).

Result: The total energy production would have to be (30 x 1,000,000,000) = 30,000 million barrels of oil energy equivalents per year, or (30,000 million / 365) = 82.2 million barrels per day. One million barrels per day is equivalent to 2.12 quads per year. Therefore, the energy collected would have to be (82.2 x 2.12) = 174 quads of energy equivalents per year. In Scenario No. 1, it was assumed that 5,500 billion square meters would produce 200 quads of oil equivalents per year. In the present Scenario, the area needed would be (174.3 / 200) x 5,500 = 4,800 billion square meters B 87 percent of the area needed for energy production in Scenario No. 1.

Conclusion: If energy consumption were half that of present-day United States, a population of between 1,000,000,000 and 2,000,000,000 would be sustainable with solar power.

TABLE 15: WORLD POPULATION SUSTAINABLE WITH SOLAR POWER ^(a)

Present-day Reality/ Scenarios	Population	Type of Energy Oil/Solar	Total Energy Consumption (Million barrels of oil equivalents per year)	Per capita Energy Consumption (Barrels of oil equivalents per capita per year)
U.S., 1995	266,600,000	Oil/Solar	16,000	60.0
World: 1994 Scenario No. 1 Scenario No. 2	5,600,000,000 3,000,000,000 1,000,000,000	Oil/Solar Solar Solar	63,531 34,434 30,000	11.4 11.5 30.0

^(a) Pimentel et al 1994, pp. 2-4. United States Bureau of the Census 2006, p. 3. Earth Policy Institute 2006a, p. 3. Heinberg 2004, pp. 38 and 44. United States Department of Energy 1999, quoted in Heinberg 2003, p. 123. Heinberg 2003, pp. 134 and 140; summarized in Hall 2004c, pp. 1-20. Duncan 2000, pp. 1-17.

World Population, 1 - 2001: Graph No. 27 shows the growth of the world population, years 1-2006 (World Almanac, 2001, reproduced in McCluney 2005, p. 154, updated with data from the United States Bureau of the Census 2006, p. 3. See Hall 2006a).

FOR HUMANITY B A COGNITIVE, CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL CRISIS

The Surplus of Threats facing us: The trends described in the preceding sections are but a few of a large number of trends which threaten the continuation of humanity as we know it. Among the trends not discussed are:

* The toxicity of rivers.

* Aquifer depletion.

* Our increasing reliance on vulnerable mono-cultures for our basic needs.

* Mercury contamination of the food chain (Worldwatch 2006b, pp. 96-98).

* The introduction of exotic species in ecosystems which do not have the capacity to limit their growth.

* Biological and chemical weapons.

* Nuclear weapons in space, nuclear space exploration.

* City over-crowding.

* Smog.

* Epidemics of recently-mutated viruses, of which HIV may be only the first.

All of these trends are the product of human agency B specifically, science-enabled 20^th century technology practiced on an industrial scale.

Historical Context: Modern trends are the 21^st century equivalent of 20^th century climactic atrocities, such as:

* The Armenian genocide.

* The Holocaust.

* The bombings of Tokyo, Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

* The killing fields in Vietnam and Cambodia.

* The genocides in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and East Timor.

* The rape/death camps of the former Yugoslavia (Card 2002, p. 8; summarized in Hall 2005e, p. 3. van Wyck 2005, p. 109; summarized in Hall 2005d, p. 1).

Characteristics of modern Trends: Peter van Wyck, in his book Signs of danger B waste, trauma and nuclear threat, emphasizes the characteristics of modern threats which make them difficult to react to. Modern threats are:

1. Predictable: The threats are on the level of natural disasters, but they derive from human activity, and hence we are responsible. We can foresee them as consequences of our own actions. We are the guilty ones.

2. A Threat to Life on the Planet as we know it: The threats involve not only our own individual death but also ecological death, the annihilation of the very cycles of life and death. The trends signal such a level of discontinuity as to put in doubt a future for humans which at all resembles the past. We cannot visualize our own individual death, much less the death of the whole framework in which our life is situated.

3. Trans-national and trans-generational. The threats do not respect human boundaries, such as those between nations, between generations, between rich and poor, and between the technologically sophisticated and the technologically non-sophisticated.

4. Diffuse: The threats are on such an enormous scale, and they are so complex, inter-related and synergistic that they thwart analysis in terms of the victim/perpetrator model which assigns degrees of responsibility and culpability. The threats are non-insurable, in that the catastrophes are likely to be so massive as to make irrelevant calculations of the insurable. The capping of the liability limits for accidents at nuclear electric utilities, enacted by the United States in its 1957 Price-Anderson Act, is an acknowledgment of the non-insurability of such (predictable) Aaccidents.@

5. Insiduous: Trends such as increased radiation and global warming cannot be seen, and hence tend to remain at a symbolic level, virtual, theoretical.

6. ASlow@: The changes brought about by the trends are extremely rapid in geological time, but in human time, they seem slow, insufficiently traumatic to move us to action. Unlike a car accident, it is easy to ignore them, or adapt to them in our daily activities.

7. Overwhelming: There are too many threats. We cannot encompass them all. They touch all aspects of our lives B and are, therefore, easily dismissed as touching none, as being but another of a surplus of bad news for the day. If nine species an hour are no longer with us, we are numb to the latest species which has ceased to exist (van Wyck 2005, pp. 86, 91-92, 99, 102, 118-119; summarized in Hall 2005d, pp. 2-3. Wilson 1992-1999, p. xviii; summarized in Hall 2005a, pp. 4-5 and 7; summarized also is Hall 2005f, p. 5. See also Pimentel et al 1994, p. 3).

Gaging the Severity of Modern Threats: Claudia Card, in her book The atrocity paradigm B a theory of evil, presents the following criteria to facilitate our evaluation of the severity of modern nuclear and ecological threats. These criteria are:

Non-quantifiable Factors:

* The intensity of suffering.

* The effect on a person=s ability to function B for example, work.

* The effect on the quality of a person=s relationship with others.

* The psychological effects on the children of the survivors.

Quantifiable Factors:

* The number of victims.

* The overt signs of suffering.

* The duration of the harm.

* The containability of the harm.

* The reversibility of the harm.

* The overt effect on the children of survivors.

* The possibility for compensation (Card 2002, pp. 14 and 20; summarized in Hall 2005e, p. 5).

Modern Situations which do not threaten Life on the Planet: Examples of modern situations which do not threaten life on the planet, include:

* The Sudan Civil War (1993-2003) and the Darfur Genocide (2003-): As of 2005, there had been 2,340,000 human victims. Overt signs of suffering included injuries, starvation and death. The duration of the harm had been 12 years. The harm was containable and reversible. The next generation would include people who had been traumatized, orphaned, and have a low IQ. The possibility for compensation is low (Hall 2005e, p. 10).

* The Iraq War (2003-): As of 2005, there had been 102,000 human victims. Suffering included injuries, diseases and death. The duration of the harm had been 2 years. The harm was containable and reversible. The next generation would include people who had been traumatized, orphaned, and have congenital abnormalities. The possibility for compensation is low (Hall 2005e, p. 10).

Modern Situations which threaten Life on the Planet: Examples of modern situations which threaten life on the planet, include:

* Radioactivity: The number of human victims cannot be assessed. Suffering includes cancer and death. The duration of the harm is 45,000,000,000 years in the case of uranium-238 (DU) B ten times its half-life of 4,500,000,000 years. The harm is neither containable nor reversible. The next generation will include people with congenital abnormalities. There is no possibility for compensation (Hall 2005e, p. 7).

* Global Warming: As of 2006, the number of human victims was probably in the millions. Suffering includes death and the extinction of cultures. The duration of the harm is measured in tens of thousands of years. The harm is not containable and may be irreversible. Future generations will live in a climate which will be more hostile to life than ours. There is no possibility for compensation (Hall 2005e, p. 7).

* The Extinction of Species: The number of human victims cannot be assessed. Suffering includes a threatened food supply and a threatened existence. The duration of the harm is indeterminate. The harm is not containable and is irreversible. Future generations will have a restricted choice of food and their numbers will be much lower than ours. There is no possibility for compensation (Hall 2005e, p. 7).

Our Response: At present, we have no democratically-elected global forum or institution in which these issues can be discussed. The United Nations is neither democratic, nor is it global in its outlook. It is a body of nation states in which national interests and inter-nation rivalry drive policy. Each nation guards its own Anational interest,@ no priority given to the common good of humanity (Monbiot pp. 68-74; summarized in Hall 2004b, p. 1).

To date, our response to global trends has been characterized by:

1. Denial: On January 2, 2007, as he undertook his duties as eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon announced his goals:

AI start my duties at a daunting time in international affairs, starting from Darfur to the Middle East, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, many other crises that trouble our world. From defending human rights to the need to step up our efforts to . . . reach the target, by 2015, of the Millennium Development goals@ (Ki-Moon 2007, quoted in Reuters 2007, p. 2).

Thus, in the world=s highest international body, the global trends which threaten life on earth are not on the immediate agenda, eclipsed by Abusiness-as-usual@ international crises. The Millennium Development goals are even now being threatened by soil erosion, lack of water, global warming, the rising price of oil and the HIV epidemic. Yet, those goals continue to be dangled in front of the eyes of the poor as if one day, they too would have the chance to live like the small minority of us now in industrialized nations.

2. The Trends are amenable to Technological Fixes: If nuclear wastes are dangerous, we will bury them inside a mountain; if there is too much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, we will sequester it underground; if the earth is warming, we will put a large number of tiny mirrors in the stratosphere which will reflect the sunlight and thus prevent the earth=s temperature from rising; if oil runs out, our technology will provide us with alternative sources of energy. This framework of understanding assumes a future more or less similar to our present, and further assumes that technology (aided by the market) will come to our rescue for any problem we may have (United States National Center for Atmospheric Research 2006).

President George W. Bush gives an example of this faith in the future and in technology:

AAmerica is the leader in technology and innovation. We all believe technology offers great promise to significantly reduce emissions B especially carbon capture, storage and sequestration technologies . . . We must always act to ensure continued economic growth and prosperity for our citizens and for citizens throughout the world. We should pursue market-based incentives and spur technological innovation@ (Bush 2001, pp. 5-6, quoted in Hall 2006a, p. 22).

3. Adaptation: If tap water is polluted, we will buy bottled water; if the temperature of the earth rises, we will plant heat-resistant crops; if avian flu comes our way, we will develop a vaccine; if the air is too polluted we will exercise indoors; if there is no snow on the mountain, we will make artificial snow.

The United States Global Change Research Program attempts to identify adaptative responses to climate change. In their 2000 report, Climate change impacts on the United States, the authors note:

ANatural ecosystems appear to be the most vulnerable to the harmful effects of climate change, as there is often little that can be done to help them adapt to the projected speed and amount of change . . . Highly managed ecosystems appear more robust, and some potential benefits have been identified@ (United States Global Change Research Program 2000, pp. 2 and 6-7).

This, at the very time that President George W. Bush explicitly rejects the Kyoto Protocol, designed to alleviate the root cause of global warming:

AThe Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways . . . [It] is, in many ways, unrealistic . . . The targets . . . were arbitrary and not based upon science. For America, complying with those mandates would have a negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for consumers@ (Bush 2001, pp. 1 and 3, quoted in Hall 2006a, p. 22).

Our Challenges B cognitive, cultural and spiritual:

1. Our cognitive Challenge: The cognitive challenge facing us is the mind-stretching comprehension of the horrendous nature of the threats we have brought about on ourselves with our technology. The numbers and time-frames are enormous and very difficult to visualize. All of us should know that:

* Every ton of uranium-238 (depleted uranium, DU) has the radioactivity equivalent of 183 Hiroshima bombs; and the half-life of DU is the age of the earth B 4.5 billion years (Yagasaki 2003. van der Keur 2001; both sources summarized in Hall 2005c, pp. 1-2).

* It takes 500 years to form 2.5 centimeters of soil (Pimentel et al 1996, p. 2).

* A barrel of oil is about the volume of a standard bathtub. A cubic meter (a measure of water) is about the size of a standard kitchen range (Alberta Government 2004, p. 1).

* After each of the five previous greatest extinctions spasms which the biosphere has sustained (440,000,000, 365,000,000, 245,000,000, 210,000,000 and 65,000,000 years ago), it has taken evolution an average of about 35,000,000 years to restore pre-disaster levels of diversity (Wilson 1991/1999, pp. xvii, 31 and 189-191; summarized in Hall 2005a, pp. 3-6; summarized also in Hall 2005f, p. 5).

* Accidents are normal. In our dire straights today, it is the accident which must be thought of as essential, the substance itself relative and contingent. The normal accident is inscribed into the design of technological endeavors. When the safety of a design is given as AThe reactor is expected to operate within design expectations x times out of 100, for y hours of operations,@ the contrary is also the case. To speak of a safety probability is also to speak of the probability of failure (van Wyck pp. xx and 13-14; summarized in Hall 2005d, p. 5).

We can facilitate comparisons by expressing all measurements in one system, such as the metric system. We can note that other species have overshot their resources, such as the rabbits when they were introduced in Australia.

We must make modern trends cognitively accessible to us B vivid, real, impending catastrophes. We must learn to organize our future around the discourse of threat and disaster (like the inhabitants of the small islands of the Pacific are already doing), and on this basis make a concerted effort to prevent the worst.

2. Our cultural Challenge: The cultural challenge facing us is to move from an exclusive identification with our nation to a broader identification with all humans on earth. We need an institution which will take care of us as members of humanity, as earthlings, as humans whose technology is presently out of control. Over the course of the past thousands of years, we have increased our ability to empathize with other humans B from those who are members of a blood-related extended family or clan, to those who are members of a leader-centered tribe, to those who are members of a geographically-defined nation. We can take the further step of identifying and having empathy with all humans, and perhaps also all animals, on the planet B a communion with life, with the biosphere (Wilber 1995/2000; summarized in Hall 2005h, p. 44).

Such a change does not come easily. The 1995 report of the International Panel for Climate Change contains an assessment of the economic value of a human life B a human life in an industrialized country calculated as being worth US$1,5000,000, while one in a Adeveloping@ country calculated as worth only US$150,000 (Glantz 2003, p. 164. United Kingdom Global Commons Institute 1996, pp. 1-5).

Considering ourselves as individuals who form a world culture, we need to make the decision as to whether we would rather have a large humanity with a relatively low level of energy consumption, or a small humanity with a relatively high level of energy consumption.

3. Our spiritual Challenge: Our spiritual challenge is to recognize the direction in evolution B from sub-conscious life (stars, rocks), to un-conscious life (plants), to conscious life (animals), to our own self-conscious life, each level representing increases in physical complexity and breadth of consciousness. How can we be in harmony with this direction of evolution, perhaps even help it, wherever it is going? How can we fulfill our responsibility as the only species on earth with the ability to know that we are alive, and know that we will one day die? How can we contact that force which drives evolution B whether we name it Spirit, Energy, Consciousness, God, Buddha or the Tao (Wilber 2006; summarized in Hall 2006b, pp. 11 and 22).

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2006a. ANASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) announces Ozone Hole is a double Record Breaker.@ October 19.

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University of Michigan,

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2006b. AHuman Appropriation of the World=s Fresh Water Supply.@ Author unstated.

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van Wyck, Peter. 2005. Signs of danger B waste, trauma and the nuclear threat. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2005d. AA Psychoanalytic Approach to contemporary ecological Threats.@ May 21 (16 pages, unpublished).

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