May 6, 2004

NUCLEAR POWER B

AN INFALLIBLE TECHNOLOGY FOR INFALLIBLE HUMANS?

THE WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Countries with Known Nuclear Weapons

As of 1998, eight countries had nuclear weapons arsenals.

Table 1: The Global Nuclear Arsenal, 12/31/1998 *

Country	Status	Strategic Warheads	Tactical Warheads	Un-specified	Total Arsenal
United States	Declared	8,500	7,000		15,500
Russia	Declared	7,200	9,500		16,700
France	Declared	482	0		482
China	Declared	284	150		434
United Kingdom	Declared	100	100		200
Israel	Unacknowledged			100	100
India	Admitted (1998)			60	60
Pakistan	Admitted (1998)			20	20
Total		16,566	16,750	180	33,496
Equivalence in Hiroshima Bombs					604,900 ^(a)

* ^{Dumas pp. 16-17.}

(a) Assuming each warhead contains a typical 4.5 kilograms of plutonium B that is, the explosive yield of 18.06 Hiroshima bombs B these 33,496 warheads represent the equivalent of 604,900 Hiroshima bombs.

Nuclear-capable Countries

As of 1998, another twelve countries had a significant nuclear weapons capability B Iran, Iraq, Lybia, North Korea, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Romania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa, the latter four having had nuclear weapons on their territory (pp.16-18).

Technically Nuclear-capable Countries

Another eighteen countries technically capable of developing nuclear weapons, had not done so B fourteen European countries and Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea (pp. 16-18).

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

In addition to its nuclear arsenal, the world has some 437 nuclear power plants, operating in 31 countries, supplying electricity to consumers, business and industry. These plants are subject to catastrophic accident, especially as they age. They also increase the chances for diversion of knowledge and materials towards the development of nuclear weapons. The following data were compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (pp. 12 and 19).

Table 2: Number of Nuclear Power Plants, 12/31/95 *

Country	Number
United States	109
Japan, France	51-56
Russia, United Kingdom	29-35
Germany, Canada	20-21
India, South Korea, Sweden, Ukraine	10-16
Switzerland, Taiwan, Bulgaria, Belgium, Spain	5-9
Slovenia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Armenia, South Africa, Netherlands, Mexico, Lithuania, Argentina, China, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Finland, Czech Republic	1-4
Total Number of Reactors	437

* ^{Dumas pp. 20-21.}

Table 3: Age of World Nuclear Power Plants, 12/31/95 *

Age (Years)	Number of Nuclear Power Plants
0-14	227
15-29	197
29-40	18
Total Number of Power Plants	442 **

* ^{Dumas p. 21.}

** ^{The International Atomic Energy Agency gives no explanation for the discrepancy between this total number and the 437 stated as the total numcer of nuclear power plants.}

FISSILE FUEL

Uranium and plutonium are the two most useful fissile fuels. The core of to-day=s nuclear weapons is either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or, more commonly, plutonium-239. Civilian nuclear power reactors usually use uranium enriched at a uranium-235 level of up to 10 percent (pp. 40 and 84).

Uranium

1. Natural Isotopes of Uranium: Naturally occurring uranium is a mixture of three isotopes.

Table 4: Naturally occurring Uranium *

Isotope	Percentage in Natural Uranium	Characteristics	Half-life (Years)
238	99.0	Stable. Non-fissionable	4,500,000,000
235	0.7	The only naturally occurring nuclear fission fuel	700,000,000
234	0.3	--	250,000

* ^Encyclopedia

2. Uranium AEnrichment: The naturally occurring level of uranium-235 in uranium ore, is raised to make in order to make the ore more fissionable. This Aenrichment@ process consists of concentrating uranium-235 by Agaseous diffusion@ B converting the ore into a gas and forcing the gas through a nickel filter. The residue uranium-238 is dubbed Adepleted uranium@ (DU).

According to physicist Ted Taylor, explosives can be made with uranium at enrichment levels above 10 percent. The Hiroshima bomb was a uranium-fueled weapon. (pp. 38, 40 and Caldicott p. 147).

Table 5: Uranium-235 Enrichment in Power Reactors *

Uranium	Percent uranium-235
Natural (Aun-enriched@) uranium ores	0.7 (too low to sustain a chain reaction)
Most civilian nuclear power reactors	10 percent or less
Military nuclear power reactors	20-45
Typical military nuclear weapons grade uranium	90

* ^{Dumas p. 40.}

Plutonium

3. Discovery: Plutonium is a radioactive metal present in very small quantities in association with uranium ores. It was discovered in 1940 at the University of California (Encyclopedia).

4. Plutonium-239: Plutonium-239 is one of sixteen isotopes present in naturally-occurring plutonium. It has a half-life of 24,000 years and is the only isotope of plutonium which can be used as a nuclear fission fuel (p. 14; Encyclopedia).

5. Toxicity of Plutonium: Plutonium is 30 times as potent as radium in producing tumors in animals. The following are data extrapolated from animal studies.

Table 6: Toxicity of Plutonium *

Amount of Plutonium (Grams)	Damage to Humans
0.200 (inhaled)	Lethal to half of exposed humans within 30 days.
0.006 (inhaled)	Lethal to most exposed humans with 18 months B usually of pulmonary fibrosis.
0.000,001	Causes fatal cancers after years to decades B usually of liver, bones, lungs and other organs. It takes 40 years for the liver and 150 for bones to eliminate half of the plutonium embedded in them.

* ^{Dumas pp. 85-86.}

6. Production of Plutonium-239: Nuclear reactors produce plutonium-239 in large quatitities from uranium-238 which is abundant but not fissionable. The chain reaction is as follows:

a. Undergoing fission, uranium-235 gives off neutrons.

b. Uranium-238 absorbs a neutron, becoming uranium-239.

c. Uranium-239 emits a beta particle, becoming neptunium-239.

d. Neptunium-239 emits a beta particle, becoming plutonium-239.

Once begun, the reaction proceeds spontaneously until the uranium fuel rods in the reactor are converted to a uranium-plutonium mixture. The plutonium is then separated by solvent extraction. Even low grade (reactor grade) plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons (pp. 21-22; Encyclopedia).

5. Amount of Plutonium in a Typical Plutonium-based Bomb: About 4,500 grams of plutonium is contained in the core of a typical plutonium-based nuclear weapon. Terrorists could use the plutonium core to disperse radiation even in the absence of a nuclear explosion (pp. 40, 84 and 86).

6. Plutonium Production in Civilian Nuclear Power Plants: The low-grade plutonium produced by nuclear power plants can be used to make nuclear weapons. In 1976, a study at the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory in California, concluded that Athe distinction between military and civilian plutonium [is] essentially false@ (p. 40).

7. Quantity of Plutonium produced in Civilian Nuclear Power Plants: The technology required to extract plutonium from spent power plant fuel has been widely accessible for decades. Indeed, according to Los Alamos nuclear weapons designer Ted Taylor, by 1995, the amount of plutonium that had already been extracted (200,000 kilograms):

a. This is about the amount used to produce all of the nuclear weapons in the world (pp. 21-22 and 38).

b. It represents 33,000,000,000 fatal doses (200,000,000 divided by the inhaled fatal dose of 0.006 grams) B that is, about enough to kill the world population of six billion six times (pp. 84-86).

Table 7: Quantity of Plutonium produced by Nuclear Reactors, (12/31/95) *

Plutonium	Kilograms
Plutonium produced by the world=s 437 nuclear power plants (kilograms/year)	70,000
Total Plutonium: Already extracted from spent power plant fuel and stored (kilograms) Still in spent power plant fuel and stored as such (kilograms)	200,000 ^(a) 1,000,000

* ^{Dumas pp. 21-22, and 39.}

(f) Stored in about 12 countries.

INVENTORY CONTROL

Protection and detection are problems common to all inventories. In a late 1970's study, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) concluded that the best possible record keeping system would probably still have a margin of error of 0.1 percent. More realistically, the best system that could be achieved would have a margin of error of around 1.0 percent (p. 59).

United States

1. Nomenclature: The United States Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguard System is the official government system for keeping track of fissionable materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The usual inventory category Amargin of error@ is called Amaterial unaccounted for@ (MUF) or, after 1978, Ainventory difference@ (ID) (p. 58).

2. Margin of Error: According to the 1996 Department of Energy report, APlutonium: The First 50 Years (1944-1994), the MUF/ID averaged 2.5 percent of the inventory for the 50 years span, and 0.8 percent from the late 1960's to 1994 (pp. 60-61).

3. Plutonium Stocks: In 1995, the combined stocks of plutonium metal held by the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense totaled 111,400 kilograms (p. 60).

4. Amount of Plutonium within the Margin of Error: Thus, in 1995, the amount of plutonium that could have been diverted without being noticed by the record keeping system, was 891 kilograms (0.8 percent of 111,400 kilograms) B enough for 198 nuclear weapons with a core containing a typical 4.5 kilograms of plutonium.

Asuming that each 4.5 kilograms of plutonium has the explosive yield of 18.06 Hiroshima bombs, this is the equivalent of 3,575 Hiroshima bombs (198 multiplied by 18.06) (pp. 60-61, 63 and 86).

World-wide

1. Record Keeping: By comparison with the United States, record keeping systems in other countries are fairly primitive, with an estimated margin of error more like the 2.5 percent reported for the U.S. by the Department of Energy for the 50 year span, 1944-1994 B or perhaps even higher (pp. 60-61).

2. Number of Hiroshima Bombs Unaccounted for in 1997: At the end of 1997, when the global stockpile contained an estimated 36,000 nuclear warheads, if all the records of all the nuclear nations had an MUF/ID of 0.1 percent (the Atomic Energy Commission=s lowest estimate of MUF/ID capability), there would have been 36 nuclear weapons unaccounted for (p. 63).

If the nuclear nations had the more realistic MUF/ID of 2.5 percent, there would have been 900 nuclear weapons unaccounted for B an equivalent of 16, 250 bombs with the explosive yield of the Hiroshima bomb (p. 63).

Table 8: Number of Nuclear Weapons unaccounted for in 1997

(Global Stockpile of 36,000 Nuclear Warheads )*

Assumed Margin of Error (percent of Stockpile)	Number of Nuclear Warheads unaccounted for	Equivalence in Terms of Number of Hiroshima Bombs
0.1 (AEC: Best theoretical)	36	650
0.8 (U.S., late 1960's-1994)	288	5,200
1.0 (AEC: Probable best) )	360	6,500
2.5 (U.S., 1944-1994)	900	16,250

* ^{Dumas p. 63.}

ACCIDENTS

World-wide

1. Under-reporting: The public reporting of nuclear weapons-related accidents are notoriously under-stated. Reliability is so doubtful that data should be taken as representing minimum orders of magnitude only. For instance:

Until 1989, the Chinese did not report publically any nuclear weapons-related accidents (p. 93).

By 1994, the British had reported only a quarter as many accidents as the French (p. 93).

Until 1980, the United States Department of Defense listed 13 accidents as having occurred during the years 1950-1968. In 1980, under pressure, it raised its figure to 31. Then, in 1989, it declassified 1000 accidents which had also occurred during this same period (1950-1968). In these accidents, 272 nuclear weapons had sustained an impact strong enough to detonate their conventional high explosive (pp. 89-90 and 338).

Table 9: Number of Major Accidents involving Nuclear Weapons

reported by the United States for the Period 1950-1968 *

Year	Number of Accidents reported for the Period 1950-68
1969-1980	13
1980-1989	31
1989-1999	1044

* ^{Dumas p. 89-90.}

Nuclear Weapons-related Accidents: During the period 1950-1994, world-wide, there was on average one publically reported nuclear weapons-related accident every six month.

Table 10: Publically reported Nuclear Weapons-related Accidents, 1950-1994 *

Accidents	1950-1974	1975-1994	Total 1950-1994	Yearly Average (45 Year Span)
Involving American Nuclear Forces	48	11	59	1
Involving Other Countries= Nuclear Forces	15	15	30	1
Total for World	63	26	89	2

* ^{Dumas pp. 89-93 and 100-105.}

Military Space-based Nuclear Power Accidents:

During the period 1964-1996, accidents involving nuclear-powered military spacecrafts and satellite occured on avereage once every four years.

Table 11: Accidents involving Nuclear-powered

Military Spacecrafts and Satellites *

Year	Owner- Country	Type of Satellite	Site of radioactivity
1964	United States	Satellite, military navigation (plutonium-238).	Burned in atmosphere.^(a)
1969	Soviet	Spacecraft, Moon-headed	Released radioactivity in upper atmosphere after being aborted in flight.
1969	Soviet	Spacecraft, Moon-headed	Released radioactivity in upper atmosphere after being aborted in flight.
1970	United States	Spacecraft, Moon-headed Apollo 13 (plutonium).	The plutonium powered lunar lander fell into the Pacific Ocean and was never recovered.
1973	Soviet	Satellite.	Fell into the Pacific Ocean, north of Japan.
1978	Soviet	Spacecraft, Cosmos 954 (uranium-235)	Scattered 82 kilograms of radioactive debris in Canada, over an area the size of Austria.
1983	Soviet	Satellite, Cosmos 1402	Fell into the Indian Ocean.
1996	Russian	Spacecraft, Mars-headed (200 grams of plutonium)	Fell into the Pacific Ocean.

* ^{Dumas pp. 95-96.}

(c) Japanese scientists have alleged that the accident was responsible for a tripling the plutonium fallout over their country between 1966 and 1967.

4. Potential Sources of Space Accidents:

a. Radioactive Reator Fuel: As of the late 1980's, 1,500 kilograms of radioactive reactor fuel had been put into earth orbit (p. 97).

b. Space Debris: In 1997, it was estimated that aout 8,000 objects were circling the earth B from used up satellites to lost tools (p. 97).

c. Proposed Nuclear Reactors: AStar Wars,@ the United States strategic missile defense system, calls for 100 or more orbiting nuclear reactors which would power space-base weapons, radars and sensors. If an orbiting reactor is hit by a piece of space debris, it could shatter into millions of tiny pieces (p. 97).

United States B Nuclear Facilities Safeguards Failures

Many threats have been made against nuclear facilities over the years. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is charged with assuring the safe operation of America=s commercial nuclear power plants, compiles data on Asafeguards events@ B events involving nuclear materials, power plants and other facilities. Most of the incidents it lists (69 percent) have involved explosives, incendiary devices or firearms (pp. 44-45 and 191).

Table 12: United States B Nuclear Safeguards Incidents *

Five-Year Span	Number of Incidents
1976-1979 (four years)	271
1980-1984	379
1985-1989	543
1990-1994	583
Total (19 years)	1776
Average number of incidents per year	93

* ^{Dumas p. 45.}

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence, a mainstay of the official security policy of the nuclear weapons states, is a form of international terrorism. The Cold War threat of Amutually assured destruction@ was officially called a Abalance of terror.@ Thus, even democratic governments have provided trans-national groups with a model for terorism B the use of violence or the threat of violence for the express purpose of creating fear and alarm (pp. 30 and 34).

Trans-national Terrorism with Conventional Weapons

No case of terrorists= use of nuclear technology as either weapon or target, has been reported to date. Terrorists may find conventional methods still sufficiently effective or may for the moment see mass destruction as interfering with their goals. Should terrorists, however, decide at any time to use nuclear weapons, they would have no problem accessing these (p. 48).

Terrorism B Incidents and Fatalities World-side

1. Incidents: The United States Department of State compiles data on global terrorism. The average number of terrorist incidents rose from the late 1960's, reaching a peak in the 1980's, and dropping since then to a level which is still 2 2 times that of the late 1960=s (pp. 55-56).

2. Fatalities: The yearly average number of fatalities has followed the same pattern as the number of incidents B rising from the late 1960's, reaching a peak in the 1980's, and dropping since then to a level which in this case is still 13 times that of the late 1960's (p. 56).

Table 13: Incidents of International Terrorism *

Years	Number of Incidents	Average Incidents per Year	Number of Fatalities	Average Fatalitites per Year
1968-72	1450	290	270	54
1973-77	1971	394	890	178
1978-82	2,439	488	1,121	224
1983-87	2,974	595	3,443	689
1988-92	2,345	469	1,460	292
1993-97	1,792	358	1,124	225
Total	12,971	432	8,308	277

* ^{Dumas pp. 54-55.}

SUMMARY

1. WORLD NUCLEAR ARSENAL

a. In 1998, the world had approximately 36,000 nuclear warheads. This represents the explosive yield of 650,000 Hiroshima bombs.

b. Typically, each warhead contained 4.5 kilograms of plutonium. This represents 375,000 doses, each of which would be fatal within 18 months, if inhaled.

2. CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

a. In 1995, the world had approximately 437 civilian nuclear power plants, 18 of them 30 years or older.

Power reactors are usually powered by enriched uranium and hence are less dangerous than nuclear weapons. However, by 1995, 200,000 kilograms of plutonium had already been extracted from their spent fuel.

This amount of plutonium is about how much had been used to produce all the world=s nucelar weapons.

The amount represents 33,000,000,000 fatal doses B enough to kill the world population six times.

3. INVENTORY CONTROL

a. In the United States, in 1995, the amount of plutonium that could have been diverted without being noticed by the record keeping system was equivalent to 3,575 Hiroshima bombs.

b. World-wide, in 1997, the number of nuclear weapons unaccounted for could have been at least 900 B an explosive yield equivalent to 16,250 Hiroshima bombs.

4. ACCIDENTS

The number of accidents involving nuclear weapons is severely under-reported. For example:

a. Until 1989, China did not report any accidents involving nuclear weapons.

b. In 1989, the United States declassifed 1000 accidents for the period 1950-1968.

c. During the period 1950-1994, world-wide, on the average, two accidents involving nuclear weapons were reported publically every year.

d. During the period 1964-1996, acccidents involving nuclear-powered military spacecrafts and satellites have occurred on average once every four years.

e. In the United States, during the period 1976-1994, there were on average 93 safeguard incidents at nuclear facilties every year.

5. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

During the period 1968-1997, there was an average of 432 incidents of (conventional) international terrorism, giving rise to an average of 277 fatalities per year. (On 09/11/02, of course, one act of such terrorism gave rise to over 3000 fatalities).

CONCLUSIONS

Technologies out of Control: Problems at nuclear waste sites have not been discussed. Neither have other-than-nuclear dangerous technologies, such as chemical and biological weapons B and within the latter group, particularly genetically-engineered new life forms. Nevertheless, the point is amply made that the use of dangerous technology is out of control and courts the end of life on earth as we know it.

To be God: The assumption which seems to underlie this frantic toying with disaster is the desire to be omnipotent B as God himself. The denial of risks, including equipment failure and human error, is massive.

REFERENCES

Where unspecified, all page numbers refer to:

Dumas, Lloyd, Lethal Arrogance (St. Martin=s, New York, N.Y.), 1999.

Also:

Caldicott, Helen, The New Nuclear Danger B George W. Bush=s Military-industrial Complex (The New Press, New York, N.Y.), 2002.

The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition (Columbia University/Gale Group, New York, N.Y.), 2000.

***