August 25, 2008

in war we trust – the military Paradigm

War

War defined: War is an annihilative contest. It is a deliberately organized campaign to obliterate the existence of perceived enemies (pp. 9, 17 and 34).

THE Two sub-types of War: Included in this general definition, are the two sub-types of war:

1. A human Enemy (Military War): War is a state (usually open and declared) of armed, hostile conflict between states or nations. It consists of the use of homicidal weapons, in a life-and-death struggle between human groups.

2. A non-human Enemy (Non-military War): War is a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism. It is a struggle between opposing forces, or for a particular end (pp. 9-11. Webster’s new collegiate Dictionary 1975).

human deaths in wars worldwide

war deaths in the 20^th century: Table 1 summarizes political deaths in the 20^th Century.

Table 1: Deaths by War and Oppression, 1900-1999*

Type of Deaths	Number of Deaths (millions)
Genocide and Tyranny	83
Deaths in War: Military 42 millions Civilian 19 “	61
War-related Famine	44
TOTAL DEATHS BY WAR/OPPRESSION	188

* White 2001/2005, p. 2.

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wAR DEATHS IN PERSPECTIVE: During the 20^th Century, one out of every 22 deaths (4.5 percent of all deaths) was caused by war. Table 2 puts war deaths in the perspective of other worldwide plagues.

Table 2, War Deaths in Perspective, World, 1900-1999*

Type of Death (20^th Century)	Number of Deaths (millions)	Percentage of Total
Smallpox	300	7
War (including genocide and famine)	188	5
Smoking	90	2
AIDS (1981-1998)	12	0
Homicide	9	0
Natural Disasters (floods, earthquakes, volcanoes)	4	0

Total deaths (all types)	4,126	100

* White 2001/2005, pp. 3-9.

WAR DEATHS UNDER NON-COMMUNISM AND COMMUNISM: During the 20^th Century, it was about as dangerous to live under non-communist as under communist rule. Table 3 summarizes political deaths in the non-communist and the communist areas of the world.

Table 3: Deaths under Non-communist and Communist Rule, 1900-1999 ^(a)

Type of Deaths	Number (in	of Deaths millions)	Total
	Non-communism	Communism
Genocide and Tyranny	39	44^(b)	83
War Military Civilian	37 13	5^(c) 6^(c)	61
War-related Famine	7	37^(d)	44
TOTAL	96	92	188

(a) White 2001/2005, p. 3.

(b) Including intentional famine.

(c) These are deaths in “Communist-inspired” wars, such as, for example the Russian Civil War, the Vietnam War and the Korean War. Some may disagree that Communists are to blame for these wars, and may transfer these (5+6) = 11 million deaths entirely to the Non-communist camp.

(d) Excluding intentional famine.

wars and atrocities of the 20^th century

WARS AND ATROCITIES:

1900-1924: Mexico, 1910-1920; Colombia, 1899-1902; Brazil, Rubber workers and Indians, during this period; World War I, 1914-1918 (15 million dead); North African Riffian War, 1920-1926; Congo Free State 1886-1908 (7.5 million dead); African Maji-Maji War 1905-1907; African Herero War, 1904-1907; Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902; Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (6 million dead); Balkan Wars, 1912-1913; Greco-Turkish War, 1919-1922; Armenian Genocide, 1915; Chinese Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1901; Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; Warlord China, 1916-1928; Philippine War, 1899-1902.

1925-1949: Chaco War (Central South America), 1932-1935; World War II in the West, 1939-1945 (36 million dead); Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939; Libyan War, 1911-1931; Greek Civil War, 1944-1949; Abyssinian War, 1935-1941; German Expulsions, 1945-1947 (2 millions dead); Stalin Dictatorship, 1924-1953 (21 million dead); India-Pakistan War, 1947; Nationalist China, 1927-1937 (3 million dead); French Indochina War, 1945-1954; East Indies War, 1945-1949; Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949 (3 million dead); World War II in the East, 1937-1945 (15 million dead).

1950-1974: Guatemala, 1960-1996; Colombia, 1948-1962; Brazil, Indian massacres, during this period; East Germany, 1945-1989; Tito Dictatorship, 1945-1990; Romania, 1947-1989; Algerian War, 1954-1962; Sudan, 1956-1972; Biafra, 1967-1970; Congo Crisis, 1960-1965; Angola, 1961-1975; Uganda, 1972-1978; Burundi, 1972; Mozambique, 1961-1975; North Yemen 1962-1970; Bangladesh, 1971; China (Mao Zedong), 1949-1976 (15 million dead); Korean War, 1950-1953 (3 million dead); Vietnam War, 1965-1973 (2 million dead); Indonesia, 1965; China, Great Leap Forward, 1959-1963 (28 million dead).

1975-1999: El Salvador, 1980-1992; Nicaragua, 1980’s; Argentina, 1976-1977; Liberia, 1989-1993; Bosnia, 1992-1995; Kurds, 1980-1992; Congolese Civil War, 1998-2003 (3.3 million dead); Angola, 1975-1995; Lebanon, 1975-1990; Sudan, 1983-? (2 million dead); Burundi, 1993-1996; Uganda, 1982-1985; Rwanda, 1994; Mozambique, 1975-1992; Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1989; Afghanistan, 1980-1999 (1 ½ million dead); Gulf War, 1991; Ethiopia, 1962-1991; Somalia, 1990’s; North Korea, 1948-?; Cambodian Civil War, 1979-1991; Cambodia (Khmer Rouge), 1975-1979 (1 ½ million dead); East Timor, 1975-1985.

(White 1999b, pp. 1-11. The numbers are White’s 1999 estimates, some of which he modified slightly in subsequent years. Bold letters signify wars with a million or more deaths. For 1900-1924, Congo Free State; and for 1975-1999, Congolese Civil War, White 2001/2004, p. 5).

WAR DEATH RATES:

1900-1924: 2.3 percent of the world’s population.

1925-1949: 4.2 percent of the world’s population.

1950-1974: 1.6 percent of the world’s population.

1975-1999: 0.3 percent of the world’s population (White 1999b, pp. 3, 7, 9 and 11).

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the 20^th century’s ten worst Atrocities: Table 4 summarizes the wars/atrocities in the 20^th century which account for 82 percent of the total deaths through war/atrocity.

Table 4: The worst Atrocities of the 20^th Century^(a)

War/Atrocity	Number of Deaths (millions)
World War II, 1937/39-1945	55⁽^b)
China, under Mao Zedong, including famine, 1949-1976	40
USSR, under Stalin, including World War II-era atrocities, 1924-1953	20
First World War, including Armenian massacres, 1914-1918	15⁽^c)
Russian Civil War, 1918-1921	8.8
China, Warlord and Nationalist Era, 1917-1937	4
Congo Free State, (1900)-1908	3^(d)
Korean War, 1950-1953	2.8^(e)
Second Indochina War, including Laos and Cambodia, 1960-1975	2.8
Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949	2.5^(f)
Total deaths, 10 worst atrocities	153.9

Total deaths through war, 20^th Century	188
Ten worst atrocities as percentage of total 20^th Century war deaths	82 percent

(a) White 2001/2004, pp. 1-3 and 5. White 1999a, pp. 1-2. Includes battle deaths, civilian casualties of war, democide, and war-related deaths, such as famine caused by war-engendered economic disruption.

(b) Total 55 million deaths. Soldiers, 20 million.

(d) These are 3 million deaths which occurred during the 20^th Century. The death toll for the full period of the Congo Free State, 1886-1908, is 7.5 million.

(e) Total 2.8 million deaths. Soldiers, 1.2 million.

(f) Total 2.8 million deaths. Soldiers, 1.2 million.

THE 20^TH CENTURY’S TEN WORST ATROCITIES, PROPORTIONALLY: Table 5 summarizes the ten worst wars and atrocities, in terms of their intensity.

Table 5: War/Atrocities – The ten highest Percentages

of the national Population killed,

20^th Century*

War/Atrocity	Percentage of the national Population killed
Southwest Africa, 1904-1907	38
Cambodia, 1975-1979	21
Congo Free State, 1886-1908	20
Poland, 1939-1945	20
Equatorial Guinea, 1972-1979	18
Turkey, 1914-1918	15
Serbia, 1914-1918	13
USSR (Stalin), 1924-1953	13
USSR, 1941-1945	12
Yugoslavia, 1941-1945	11

* White 2001/2004, pp. 3-4.

Lack of Correlations: Studying the 50 countries with the highest proportion of their population killed in any war/atrocity, Matthew White, author of “The Atlas of the twentieth Century” (online), finds no correlation between the proportion of the population killed in a country, and such parameters as race (white, black, yellow, brown), religion (Christians, Moslems, Buddhists, Atheists), political ideology (left, right, middle), socio-economic level (rich, poor), degree of industrialization (industrial, agrarian), concentration of power in the government (monarchy, dictatorship, democracy), or size of neighbor. Regarding this latter parameter, White comments:

“We’ve got innocent victims invaded by big, bad neighbors, and we’ve got plenty of countries who brought it on themselves, sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind” (White 2001/2004, p. 4).

All types of countries are represented among the first 50 countries with the highest proportion of their population killed in a war/atrocity (White 2001/2004, p. 4).

world military expenditures

WORLD mILITARY sPENDING: In 2008, world military expenditures totaled 1.5 trillion dollars. The yearly increase 2005-2006 was 3.5 percent. The decadal increase 1988-1999 was 37 percent. Table 6 summarizes expenditures by region, for 2008.

Table 6: World Military Expenditures, by Region, 2008^(a)

World Region	Military Expenditures (billion dollars)	Percentage of World Total
United States	711^(b)	48
Europe	289	20
China	122	8
East Asia/Australasia	120	8
Middle East/North Africa	82	5
Russia	70	5
Latin America	39	3
Central/South Asia	30	2
Sub-Saharan Africa	10	1
World Total	1,473	100

World Total (2006) Yearly increase, 2005-2006 Decadal increase, 1988-1999	1,204 3.5 percent^{(c) (d)} 37 percent^(c)	-

(a) Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation 2008, cited in Shah 2008, pp. 2, 7 ½ and 11.

(b) The figure $711 billions is the best possible approximation of the United States’ military expenditures. In 2008, the “defense” budget (the budget of the Department of Defense, the “Pentagon” budget, the category “national defense”) was $518 billion. This “defense” budget, however, does not include:

i. Nuclear weapons programs, categorized in the Department of Energy – for which the Administration has requested $29 billion for 2009.

ii. “Combat funds” for wars, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are supplemental requests approved by Congress separately – for which the administration has requested $170 billion for 2009.

iii. Costs, such as general care and health care for veterans, military training and/or aid, and secret operations, which are either categorized under other departments, or are counted separately.

(d) The United States is responsible for 80 percent of this increase.

Table 7 summarizes world military spending by country.

Table 7: World Military Expenditures, by Country, 2008*

Country	Military Expenditures (billion dollars)	Percentage of World Total
United States	711	48
China	122	8
Russia	70	5
United Kingdom	55	4
France	54	4
Japan	41	3
Germany	38	3
Italy	31	2
Saudi Arabia	30	2
North Korea	25	2
India	22	2
Australia	17	1
Brazil	16	1
Canada	15	1
Spain	14	1
Turkey	12	1
Israel	11	1

* Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation 2008, cited in Shah 2008, p. 9.

WORLD MILITARY SPENDING IN PERSPECTIVE: The United Nations, and all of its agencies and funds, distribute about $20 billion a year ($3 per world inhabitant). This is 1.3 percent of the world’s expenditures for the military and the UN combined.

As of May 31, 2008, the arrears of member countries to the Regular Budget was $1.2 billion (of which the share of the United States was $0.85 billion) (Global Policy Forum 2008, p. 1).

Table 8 summarizes these priorities, for 2008.

Table 8: World Expenditures, for the Military and for the United Nations

A Comparison, 2008^(a)

World	Total (billion dollars)	Dollars per world inhabitant^(b)
Military expenditures, 2008	1,473	221
United Nations distributions, 2008^(c)	20	3

Total (Military + UN)	1,493	-
Percent UN of Total (Military + UN)	1.3 percent	-

Ratio Military: UN	74:1	-

(a) Global Policy Forum 2008. p. 1. United States Bureau of the Census 2006, p. 3.

(b) On the basis of a 2008 world population of 6.68 billion.

THE PRIORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES: Table 9 summarizes the allocation of tax dollars in the United States.

Table 9: United States, Allocation of Tax Dollars, 2007^(a)

Activity	Percentage of Total Tax Dollars
Military Current Spending . . . . . . 29 percent Spending for past Wars . 14 “	43
Interest on the non-military Federal Debt	11
Health Research and Services	20
Responses to Poverty	12
Government Operations	7
Social Programs	3
Science, Energy and the Environment	3
Non-military international Programs	1
Total Taxes ($2,047 billions)	100

(a) Friends Committee on National Legislation 2008, cited in Shah 2008, p. 14.

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Table 10 summarizes the three largest categories in the United States’ discretionary budget.

Table 10: United States, Discretionary Budget, the three largest Categories, 2008^(a)

Category	Billion Dollars	Percentage of Total
National Defense^(b)	481	52
Education	59	6
Health	52	6

Total discretionary Budget	930	100

(a) Shah 2008, pp. 11-12 and 15-16. The discretionary budget is that money over which the President and Congress have direct control. (This is in contrast to the mandatory budget – that money which must be spent in compliance with existing laws, such as social security benefits, Medicare, and the interest on the national debt).

(b) For the definition of “national defense,” see the present document under “World military Expenditures,” “World Military Spending,” Table 6, “World Military Expenditures, by Region, 2008.”

The military Paradigm

WAR IS HOMICIDE: Throughout history, philosophers and social scientists have invariably and automatically assumed that the only possible form of war, is the military sub-type of war – that is, war between human groups.

Whereas the general concept of war is an annihilative struggle, no matter the nature of the enemy, the military paradigm reduces war to only one of its two sub-types – the sub-type in which humans are the enemy. War is defined only as an organized armed engagement in which humans kill or mutilate other humans as efficiently as possible. The nature of war is necessarily mass-homicidal (pp. 5 and 55. See the present document under “War,” “The two Sub-types of War”).

methodS of war:

1. Total Destruction: In the military form of war, large-scale massacre has traditionally been the mode of enemy annihilation. The historical trend has been toward ever more efficient means of doing so.

In Western civilization, as reported in the Old Testament (1,000 B.C.E.), Yahweh orders the Israelis to destroy men, women and children, as well as systems of life support, so that they can take:

“the whole land of Canaan to own in perpetuity” (Genesis 17:21, cited p. 30).

Forbidding any “pact with them,” Yahweh orders the Israelis to:

“exterminate [all of Palestine’s inhabitants – ] Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, Canaanites, Hivites and Jebusites (Exodus 23:24, cited p. 30).

The traditional mode of whole-sale massacre has prevailed through the centuries. During the Second World War, it was applied to the cities of Dresden (February 1945) and Hiroshima (August 6, 1945), and to the country of Vietnam (1964-1975).

Total destruction as the intent of the national defense policy of the United States, was affirmed, in 1967, by Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense 1961-1968):

“Offensive capability, or what I will call the capability for assuring the destruction of the Soviet Union, is far and away the most important requirement we have to meet . . .” (McNamara 1967, cited pp. 28 and 60).

During the latter part of the last century, the total destruction concept was applied to Nicaragua (1981-1990), and East Timor (1999), among other sites.

During the present century, the policy has been applied to Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (beginning in 2003, with the “Shock and Awe” campaign).

2. Inflicting as few Casualties as possible: The advice to restrict the number of enemy casualties in military war, was given long ago – notably by Sun Tzu (c.500-320 B.C.E.), the name used by a group of unknown Chinese authors who wrote The art of war, a sophisticated treatise on war, which includes the philosophy and logistics of war, as well as sections on espionage, strategy and tactics. The core text was probably written by one person, early in the Warring States Period (c. 453-221 B.C.E.). Sun Tzu’ s counsel is to inflict the fewest possible casualties:

“The best battle is the battle that is won without being fought” (Sun Tzu, cited pp. 30 and 61. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

The work has deeply influenced Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese military thinking.

The intent to focus on military targets, and thereby reduce casualties, is clear in a statement made, in 1971, by Soviet Minister of Defense, Andrei Grechko (Minister of Defense 1967-1976). The statement is the counterpart to that made by Robert McNamara, in 1967:

“The Strategic Rocket forces, which constitute the basis of the military might of our armed forces, are designed to annihilate the means of the enemy’s nuclear attack, large groupings of his armies and his military bases; to destroy his military industries; and to disorganize the political and military administration of the aggressor, as well as his rear and transport” (Grechko 1971, cited pp. 28 and 60-61).

3. Subjugation only: The more limited intent to kill only that segment of the enemy population which resists domination, forms a connecting thread from the imperial systems of Ancient Egypt and Greece, to those of the present time. The autonomy of the adversary is to be destroyed (as in slavery, feudal bondage and colonialism), not the adversary himself. The intent is to sever the connection between the people (agents) and their behavior (pattern they bear).

The Old Testament (1,000 B.C.E.) reports that Yahweh entertained the notion.

The Veda (1,500-500 B.C.E., the literature of the Aryans who invaded Northwest India in 1,500 B.C.E., the oldest scriptures of Hinduism) celebrate this option as a rightful reward for certain kings.

Classical Greek philosophers Plato (427?-347 B.C.E.) and Aristotle (382-322 B.C.E.) imply this option for controlling “barbarian” peoples.

The Arthashastra (150-350 C.E.), a treatise on statecraft, economic policy and military strategy, based on material written during the Mauryan Empire (325-183 B.C.E., the first great flowering of the Indian civilization), also celebrates this option as a rightful reward for certain kings.

German philosopher Georg Hegel (1770-1831 C.E.) endorses this option, considering it the most basic relationship between humans, and recommending its institutionalization in wars between nation-states:

“Each aims at the destruction and death of the other [until one is terrified out of choosing a transcendent attitude to the body, and submits in bondage to his adversary . . . This is] spirit’s ultimate instrument [for] universalizing Right and Law on Earth” (Hegel, cited pp. 31 and 61).

Prussian general and military strategist Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), in On war, is ambivalent on the subject, using the “kill the agent” and “kill the pattern” distinction, but neither declaring it overtly, nor enunciating the general principle it expresses:

* On the one hand, von Clausewitz sees the goal of war as purely annihilative:

“destroying the adversary.”

* On the other hand, he sees the goal of war as only the destruction of the adversary’s autonomy:

“War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (von Clausewitz undated, cited pp. 31 and 61).

4. Assigning Value to the Enemy: How much value the enemy has, is an ethical judgment. Absolute dis-valuation of the adversary is not a necessary consequence of even the intention to annihilate. Greek philosopher Heraclitus (c.535-c.475 B.C.E.), for instance, conceived of the opposition in military war, as a just opposition by its very nature, because it ensures that no part of nature can overstep its measures. The opposition orders the world as it should be ordered, even if this means that one’s own self or state is thereby restrained (Heraclitus, described pp. 24 and 60).

Progress: In general, the ritual of war by human sacrifice remains an a priori given from the point of view of the military paradigm. Inter-tribal and international wars have been confined to either the first option (total destruction) or the third option (subjugation only). Sun Tzu’s advice (the second option – inflicting as few casualties as possible) has not been heeded, much less has Heraclitus’ advice (the fourth option, valuation of the enemy) been heeded. Non-homicidal methods of war, such as economic competition, cultural superiority, battle for a better life, have not been favored.

The trend, however, between the first (total destruction), second (as few enemy casualties as possible), and third option (subjugation only) shows progress in civilization. It expresses a more inclusive enablement of life, an ascending value attributed to the adversary. In the second and third option, the adversary retains some value. He is not destroyed but preserved – although in a form reduced to the extension of another’s will. The transition between the first and the third options marks the principal difference between civilization’s earlier and later forms of military genocide.

(Pp. 24, 30-33 and 60).

preparing for homicide: As a whole, societies subscribe to the genocide military paradigm of war, and prepare for it in ways which follow a common pattern:

1. An Army: The society segregates a group of war specialists, giving it the task to execute war objectives.

2. An authoritarian Command Structure: The army has a rank-ordered command structure which relies on fear to coerce recruits into performing its mass-kill operations, even though, while they do this, the recruits are risking en masse death at the hands of the enemy.

3. Compliance through Indoctrination: The army achieves compliance on the part of recruits through immersion in indoctrination, obedience conditioning, and imposition of uniformity in all aspects of life (“boot-camp methods”). The goal is the elimination of all individuality and choice.

4. Specialized Technology: The army has its own autonomous technological development program whose scientific telos is ever-more destructive homicidal weapons. Outside the nation-state, the army has monopoly in the use of these weapons.

5. Moral Sanction: The society provides moral sanction for the overall military program by enshrining as a supreme ethical good, the sacrifice of one’s life for military goals (pp. 5 and 8. See the present document under “The immorality of Nations,” “’Rational’ Immorality,” “When Morality is not possible”).

A SPURIOUS LOGIC: Focusing only on mass homicide, and taking only the interests of one’s own side into consideration, established military and geopolitical logic has a lock-step structure from which all other choices are sealed off.

The sequence of inferences is commonly as follows:

1. “A” is opposed to us. This is immoral, and “A” is, therefore, our enemy.

2. For our own national interest, “A” must yield.

3. Therefore, we must have the ability to make “A” yield militarily, be willing to threaten him with our weapons, and, if necessary, be willing to use our weapons.

4. If “A” continues opposed, we must attack.

5. If “A” resists, we must seek to destroy him through large-scale homicide, disablement, and the destruction of his life-means.

An incoherent Sequence: Each step in this inferential sequence of the military paradigm, is a non-sequitur. The sequence is incoherent and presumptive at every step. The logic is spurious. Yet, in customary war thought, each step, clothed in the formal language of identification and deduction, leads to a conclusion expressed with absolute certainty as a necessary truth, and affirmed with hypnotic repetition.

The sequence is the standard formula for the justification of war as necessary – “strategic necessity,” “military necessity,” “necessary for national security,” “necessary for defense,” “necessary for the national interest,” etc . . .

Yet once the pattern is exposed, it can be seen as an undeviating lock-step sequence of inferences invariably leading to the conclusion that mass homicide is necessary.

In his article, “The Relevance of Nuremberg,” published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1971, Richard Wasserstrom points to this closure of national institutions to morality and reason. Wasserstrom describes national institutions as having a “theoretical incapacity” to perceive or find against war crimes perpetrated by their own governments, even where such crimes can be shown to have occurred, and be the responsibility of the government.

Unrecognized in the sequence, are countless alternatives. Conventionally advanced as a simple sequence of necessary steps to protect the national interest, the sequence is, in fact, a pyramid of choices, each one made in the direction of war – and each one concealing all other options, some of which would lead in the direction of outcomes other than war (pp. 9-10. Wasserstrom 1971, cited p. 53. See the present document under “Harnessing War,” “Controlling the Monster,” No. 2, “The Arguments”).

The Range of Options denied: In its sequence of assumptions leading to “necessary” war, the military negates a range of options, even within its own narrow paradigm of a war against humans by personalities devoid of feelings.

For example:

* The entire World: At one extreme of choice, a human personality could, through force, appropriate as its sphere of interest, the entire world.

* Defense only: At the other extreme, a human personality could adopt a policy of strictly defensive armed capacity aimed at repelling either invasion or internal revolution.

These two extremes, both resting on the military paradigm of war, lead to very different projects – the former, a project of unlimited aggressive reach, the latter, one of self-reproduction only.

Yet, in geopolitical discourse, these two extremes are not customarily distinguished. On the contrary, they are presumed to be the same. The opposed alternatives of national aggression and national defense are made to appear as if there were no choice between them.

For example:

* Security through Aggression: Super-powers, and even weaker nations, typically characterize their armed invasion of smaller countries as “defensive,” “necessary to defend their own borders” or “to repel enemy aggression,” even when the attacks on the smaller country are unilateral, unreciprocated, against impoverished foes, and/or at a distance thousands of miles from the invader’s national borders (as was the case for the United States’ attacks on Vietnam in the 1960’s, Afghanistan, in 2001, and Iraq, in 2003).

Fundamental distinctions and contradictions in terms are thereby normalized, and the myth of national security through mass-homicide aggression is perpetuated (pp. 14-15).

only one human Personality: How the military conceptualizes the nature of the human personality determines its war strategies.

The military’s concept of humans is that they are:

1. Malleable in either their individual or group form.

2. Motivated most effectively by physical fear.

3. Controllable only by punitive, vertically-structured authority.

4. Expressing their highest potential when they are an organized armed power of the state.

The Range of Options denied: In real life, there is an infinite number of forms and shades of human personalities, each one of which offers an opportunity for choice, and consequently, a judgment which can lead to non-military war (where the enemy is not human).

Yet the assumption by the military is that there is only this one type of human personality. The assumption is so taken for granted, that its negation is automatically dismissed as “naïve” (pp. 13-14. See the present document under “The Immorality of Nations,” “’Rational’ Immorality”).

greatness measured by kill-capacity: In the military paradigm, excellence in war means the ability to kill efficiently masses of human beings. For nations, kill-capacity is proof of greatness. Our military paradigm is still at the killer-gang stage of development.

The methodical coldness with which this killing is done, is described graphically by Argentine Marxist revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1928-1967):

“Hate is a factor in the struggle, intransigent hate for the enemy which takes one beyond the natural limitation of a human being, and converts one into an effective, violent, single-minded, cold, killing-machine” (pp. 5 and 32. “Che” Guevara undated, cited p. 50. Wikipedia 2008 “Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara,” p. 1).

paramilitary entities OF THE SAME MOLD: By virtue of their similar logic of organization and action, intelligence agencies, the national secret police, paramilitary organizations and similar entities, form a common type with uniformed armed forces. The homicidal attacks, torture, and imprisonment of internal and external “enemies” executed by these institutions, is often more routine and mass-destructive than those of the army (p. 52).

harnessing War

CONTROLLING THE MONSTER: During the past 2,000 years, theoreticians have sought to place moral or legal limits on the methods and targets of war. However, even here, where the intent of their argument is to vitiate war, the authors still assume the military paradigm, without question, and thereby leave two of its assumptions un-scrutinized.

1. Assumptions: Un-scrutinized assumptions include:

a. Military War: The authors assume that the mass homicide model of military war is the only possible kind of war. They see war only as a program of killing and disabling other humans in great numbers, and, therefore, think of it as necessarily requiring the use of mass-homicidal weapons.

Exclusive focus on this narrow, military sub-type of war, renders impossible a grasp of the more general sense in which humanity wages war, and hence, prevents an understanding of the evolutionary value of war.

The all-or-nothing Fallacy: One of the consequences of restricting war to only its military sub-type, is the all-or-none fallacy – seeing the only war choice as either mass homicide or pacifist rejection of all violence.

b. The “tribal a priori”: The authors have a systematic bias toward their own side – the side on which they themselves have been placed by the circumstance of either national or allied citizenship. They consider only the material interests and moral assumptions of this one side.

This bias is revealed in the use of value-loaded terms, the truth of which is not substantiated but simply assumed – for instance, “free and democratic” for one’s own side, and “totalitarian dictatorship” for the other (pp. 5-6, 50-53 and 55).

2. The Arguments: The arguments which are based on the above two assumptions, are, of course, colored by these assumptions.

Two types of arguments are made:

a. “Just War”: “Just war” and “moral means” arguments describe those occasions when the systematic killing or maiming of large groups of other humans, is moral.

Justifications for war and the legitimate means by which it can be carried out, have been prominent in Western philosophical discourse since the reflections of Saint Augustine (354-430 C.E.), in The City of God; and “Question 40,” “Question 105,” and “Question 125” by Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 C.E.), in Summa theologica.

These works, however, as well as recent work on the nuclear bomb method (which threatens its users), all have assumed the mass-homicide model of military war. In the words of Nicholas Fotion and Gerard Elfrom, in Military ethics (1986), the goal is:

“to control the military monster, at least to some degree” (Fotion and Elfrom 1986, cited pp. 6 and 50).

But that this monster is the necessary pattern of war, is assumed. The monster needs to be restrained by such means as arms control, specific targeting, the abolition of specific weapons, and/or world-law armies.

(Harnessing War, Controlling the Monster, The Arguments, continued)

b. Strategic Analysis Calculations: Arguments based on game theory, decision theory, strategic analysis, and other “rational” calculation, seek to prescribe those strategies of systematic human killing and maiming, which, either by threat or actual enactment, maximize payoffs for one side.

The Zero-sum Game Theory: The prevailing paradigm of military and geopolitical strategic rationality, assumes the zero-sum game model – that is, that the self-interest of each side can be won only at the expense of the other. Whatever is deprived from one side is won by the other.

In his chapter, “Contributions of Game Theory to Peace Education,” in the book edited by Thomas Perry and Dianne De Mille, Nuclear war – the search for solutions (1985), Anatol Rapaport points out that this simplistic and maximally hostile framework of rationality means that:

“the opponent will always calculate so as to do his worst to you as he possibly can” (Rapaport 1985, cited pp. 7 and 53).

This monolithically presumptive military conceptualization leads easily to the conclusion that the enemy is immoral and needs to be conquered, by either threatened or enacted killing. Each step in the sequence is justified as strategically necessary for “national security,” “national interest” or “the defense of the country.” One’s own government is always blameless, or at least well-meaning (pp. 5-6, 27 and 50-51. See the present document under “The military Paradigm,” “A spurious Logic”).

a new PERSPECTIVE – THE Self and war

different wars for different selves: Despite the assurances of our political leaders, national wars are not driven by requirements of national necessity. At both the individual and aggregate level, self-concept is a radically open question, and different selves lead to different kinds and occasions for war.

The lines of life and death which war draws, reflect what people will sacrifice in order to keep – what is ultimately their self and what is not. The possibilities for different kinds of war are endless, from a war to keep a nationally-pervasive self-delusion, or one to advance the narrow interests of money capital, to one against all that detracts from the common well-being of humanity.

THE MANY FACES OF TRUTHFUL SELVES:

1. If the Enemy is human: Even in the restrictive sub-type of a war between human groups, there are a myriad of possibilities for the self/other axis which the military paradigm fails to consider.

a. The individual Self alone: At the most primitive level of self/other disjunction, is the possibility, described by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), of merely individual selves, driven by fear or an appetite for power, to wage a bellum omnium contra omnes (a war of all against all).

Even this very narrow concept admits countless possibilities for the self. At one extreme, the self may be a brutish, short existence, a mere pawn of chance in the mortal struggle. At the other extreme, it may be so vainglorious, so infantile in its delusion of omnipotence, as to negate all otherness, including nature – as do, for instance, the “great powers” or would-be world conquerors.

b. The individual Self as a Patriot: Even a patriotic self has many forms because there are many types of national identification. For super-power citizens, patriotism may be on the basis of an assumed destiny of world dominion, “being number one.” More generally, patriotism may be on the basis of geography (“I am a citizen of the United States”), on the basis of the nation’s civil and political institutions (as is conventional in the British tradition), on the basis of the past (as is essential to the Jew), or on the basis of the potential which the patriotism has of contributing to human well-being (for world citizens).

c. Other Types of individual Selves: The range of possibilities for the self/other disjunction is infinite because the range of possibilities for the self is infinite. The self can be a seller in a market-place contest of survival and elimination; it can be a soul seeking the annihilative conquest of all attachment to material objects of desire; it can be a vehicle of genetic reproduction in the evolutionary war for continued life; or it can be an exclusive occupant of a bounded world space, drawing lines of death by its very processes of metabolic exchange with the world.

d. The Self as a Community Member: The self may be first and foremost a community member, such as a tribal member, a loyal vassal of a warrior clan or imperium, or the patriotic pawn of a national program.

e. The Self as Member of a Class: Yet again, the self may be neither fully individual nor fully collective, but rather confined to an economic class role, with limits on its actions set by a mode of social production – as in wars where the ruling classes on opposite sides support each other, even if it is against their own people (as happened in 1871, during the Franco-Prussian War, when the Paris Commune was repressed by both the French and Prussian armies).

2. If the Enemy is non-human: Where the enemy is non-human, the possibilities for non-military war, are again endless. Some of these wars may be detrimental to humanity, such as the war by industrialized agriculture against all weeds, pests, “non-useful” forms of life, and biodiversity in general. Some are beneficial to humanity, such as wars against disease, illiteracy, destructive falsehood, corruption, tyrannies, and toxic pollutants (pp. 9-12, 14, 18, 34 and 54-55. See the present document under “Choosing the national Enemy,” “Innumerable possible Forms of War”).

the face of A pretendED Self: Where war is waged against a human enemy, the self, on either the individual or aggregate level, is often claimed to be a national self – a patriotic self aiming to protect and advance a high human value, such as “freedom.” Such is the claim, for instance, of the government of the United States at the present time.

* If this were truly so, this self could not consistently elect to transfer a maximum of wealth and power from poorer countries to itself by means of lethal weapons. Such a project of exploitation would contradict its declared patriotic identity.

* However, this project of exploitation would be quite consistent with a self seeking before all else, national accumulation or ascendance.

Which self an individual or nation really is, gives the ontological bearing for what the individual or nation decides to do. In this example, the patriotic self is a mere disguise for a self which exposes itself by its actions as an acquisitor of ever more of the world.

Thus the saying:

“War reveals a society’s inner nature” (pp. 11-12).

The immorality of nations

“RATIONAL” IMMORALITY: Civilian leaders do not subscribe as overtly to the military concept of the human personality (malleable, fearsome, responding to authority, violent), as they do to the weapons which this military personality produces.

Nevertheless, the human personality as characterized by the military, underlies the concept of the national personality known as “the patriot.” It is a concept of the human personality which rules out higher levels of purpose, such as cooperative autonomy, and rules in ever-more brutal possibilities (See the present document under “The military Paradigm,” “Only one human Personality”).

For example:

* When Morality is not possible: A human personality (such as a patriot) which would appropriate as its own, another country’s specific interests (as the United Nations Charter would have us do), is too different from the human personality as conceived by the military, to be compatible with it. The difference between these two conceptualizations of the human personality, with regards to motivation and capacity, is irreconcilable.

* When Immorality is “rational”: On the other hand, a project of appropriating another country by subordinating its productive resources, its economic system, its political rule, its diplomatic posture, or, at the totalitarian extreme, subordinating all of these at once, is quite compatible and even consistent with the military concept of the human personality.

This immorality has been the traditional “defense” policy of the United States throughout the world. Indeed, this is the current norm of great power relations with weaker, “less developed” countries, and is accepted by established geopolitical strategists, as “realistic” and “necessary” to maintain vital interests. It is “rational” in the sense that it falls within the range in which the military personality functions (pp. 12-14. See the present document under “The military Paradigm,” “Preparing for Homicide,” No. 5, “Moral Sanction”).

(The Immorality of Nations, “’Rational’ Immorality,” “When Immorality is ‘rational,’” continued)

Authors have repeatedly recognized the immorality of nations:

* George Will, United States conservative political analyst, comments, in 1984:

“Vietnam was positively Athenian next to what we’re involved in, in El Salvador, but we must recognize we’re not there for the interests of El Salvador or anyone else’s but ours. Sometimes, a great nation has to pursue a policy whatever its cost to others” (Will 1984, cited pp. 14 and 54).

* Trita Parsi, faculty member at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, MD, counsels, in 2007:

“Great powers behave like this. There is no innocent party in the Middle East or elsewhere. A lot of people are focused on how the United States is behaving. It’s very difficult to see other super-powers, or regional super-powers, not having behaved similarly in the past. All I am trying to say is, I think putting a moral dimension into these things is quite futile, because there is no great power that has behaved morally, period” (Parsi 2007).

The NATIONAL ruling Group

THE RULING GROUP – DEFINITION: A nation’s ruling group consists of its decision-makers. The group is composed of those who occupy senior state offices, senior political party positions, and/or are owners of private capital. Most in this group, of course, are nationals but the group also includes foreigners who hold office and/or own capital.

As a group, this elite, privileged minority:

1. Directs national production.

2. Controls the use of the nation’s major means of production.

3. Controls the use of the nation’s major means of destruction.

4. Use the military establishment, and the wars it undertakes, to consolidate or augment their power to command and/or augment their income.

This definition of “ruling group” differs in two ways from the definition which the German social philosopher Karl Marx (1818-1883) gave to “ruling-class,” in that:

* It includes occupants of senior state offices and of senior political party positions.

* It excludes those owners of social means of production whose position of rule does not depend on armed forces for its sustainment. These owners do not participate in the connection between the goals of the ruling group and the nation’s wars.

It is the connection between the ruling group and war which needs to be understood. The ruling group gains from war, regularly using the pretext of “national defense” or “national security,” to enhance their own privileged position of office or wealth. Their personal goal is achieved through national military means. War enables them to continue in authority despite domestic dissatisfaction (re-directed toward an external enemy), make extravagant profits from the manufacture of weapons and national arms races, and gain directly from the seizure of foreign lands, markets, resources, strategic sites and/or labor pools.

Contrary to the (naïve) conventional dogma which insists that they do, national military establishments do not exist to protect national peoples as a whole. They exist to protect the ruling group, and are used by this group to consolidate and enhance their power (pp. 15 and 54-55. See the present document under “The National ruling Group, “‘Necessity’ pretended by the ruling Group”).

“Necessity” pretended by THE RULING GROUP: The systematic denial of alternative national options by the ruling group, provides cover for its hidden agenda. History has shown that ruling groups use the goal of “national defense” or “national security” as the pretext for what is, in fact, the advancement of their own privileged positions, in terms of authority and/or wealth.

The group pretends that war will be the nation’s salvation from external threat, when, in truth, it will enhance their own quite private advantage, by means of several venues:

* For all members in the ruling group, war will consolidate their authority in the face of domestic unrest (which the war will re-direct toward an external “enemy”).

* For the ruling group’s business members, war will enable them to make extravagant profits either from national arms races or from war itself.

* For state office holders and investors, war will increase their power by bringing under their control seized foreign lands, markets, resources, strategic sites and/or labor pools.

The many other options available for the implementation of the national purpose, are kept from the view of the common people.

The Lot of Citizens: For ordinary civilians, acquiescence to the military program as a dictate of necessity, implies:

1. Being restricted to a primitive concept of patriotism.

2. Foregoing the variety of options available to further the nation’s goal, in exchange for an all-justifying imperative of national security.

3. Being duped into believing that the goal of the military establishment is the protection of their own freedom.

4. Actively being prevented from seeing the actual interests which the military establishment serves.

A closed circuit of thought (upon which poor men’s bodies are piled as on pyres) is thus forged. It becomes almost impossible to escape without inviting the charge of disloyalty to national cause, as a “subversive,” an “un-American,” a “counter-revolutionary,” a “terrorist,” and the like (pp. 15-16 and 37. See the present document under “The national ruling Group,” “The ruling Group—Definition”).

THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The hidden agenda of ruling group advantage which underlies and governs what is called “national security,” leads to the conclusion that the collective interests of the general population, who continually pays and dies for the implementation of the military program, are, in principle, opposed to the interests of the non-combatant leaders of this program, who are also its beneficiaries.

This may be why the recommendations of the military establishment follow so routinely the lock-step logic of the military paradigm. Its pre-supposition conceals this contradiction of interests behind a pretended communality of national defense, and turns anyone who exposes the pretense, into a violator of the “national interest.”

Note that:

* Depth: The more interiorized the military paradigm premises are, the more automatic is the acceptance of them.

* Breadth: The more widely the military paradigm premises permeate civil life, the more difficult is the rejection of its hidden agenda.

Once ensconced at the foundation of the nation’s identity and purpose, the elaborations of the military program follow in lock-step sequence – the definition of the national enemy, the labeling of him as immoral, and the preparation, through maximally destructive means, to annihilate him.

But each step prescribed by the military program, represents a choice which, when brought into the open and analyzed, reveals an abundance of other possibilities.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR: Human societies across the world increasingly reproduce themselves as military bodies, poised to destroy identified enemies reflexively. Non-military options for conquering adversaries are generally ruled out a priori. The belief persists that no alternative to mass homicide exists which will keep us safe from foreign enemies.

This mind set reflects the global structure of rule – which the military serves and protects. It is, in the language of Karl Marx (1818-1883), a “form of social consciousness” which reflects the interests of the ruling class – the need to control and exploit.

In modern times, however, military build-ups are of such magnitude and destructiveness, and they present such danger to the very citizens who pay for them, that they can no longer be justified, as traditionally, on the basis of being necessary for defense. The threat, therefore, has to be amplified.

Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense (1981-1987) admitted, in 1983:

“It’s the threat that makes the budget” (Weinberger 1983, cited pp. 39 and 64. Wikipedia 2008 “Caspar Weinberger, p. 1).

The necessary Amplification of Threat: Since the military must grow, the threats must increase. The alleged proof of proportionality between threat and military budget, is now achieved on the basis of manipulation:

1. The amplification of minor threats and the invention of new threats.

2. The claim, made without substantiation, that the counter-threat applied is also a deterrent.

3. Keeping the provocation dimension of one’s own military power, out of all calculations of degrees of threat.

No official statement of any modern national defense establishment, nor any argument in military-strategic literature, ever assesses systematically:

1. The probability of being attacked.

2. Defensive counter-measures which would be proportional to the threat.

3. The effectiveness of poised mass-kill as a deterrent (pp. 33 and 38-39).

In 1984, Lord Solly Zuckerman, chief scientific adviser first to the British Ministry of Defense (1960), and then directly to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1964-1970), and British Prime Minister Edward Heath (1970-1971), summarized the pattern of justification for “defense” weapons:

“First came the weapons, then they had to be fitted into a presumed tactical doctrine, which in turn had to be fitted into an illusory strategy, usually elaborated by armchair warriors” (Zuckerman 1983, cited pp. 39 and 64. Wikipedia 2008 “Solly Zuckerman,” p. 1).

CHOOSING THE NATIONAL ENEMY

INNUMERABLE POSSIBLE FORMS OF WAR: In a war context, the opposition is something to annihilate. The military pre-empts all wars where the opposition in non-human. Yet the historical development and ecological adaptation of the human species, have depended upon its waging wars against non-human enemies – pathogens, disease-bearing pests, civil corruption, intolerance, official lies, and the like. Some of us even wage war against war itself. The pattern of our wars underlies both our cultural and evolutionary success as a species. War of the non-military type is the immune system which has permitted the defense of and advancement of humanity’s interests on earth.

The human capacity to make war is, to the degree that it calls upon the cooperation of all humans, a species-distinctive ability upon which humanity’s survival and development depend.

The history of war probably starts with our cooperative fight for survival against large predators, and continues through cooperative weeding techniques during the agricultural revolution, to our effective coping with vermin and pestilences of all kinds, the conquest of plagues and disease, and, in modern times, the progress of hygienic practices and allopathic medicine.

Only the military format of this species-defensive function destroys all, reeking devastation on all there is. After epochs of being imposed by human ruling groups, the military pattern of destruction is now out of control – life on earth itself having become the potential object of its immolation. Life at all levels of consciousness is being liquidated at once. The military model of conquest is the historical prototype of the ecological devastation brought about by industry’s mechanical and chemical destruction of entire ecosystems.

War is an undesirable extreme to the extent that it destroys humans and human capacities.

Exceptions – Non-human Wars which kill Humans: Some non-military forms of war, such as the inquisitorial wars against perceived satanic influences, have killed humans. In these cases, as the war has developed, its characteristics have been increasingly similar to military war, where the objective is to kill humans.

The Tragedy of War: The tragedy of war, from the point of view of the value of all forms of life, is that it is always, by definition, deliberately and systematically annihilative. But what is annihilated need never be humans, or even sentient life. The most progressive war – its highest form, as English poet and artist, William Blake (1757-1827) conceived it, is the non-corporeal war of ideas (pp. 17-19 and 56. See the present document under “A new Perspective – the Self and War,” “The many Faces of truthful Selves,” “If the Enemy is non-human.” See Blake’s poem on the front cover of the present document).

what Face the Enemy?: Because war admits such polarities of possibility as to lead to the very extremes of our species health and morbidity, what we elect as our enemy is decisive for our future. Our choice determines whether our wars are tools in the service of human liberation, or tools of the most abominable sort in the service of the powerful and greedy.

As the American philosopher William James (1842-1910) argued in “The moral Equivalent of War” (reproduced in A William James Reader, edited by Gay Allan, 1971), we need not repress our martial propensity, only express it differently (James undated, cited pp. 20 and 56).

There is no constraint on what we elect.

For example:

* The Deeds/Rhetoric Dichotomy: We might concur with the oft-declared projects of the United States government to eradicate international terrorism, government waste, and violations of human rights by totalitarian regimes.

We could agree on the definition of terrorism – the killing or maiming of people (or support for these actions) which is indifferent to the legal innocence of the victims.

We would then observe that:

. Most terrorism – assassinations of civilian leaders and murders by death-squads – are perpetrated by military regimes trained and financed by the U.S. government.

. The greatest proportion of government waste occurs through the global purchase of weapons – which are unproductive. Yet the leading producer and distributor of weapons is the U.S. government.

. The U.S. government steals the wealth of “developing” countries, by exporting increasingly expensive armaments to the established ruling groups of these countries.

We would see that the practice of the U.S. government systematically contradicts its declared objective, and we would then choose a different adversary from the one it proposes.

Indeed, the national enemy is often, perhaps generally, opposite to what the economic-military program would have us believe. If humanity’s species-distinctive capacity to make war, is to be rationally directed, the primary enemy to target seems to be the military system itself (pp. 20-23, 56 and 60).

Moral Wars

EVIL: Judgment is highly distorted by what the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) called “the notable multiplying glasses” of self-interest. Such magnifiers exist in all of us.

Indeed, like Captain Ahab, in Herman Melville’s novel, Moby-Dick (1851), many of our political leaders see their identified enemy as “all evil visibly personified.”

1. Internal Contradiction in the military Approach: Evil pre-supposes a capacity to choose, of which humans but not lower forms of life are capable. Wars against bacteria must kill the bacteria. Wars against humans do not necessarily have to kill humans because humans can change their behavior.

Military and political leaders justify their use of homicidal methods on the basis of the evilness of the enemy. Yet, since humans are capable of choosing alternative modes of expression, the use of these homicidal methods is not the only possible solution, no matter how evil the enemy.

2. The non-military Approach: Wars other than military, are moral in that they seeks to expunge only the disabling pattern, not the being that bears it. They repudiate the method of mass sacrifice of human beings, and instead use methods which do not destroy but rather capacitate, enable a more full expression of human life.

It is the disabling program of which the combatant is a bearer which needs targeting, not his person. Military combatants are customarily forced to be military combatants. They are persons who are imprisoned and governed in a coercive society. The social structures within which both sides of a military war are normally constrained to act, is the proper object of annihilative attack, not the humans bound by them.

The underlying form of social coercion and destruction which involuntarily imprisons the vast majority of those at war on both sides, is indeed, precisely the military form of war itself. It is this imposed program of war and ruling group interests which are the real enemy against which some new form of war is not only morally justified, but also, at the present time, imperative for the human species.

(Moral Wars, Evil, the non-military Approach, continued)

The Distinction is not soldier/civilian or guilty/innocent: The distinction persons/patterns is deeper than the distinctions soldiers/civilians and innocent/guilty. While these distinctions reveal the falsehood of the officially-established, monolith “Enemy,” they rely on mere appearances (soldier/civilian) and personal intentions (guilty/innocent).

The distinction agent/pattern, however, reveals the social structures within which both sides of military war are normally constrained to act. It is the context of the soldier/civilian or guilty/innocent dichotomies.

The distinction persons/patterns exposes the underlying form of social rule within which the majority on both sides, are largely cogs and victims. Within this overall social rule, the distinction focuses specifically on the military program because it is used to sustain this rule. The moral target of the agent/pattern distinction is the compulsory killer game, and the various economic, political, and military beneficiaries who preside in safety over its civil imposition.

A focus on the social-structure framework within which the massacres of war occur, forces us to see that the enemy which threatens us most directly, is within our own borders, as it is in the enemy’s borders – it is the ruling military-industrial complex. The enemy to be annihilated consists of the militarist patterns which prescribe such massacres (pp. 25-29).

WAR AS AN EXPANDER, NOT AN EXTINGUISHER OF HUMAN LIFE: The choice exists for moral wars. Nations, like individuals, might, for example, elect a form of purging, educative war, governed by a principle opposite to that of military war – the abolishment of the enemy by any means except the death or subordination of human life.

Models of Wars which expand: Spiritual leaders of all major world religions have fought wars which enlighten, enrich and deepen the experience of living:

* The Rishis (c.1,000 – c.500 B.C.E.), the inspired seer-poets of the Rig-Veda. The Rig-Veda is the earliest of the four Samhitas, and consists of a collection of 1,028 hymns. The Veda (c.1,500-c.500 B.C.E.) are the oldest scriptures of Hinduism, and the most ancient religious texts in an Indo-European language (The Veda, cited pp. 32-33. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000).

* Buddha (563-483 B.C.E.), founder of Buddhism, described in the Dhammapada, as counseling an internal war against the self, instead of a conquest of others:

“If a man were to conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and another were to conquer one, himself, he indeed is the greatest conqueror” (Dhammapada, Chapter VIII, Verse 4, cited pp. 32 and 61-62).

* Lao Tzu (c.550 B.C.E.), Chinese founder of Taoism, the first known advocate of weaponless war:

“Fine weapons are instruments of evil,

Therefore those who possess Tao turn away from them.

Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,

For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.

For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral ceremonies.”

(Tao-te Ching, Translator Wing Tsit Chan. Princeton University Press, 1978. Chapter 31, p. 155. Cited pp. 32 and 62).

* Lord Krishna, one of the most popular deities in Hinduism, the eighth avatar (incarnation of Vishnu). Krishna is a main character in the Bhagavad-Gita (composed 200 B.C.E.-200 C.E.), a Sanskrit poem incorporated into the Mahabharata (one of the greatest Hindu religious classics). The poem consists of a dialogue between Lord Krishna and Prince Arjuna on the eve of the great battle of Kurukshetra – military war being an allegory for a war to the death against self-attachment (Bhagavad-Gita, cited pp. 32 and 61).

* Jesus, whose counsel toward the self was:

“And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell”

(Jesus, Sermon on the Mount, Gospel of Matthew 29:30. Cited p. 32).

* The Tibetan (Vajrayana) Buddhists (c. 750 C.E.-present) who seek Nirvana, the extinction of all attachment and ignorance.

* The Toltec Indians in the Valley of Mexico (c.900-1,250 C.E.). Previously considered an ethnic group, a nation, or an empire, the word Toltec is now recognized to be an Aztec (Empire c.1,200-1,600), or more generally a Mesoamerican mythical construct which symbolizes the high degree of civilization achieved by several post-classic Mesoamerican cultures – cultures which flourished from around 900 C.E.

The Toltecs were “women and men of knowledge” who formed a society to explore and conserve the knowledge and practices of the ancient ones. The sacred and the secular were not differentiated, since both spiritual and material energy derived from the same source.

The society was based in Teotihuacan, the ancient city of pyramids outside present-day Mexico City, known as the place were “Man becomes God.” Spiritual life focused on Awareness, Transformation (Tracking) and Intent. The objective was the attainment of personal freedom through self-knowledge and the ability to transcend ordinary human awareness. To this day, Teotihuacan remains a living repository of “silent knowledge” – knowledge which is spirit-generated, not reason-generated (Crystalinks undated, pp. 1-4).

* Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869-1948), Indian political and spiritual leader, and his satyagraha campaign of civil disobedience, expressed in non-violent resistance to what he regarded as unjust laws. Gandhi made clear his attitude toward British colonial rule:

“[It is] a fight to the finish” (Gandhi undated, cited p. 32).

War, organized annihilation of the enemy, admits of as many types of relationship with its object, as does life when it draws lines of what will and will not be allowed to exist. The lines of battle are as open to a choice that enables life, as when we fight against plagues, injustice, or self-limits (pp. 32-34).

Conclusions

THE Pervasiveness of the military paradigm: Human culture seems on the verge of defaulting to the military program as the final shared framework of empowerment and meaning. The established pattern of our social order consists of military governments controlling civilian existence.

The phenomena are everywhere. All of them are connected.

For example:

* Military threats or interventions.

* Military models of corporate management.

* Military models of marketplace competition.

* Military priorities of public expenditure.

* Military toys, arcade games, fashion designs, and school-child chants.

* Armed-forces heroes and plots on mass television, film, book, and newsprint media.

* Military organization and military content in leisure contests, spectacles and spectator sports.

* Conceptualization of religious aspiration, political conflict, social development and even bodily defense (our body’s immune system) in terms of military attacks and battles.

* Celebration of national collectivity and conscience in the symbolisms of military displays, anthems, and invocations.

* Increasing closure to alternative, non-military means of proving national strength.

* Denigration of non-military options as “weak,” “soft,” “naïve,” or “unrealistic.”

These all manifest a way of life in the world, unified by a culture of military a priorism running beneath conscious understanding and control (pp. 44-46).

Who will live and who will die?: Contesting the lines of life and death is a far more open matter than the military paradigm assumes. The nature of a nation’s self identity and its projects, what is judged to be the enemy, why, how, and by what means the annihilation of this enemy is sought – all these admit of profound, still unexplored ranges of choice.

At the present juncture of its history, the human struggle for survival is no longer against natural or foreign enemies, or even war as such, but against the military program itself (pp. 46-47 and 66).

In Totality and infinity – an essay on exteriority (1961), French ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) gives the stirring invocation:

“Morality will oppose politics in history, and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons of the beautiful, to proclaim itself unconditional and universal, when the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superimpose itself on the ontology of war” (Levinas 1969, cited pp. 46 and 67. Wikipedia 2008 “Emmanuel Levinas,” pp. 1-5).

my conclusions

BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS: We live and think in a cultural world bequeathed to us by our ancestors. And those ancestors who have given us the categories with which to think, have generally been the wealthy, privileged few. They are the ones who were literate and educated, and who had sufficient leisure time to pursue intellectual endeavors, often supported financially by royalty and its entourage, including men (usually) of knowledge. They are the ones who have written “history.”

But those of privileged status in society have never wanted the populace to even suspect that wars might be fought to maintain, consolidate and even enlarge their own power. Better that the people trust that their leaders will keep them “secure,” even if this means that these very same people will engage in the very dangerous pursuit which is war. The practice of war systematically contradicts its declared objective.

In Moral politics – how liberals and conservatives think (1996/2002), George Lakoff, professor of linguistics at the University of California, Berkeley, makes the observation that we think in terms of constellations of ideas, not individual ideas separately. Lakoff demonstrates this for the “liberal” and the “conservative” points of view. Combining the contribution of Lakoff with that of John McMurtry, one can see that it is not useful to think in terms of “left” and “right” – which are categories of thought empty of content, handed down to us by those who would rather we not think in terms of wealth. It is much more incisive to think in terms of “up” (the national ruling group) and “down” (the general population). The enemy of citizens is the constellation of political positions espoused by the ruling group to further the group’s own interests (Lakoff 1996/2002, summarized in Hall 2005, pp. 1-22).

It is also not useful to keep analyzing war according to the categories handed down to us – such as country, race, religion, political ideology, political system, national average degree of industrialization, national average socio-economic level, or size of neighbors. To do so, is to minimize the probability that correlations with war will be found. In his detailed and excellent analysis of wars and atrocities in the 20^th Century, using these criteria, Matthew White does not find any correlation (White 1999a, 1999b, 2001/2004 and 2001/2005).

The category “ruling group” is of much greater explanatory value than the commonly used categories, and as McMurtry point out, it cuts across all these usual categories. Those of privileged status in all countries, not only have interests in common which reach beyond the usual categories, but they also have a stake in keeping such categories as “wealth,” “power,” “privilege,” “decision-makers,” and “status quo” out of our conceptual framework.

Wars are fought because the powerful want to consolidate or augment their power. On a more proximate level, they are fought for things which benefit those who own the means of production, and their brethren in government, the military apparatus, and academia. In modern times, wars tend to be fought, either directly or by proxy, to grab resources which others have (often under their soil), to obtain a cheap, docile, flexible labor source, or to keep at bay (as Israel does at the present time), a cheap labor force (the Palestinians in Gaza) which would compete with their own. The interests of the privileged are at stake, not those of the common people.

All of us have aggressive instincts, even the poor farmer who on first appearance does not have anything to gain by going to war. Even the most innocent among us has anger which can be manipulated and diverted toward an enemy other than the ruling group. The soldier is an aggressor, of course. But he is also the victim of the “military paradigm” – the categories of thought handed down to us by those in power, and maintained untouched by present-day academicians and rulers, whose interest continues to be to maintain the status quo and keep the rest of us “in our place.” McMurtry exposes unequivocally the conflict of interest between the ruling group and the majority of the population.

LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS: If our level of consciousness encompassed all of humanity, or better yet, all of life on earth (with the more conscious the life, the higher its value), we could not be manipulated to kill each other or devastate the means of life.

On the average, throughout the world, however, level of consciousness is at the tribal or national level. Many areas of the world are lower – on the clan or blood kinship level. This means that, like toddlers, if we have an opposition, we want to obliterate it.

It is rare to find a life where every moment is affirmed for what it actually is. It is rare to find a conceptualization of humanity in terms of Indra’s cosmic net, laced with jewels at every intersection, each jewel reflecting all the others, including the reflections which are in all the others (Smith 1991/1994, p. 96. Columbia Encyclopedia 2000. Indra is the Buddhist god of war and thunder, celebrated for his slaying of the drought demon Vritra).

And yet, Indra’s net is a true representation of our connections as humans. We need an “other” on every level, and in turn, we reflect this other.

Our task, in order to eliminate war, is to enlarge and deepen our consciousness, so that the crime of war becomes so obvious to us, that no amount of manipulation by the ruling group can shake us from our foundation in all of humanity, indeed in all of life on earth.

A NARROW AWARENESS, NOT A PATHOLOGY: John McMurtry pathologizes war behavior. In his opinion, military war is a pathological sub-type of war, among an infinite number of sub-types of war which are normal, and often promote human evolutionary success (pp. 8, 17-18, 32 and 34).

In my opinion, a behavior as common as war, should not be pathologized. I prefer the explanation given to us by Ken Wilber, to the effect that the average level of consciousness in humanity today is able to encompass and identify with one’s own nation, but not with the whole of the human species, much less with all life on earth. Grabbing a peer’s toy is normal behavior for a four-year old. War demonstrates that most adults still function on this level with regards to national “enemies.” Spiritual leaders of all the great world religions have pointed to a higher, more encompassing self. In my opinion, the most effective way to prevent war is to help people broaden and deepen the segment of life with which they are able to identify – their level of consciousness (Wilber 2006, summarized in Hall 2006, pp. 1-26).

Lloyd deMause, psychoanalyst, and Director of the Institute for Psychohistory, New York, N.Y., also pathologizes war, attributing it to profound anger engendered by child-rearing methods (deMause 2002, summarized in Hall 2003, pp. 1-3).

This viewpoint is valid but narrower than the idea of level of consciousness. Parents who bring up their children do so within the average level of consciousness in their society. Level of consciousness encompasses all the activities of the society, including, for instance, its tolerance of minority groups (blacks, gays, welfare recipients, the mentally disturbed), system of justice (the death penalty), attitude toward reproduction (right to abortion), individual versus public priorities (right to carry a gun), and degree of authoritarianism (the need for rules to dictate behavior). Attitude toward war is formed within this web of forces.

Our bringing up obliges us to grow in level of consciousness up to the average level of the society in which we live. For instance, in the United States today, we are all obliged to reach an adolescent level of consciousness in most areas of national life. However, in relationship to other nations, we can maintain a lower level of consciousness (such as the level of a 4-year old).

On an individual basis, we can grow to higher levels of consciousness, but for this, we are on our own. Society will not help us, and, in fact, is likely to at least mock us (labeling us “naïve”) and at most kill us (as was the case for Jesus).

Both a society’s child-rearing methods and its attitude toward war are components and indicators of its average level of consciousness.

references

Unless specified otherwise, all page numbers refer to:

McMurtry, John. 1989. Understanding war – a philosophical inquiry. Canadian Papers in Peace Studies, 1988, Number 2. Toronto, ON: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens.

Specified page numbers refer to:

Columbia Encyclopedia. 2000. 6^th Edition. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University/Gale Group.

Crystalinks, undated. “Toltec.”

http://www.crystalinks.com/toltec.html. Accessed September 3, 2008.

deMause, Lloyd. 2002. The emotional life of nations. New York, N.Y.: Karnac/Other.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2003. “Historical Personalities and Violence.” October 15 (3 pages, unpublished).

Global Policy Forum, 2008. “UN Finance.” May 31.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index.htm. Updated May 31. Accessed September 6, 2008.

Hall, Francoise,

2003. “Historical Personalities and Violence.” October 15 (3 pages, unpublished).

2005. “Moral Politics – How Conservatives and Liberals think.” January 24 (22 pages, unpublished).

2006. “Integral Spirituality.” October 28 (26 pages, unpublished).

Lakoff, George. 1996/2002. Moral politics – how liberals and conservatives think. 2^nd Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2005. “Moral Politics – How Conservatives and Liberals think.” January 24 (22 pages, unpublished).

Parsi, Trita, 2007. Speech, “Israel, Iran and the United States – Treacherous Alliance.” Seattle, WA. November 2. Broadcast by Alternative Radio. Tape PART001a.

http://www.alternativeradio.org.

Shah, Anup, 2008. “World Military Spending.” Global Issues.

http://www.GlobalIssues.org/article/75. Updated March 1, 2008. Accessed September 3, 2008.

Smith, Huston. 1991/1994. The illustrated world’s religions – a guide to our wisdom traditions.” New York, N.Y.: HarperCollins/HarperSan Francisco.

White, Matthew.

1999a. “Historical Atlas of the twentieth Century – Wars of the Twentieth Century.”

http:users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-list.htm. Updated January 1999. Accessed September 6, 2008.

1999b. “Historical Atlas of the twentieth Century – Wars and Atrocities in the four Quarters of the twentieth Century.”

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-2000.htm. Updated September 1999. Accessed September 6, 2008.

2001/2004. “Historical Atlas of the twentieth Century – The 30 worst Atrocities of the 20^th Century.”

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/atrox.htm. Updated December 2004. Accessed September 6, 2008.

2001/2005. “Historical Atlas of the twentieth Century – Deaths by mass Unpleasantness – Estimated Totals for the entire 20^th Century.”

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat8.htm. Updated September 2005. Accessed September 4, 2008.

Wikipedia, 2008:

“Andrei Grechko.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated August 16, 2008. Accessed September 2. 2008.

“Arthashastra.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated September 1, 2008. Accessed September 1. 2008.

“Emmanuel Levinas.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated August 24, 2008. Accessed September 1. 2008.

“Robert McNamara.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated August 30, 2008. Accessed September 2. 2008.

“Moby-Dick.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated September 2, 2008. Accessed September 3. 2008.

“Caspar Weinberger.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated August 28, 2008. Accessed September 6. 2008.

“Solly Zuckerman.”

http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki. Updated August 31, 2008. Accessed September 3. 2008.

Webster’s new collegiate Dictionary. 1975. Springfield, MA: Merriam.

Wilber, Ken. 2006. Integral spirituality – a startling new role for religion in the modern and post-modern world. Boston, MA: Shambhala/Integral Books.

Summarized in Francoise Hall, 2006. “Integral Spirituality.” October 28 (26 pages, unpublished).

United States Bureau of the Census, 2006. “Total Mid-year Population for the World – 1950-2050.”

http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldpop.html. Updated August 24. Accessed October 11, 2006.

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