July 10, 2004

 

                                                              ENERGY TODAY

 

ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS

The collapse of ancient civilizations shows that complex societies disappear, despite the fact that their people are obviously knowledgeable enough to build impressive temples, roads and cities as well as organize themselves into far-flung empires, with communication networks and distribution systems.  Archaeologist Joseph Tainter has studied 17 civilizations which have collapsed, among which are the following:

 

Civilization                                Year of Collapse

 

1.                  Egyptian                                                                     2,300 B.C.

2.                  Harappan (Indus Valley)                                            1,500 B.C.

3.                  Minoan (Cretan, part of the Aegean civilization)       1,400 B.C.

4.                  Hittite (Asia Minor and Syria)                                    1,200 B.C.

5.                  Western Chou Empire                                                   256 B.C.

6.                  Greek                                                                             146 B.C.

7.                  Roman                                                                190 A.D.

8.                  Mayan                                                                            900 A.D.

9.                  Mesopotamian                                                               224 A.D.

10.              Chacoan (central South America)                                     ?        (pp. 33 and 36).

 

From the ecological perspective that societies are energy-processing structures, Tainter attributes the collapse of complex societies to the law of diminishing returns acting on their strategies for energy capture.  Beyond a certain level of complexity, benefits from further investments in complexity gradually diminish, eventually becoming negative.  At that point, the society becomes vulnerable to collapse.  Tainter states:

AAs a society evolves toward greater complexity, the support costs levied on each individual [rise]...  From the perceptive of the average citizen, the burden of taxes and other costs [increases] while at the local level, [benefits decrease].  The idea of being independent thus becomes more and more attractive.@

 

The society collapses from internal decomposition and/or through invasion by another society still enjoying higher rates of return on its investments in strategic leveraging (Graph 1) (pp. 34-35).   

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WESTERN CIVILIZATION

To date, Western civilization has avoided collapse, and at two critical moments in time, even sustained major surges of growth on the basis of new energy subsidies consequent to the discovery of a new energy source and a willingness together with an ability to exploit it.  The two instances are:

11.              Takeover: The takeover the Americas, Africa, India and the Pacific Islands provided Western civilization with subsidies ranging from slave labor to new sources of metal ores and timber. 

 

12.              Fossil Fuels: The discovery of fossil fuels enabled the transformation of civilization itself into a hitherto unknown form B industrialism. 

 

At the present time, however, no further energy subsidy is on the horizon and the United States is already seeing steep reductions in returns on ever greater investments in education, military hardware, information processing, scientific research, and the extraction of fossil fuels (p. 36).    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


THE WORLD

1.                  DISCOVERY OF NEW SOURCES OF PETROLEUM

Worldwide, the amount of oil discovered peaked in the 1950's (Graph 2) (p. 108).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The rate of discovery of new oil peaked in the 1960's (Graph 3) (pp. 100 and 108).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

2.                  OIL PRODUCTION

Analyzing data through the end of 1999, Richard Duncan, of the Institute on Energy and Man, projects that the peak in world oil production is likely to come in 2006 (pp. 103-104).

 

In 1998, Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrere predicted that the peak world oil production would come before 2010.  In 2000, however, Campbell revised this estimate and, agreeing with Duncan, predicted that the world peak oil production would likely come in 2006 (p. 96).

 

Campbell and Laherrere note:

AFrom an economic perspective, [the date at which] the world runs completely out of oil is... not directly relevant.  What matters is [the date at which] production begins to taper off.  After that point, prices will rise, unless demand declines commensurately@ (Graph 4) (p. 93).     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.         OIL DEMAND

a.         In the Year 2000: At present, the global consumption of conventional crude oil is 26,000,000,000 barrels a year (p. 112).

 

b.                  During the Period 2000-2030: A conservative estimate suggests that the average demand for oil during 2000-2030, will be 30,000,000,000 barrels a year (pp. 112 and 116).

 

4.                  NEW OIL FINDS

During the period 1996-2000, the amount of oil discovered plus the growth in reserve oil (due to better assessments of reservoir size), averaged 10,000,000,000 barrels a year (p. 116). 

 

5.                  DEMAND AND NEW OIL FINDS COMPARED

Comparison of oil demand and new finds (3. and 4. above), shows that the people of the world consume almost three barrels of oil for every one they find.

 

In a speech delivered in October 2000, Colin Campbell estimated that we consume four barrels for every one barrel we find (p. 95).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


4.                  YIELD PER EFFORT

Colin Campbell predicts that after the peak in world oil production, which he estimates will occur in 2006, oil yield per effort (YPE) will increase until production will become insignificant by the year 2060.  Demand for oil will overwhelm supply and as a result, world population will decrease in the next century to a level more compatible with available energy supplies (Graphs 5 and 6) (p. 30).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

THE UNITED STATES

5.                  DISCOVERY OF NEW PETROLEUM SOURCES

In the continental United States, the rate of discovery of new petroleum resources peaked in the 1930's (p. 41).

 

6.                  OIL PRODUCTION

In the continental United States, the production of petroleum resources peaked in 1970.  Production has been as follows:

1950                2,000,000,000 barrels a year

1970                4,000,000,000         A            (peak)

2000                3,000,000,000         A                   (Graph 7) (pp. 41, 71 and 73).       

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


3.                  OIL DEMAND

In 2000, oil demand in the United States was around 7,000,000,000 barrels a year (Graph 7) (p. 73).                                                           

 

4.                  YIELD PER EFFORT                                           

Yield per effort (YPE) is the ratio of total annual additions to proved oil reserves to total oil footage of exploratory drilling.  In the continental United States, the YPE (onshore and offshore), has decreased as follows:

1860-1920                   240 barrels per foot

1930's                          300       A                  (peak)

1946                             35       A

1986                             15       A

2000                        9       A

 

(Graph 8) (pp. 98 and 109).  In the Graph, the dotted line represents actual observations.  The dashed line represents the regression as a function of drilling efforts.  The solid line incorporates a number of factors in addition to drilling.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.                              COST PER WELL

In the continental United States, the cost per oil and gas well drilled has increased as follows:

1960    $250,000 per oil and gas well drilled

2000    $850,000             A                              (Graph 9) (p. 98).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

6.                  OIL IMPORTS

Until 1943, the United States was a net exporter of petroleum.  In 2000, the country imported more than half the petroleum products it consumed B  4,000,000,000 barrels a year (Graph 7) (pp. 40 and 73).

 

7.                  THE PRICE OF IMPORTED OIL

The price per barrel of imported oil has increased dramatically:

1973 (before the Egypt-Israeli war)                              $3 per barrel

1973 (after the OPEC embargo)                                 $12       A

1979 (after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war)          $30       A

1986 (after Saudi Arabia flooded the markets)          $10       A

2000 (after OPEC honored its production quotas)     $35       A

2004                                                                            $25       A

 

(pp. 72-74, 84 and Hutson).

 

8.                  ENERGY PROFIT FOR OIL

Domestic Oil: The ratio energy recovered over energy invested (EROEI) measures the units of energy returned for every unit of energy invested in exploration, drilling, the building of drill rigs, transportation, the housing of production workers, etc...  (pp. 97-98 and 109).

 

The most significant trend in the U.S. oil industry has been the decline in the amount of energy recovered compared to the energy expended to explore for, drill for, and produce oil from wells.  The ratio has decreased as follows:

1916                                        28:1

1985                                        2:1 (continental U.S.)

1995                                 11:1 (Alaska oil)         

1997                                  less than 2:1 (continental U.S.)

2005 (projected)         less than 1:1 (continental U.S.)

 

That is, by 2005, on the average, more energy will be expended to produce oil than the oil will produce in energy (pp. 97-98 and 153).

 

Imported Oil: For imported oil, the EROEI has decreased as follows:

Before 1950    100:1

1950-1970         40:1

1995                  10:1 (Between 8.4 and 11.1, depending on the source) (pp. 124-125).        


 

 

 

 

 

 

THE UNITED STATES B OPTIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY.

 

Natural Gas:

Natural gas well productivity has decreased as follows:

1971    435,000 cubic feet per day per well (U.S.=s peak well productivity)

2000    150,000                      A                     (Graph 10) (p. 128).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Coal:

The energy profit ratio of coal is falling, as follows:

1954                                       177   :1

1977                                         98   :1 (Counting only the fuel used at the mine).

  20   :1 (Counting not only the fuel used at the mine   but also the energy used to build the                machines for mining, for moving the coal       away from the mines, and for processing         the coal).

1995 (Wyoming)                       11   :1  

                        2040 (projected)                          0.5:1 (Coal having ceased to serve as a useful                                   energy source) (pp. 131 and 153).

 

Oil Shale:

Shale is a misnomer used to facilitate the sale of venture shares.  The rock is organic marlstone which does not contain oil but rather a solid organic material called kerogen.  Processing and auxiliary support facilities require large amounts of fresh water B an endangered resource intrinsically more precious than oil (p. 111).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nuclear Power:

a.                   Fast-breeder Reactors: Fast-breeder reactors produce plutonium, one of the most poisonous materials known and a material used to make nuclear weapons.  Plutonium-239 has a half-life of 24,000 years.

 

b.                  Conventional Reactors: Conventional reactors usually use uranium which exists in finite quantities and is radioactive.  Uranium-238 has a half-life of 2.4 billion years.  The U.S. currently possesses enough uranium to fuel its 103 presently operating nuclear reactors for the next 40 years.  Much of the energy needed to mine uranium currently comes from oil.

 

c.                   MOX Reactors: Nuclear reactor spent fuel can be reprocessed into a form known as MOX (mixed oxide) which consists of a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides.  This reprocessed MOX fuel can then be used to replace conventional uranium fuel in power plants.  However, the two MOX plants that have been built (one in the UK, the other in France) have turned out to be environmental and financial nightmares.

 

d.                  Nuclear Wastes: Direct wastes include about 1,000 metric tons of high- and low-level waste per plant per year, posing a hazard for tens of thousands of years.  Uranium mill tailings, also radioactive, can amount to 100,000 metric tons per nuclear power plant per year.

 

e.                   Not for Transportation or Agriculture: Nuclear power is best suited to produce electricity and is not well suited to the powering of our current transportation and agriculture infrastructure (pp. 133-135, 137 and Encyclopedia).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

Wind:

f.                   A Mammoth Undertaking: Total energy usage in the U.S., in British thermal units (BTU), has risen as follows:

1950      35 quadrillion BTU

2000    100            A              (pp. 134 and 140).

 

To produce 18 quadrillion BTU of wind power by 2030, would require the installation of 500,000 state-of-the art turbines B about 20,000 per year starting in 2005.  This is five times the present world production capacity for turbines.

 

b.                  Not for Transportation or Agriculture: Wind power is best suited to produce electricity and is not well suited to the powering of our current transportation and agriculture infrastructure (pp. 141-142).

 

Solar Power:

a.                   Potential: Optimistic assessments of silicon-crystal cells suggest a current net energy return of about 10:1.   At some point, therefore, the net energy available from photovoltaic (PV) electricity will overtake the EROEI of petroleum as the latter is depleted.

 

b.                  Not for Transportation or Agriculture: As in the case of nuclear power and wind, solar photovoltaic technology is best suited to produce electricity and is not well suited to powering our current transportation and agriculture infrastructure (pp. 145-146).

 

Hydroelectricity:

a.                   No New Large Dams: The building of new large hydroelectric dams in the U.S. is not an option.  Hydro resources are largely developed and there is little room to increase them.  Not one large dam has been approved in the past decade.

 

b.                  Not Many Small Dams: The small scale, local production of electricity from rivers and streams relies on fresh water B itself an endangered resource (p. 150). 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

Geothermal Power:

Not a Renewable Resource: Geothermal electricity production may not be a renewable energy source.  As underground steam or hot water is used to turn turbines, it is gradually depleted.  For most geothermal fields, the period in which depletion reaches the point where the resource is no longer commercially useful is in the range of 40-100 years.

 

Not much Hope: The U.S. currently has 44 percent of the world=s developed geothermal electric capacity, but the geothermal industry is stagnant (p. 151).

 

Tides and Waves:

Tides: The U.S. does not have an optimal site for tidal power. 

 

Waves: Wave energy is unlikely to provide more than limited power in the foreseeable future (p. 154).

 

Biomass, Bio-diesel and Ethanol:

Biomass: The term biomass refers to plant material and includes wood, animal waste, seaweed, peat, agricultural waste (such as sugar cane and corn stalks), and garbage.  It is doubtful that there is much growth potential for total energy from biomass.

 

Bio-diesel: At present, the production of vegetable oil for use as a fuel is usually a net energy loser.  Extraction of oil from algae, however, could be several times more productive than that from palms and coconuts.  If further research on algae oil continues to yield promising results, it is possible that a favorable net-energy production could be achieved.

 

Ethanol: The EROEI of ethanol is between 0.59:1 and 1.3:1 B meaning that the amount of energy recovered from ethanol is very close to the amount invested to produce it.  If the entire U.S. automotive fleet were to run on pure ethanol, nearly all of the continental U.S. would be required in order to grow the feedstock B leaving no land to either feed or house the population (pp. 154-157). 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

THE U.S. B ALTERNATIVES FOR ENERGY TRANSPORTATION

Fuel cells store energy and make it available for convenient use.

 

Hydrogen:

Not a Fuel: The process of hydrogen production always uses more energy than the resulting hydrogen yields.  Hydrogen is thus not an energy source, but an energy carrier.

 

Must be manufactured: There are no exploitable underground reservoirs of hydrogen.  It must be either extracted from water through electrolysis or manufactured from hydrocarbon sources, such as natural gas or coal. 

 

A Mammoth Undertaking: A hydrogen energy infrastructure would be quite different from our present energy infrastructure.  Transition would require time and the investment of large amounts of money and energy.  If we wait for price signals from the market to trigger the transition, it will come far too late.

 

Must be Abootsrapped@ with Hydrocarbons: At present, there is not enough net energy available from renewable sources to get the process of developing a hydrogen energy infrastructure started without a hydrocarbon source, and at the same time support a viable economy.  Faced with a crisis, decision makers will find it difficult to justify diverting natural gas supplies away from immediate survival needs.  The future may well hold hydrogen fuel cell-power cars, but not in numbers approaching the current fleet (pp. 146 and 148).

 

The Regenesys Fuel Cell: The Regenesys regenerative electrochemical fuel cell uses two electrolyte salt solutions to store energy and may in the future eliminate the daily variations in electricity generation produced by wind or solar power.  Peak electricity generation which momentarily exceeds demand, could be used to produce hydrogen (pp. 141 and 147).  

 

The Zinc-air Fuel Cell: This cell uses a solid fuel and has the potential of being much cheaper to make than the hydrogen fuel cell (p. 147). 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

Needed: An Additional Level of Democracy

George W. Bush (2002):

AWe need an energy bill that encourages consumption@ (p. 167)

 

Such irresponsibility and criminal negligence shows that the present level of democracy in the United States, is insufficient to control leaders= short-sightedness, greed and occasional diabolical megalomania.

 

I suggest an increment in the level of democracy.  After finishing their term of office, leaders would be punished for any campaign promise broken.  In the event of having led the people of the United States into a war, the punishment would automatically be imprisonment for life.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

                                                                     References

 

All page numbers refer to:

Heinberg, Richard, The Party=s Over B Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (New Society, Gabriola Island, BC, Canada), 2003.

 

Heinberg=s principal references are as follows:

Campbell, C. J.

The Coming Oil Crisis (Multi-science and Petro-consultant), 1997.

 

APeak Oil B An Outlook on Crude Oil Depletion@ [online], Speech, October 2000.  <www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/p0005.htm>.

 

Campbell, C. J. and Jean Laherrere, AThe End of Cheap Oil?@, Scientific American, March 1998, archived online at <http://dieoff.org/page140.htm>.

 

Duncan, Richard, ADuncan=s World Oil Forecast #5,@ Report to the Geological Society of America, Summit 2000, Pardee Keynote Symposia, Reno, November 13, 2000.  (The data account for more than 98 percent of the world=s oil production).

 

Odum, Howard, Environmental Accounting, AEmergy@ and Decision-making (Wiley, New York, N.Y.), 1996.

 

Tainter, Joseph

The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge University, Cambridge, England), 1998.

 

AComplexity, Problem Solving and Sustainable Societies,@ in Robert Costanza et al, Eds, Getting down to Earth B Practical Applications of Ecological Economics (online), (Island Press), 1996. <http://dieoff.com/page134.htm>.

 

United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, Washington, D.C.

 

Youngquist, Walter, Geodestinies B The Inevitable Control of Earth Resources over Nations and Individuals (National), 1997.  (Complex Research Center, University of New Hampshire).

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Where stated, references are to the following:

Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th Edition (Columbia University/Gale Group, New York, N.Y.), 2000.

 

Hutson, Don, financial consultant, Merrill-Lynch, Minneapolis, MN, telephone conversation, 07/09/04.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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